CONCEPT
RISK. Risk is the chance of hazard or bad consequences. Hazards are unfavorable conditions of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available) factors with the potential to cause losses and mission degradation from enemy action and accidents. In recent wars, the risk of losses from accident hazards was higher than from enemy hazards. This is reflected in our doctrine which states that "Historically, more casualties occur in combat due to accidents than from enemy action," FM 25-101, Battle-Focused Training.

FRICTION AND CHANCE. Whether or not a hazard will actually result in loss or mission degradation, and how severe the effect will be, is largely a matter of chance. Uncertainty, generated by the chance nature of hazards, has long been recognized as a primary element of all operations. Clausewitz advanced the concept of "friction" in which "Countless minor incidents... combine to lower the general level of performance...(and) bring about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance...."1
These friction incidents in which hazards result in losses or mission degradation involve human error, materiel failure and/or inadequate precautions for environmental factors. Human error is by far the largest cause of these incidents. For example, of all Army accidents, 80 percent are caused by human error, with environmental factors accounting for 15 percent and materiel failure, 5 percent. Clausewitz clearly saw the role of human error in the friction of war: "The military machine...is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential of friction...(and) the least important of whom may chance to delay things or somehow make them go wrong."2
I
am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemy's designs.3--Pericles,
432BC |
HAZARD REASONS. The results of hazards may be governed by chance, but what is certain are the reasons that allow hazards to become a risk to the force. These reasons are shortcomings in support, standards, training, leadership and unit self discipline.
Shortcomings in:
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HAZARD CONTROL AND RESIDUAL RISK. Risk to the force due to enemy and accident hazards must be identified and controlled. The remaining risk (residual risk) is what commanders, leaders and soldiers must decide to accept/not accept before performing any task or mission. The decision must be based on whether or not potential benefits outweigh potential costs.
The potential cost of high risk missions can be significantly reduced by effective identification and control of hazards. For example, training at the three maneuver combat training centers (CTCs) is the toughest, most wartime-realistic training conducted by the Army. However, it is safer than unit training at home station because it is highly structured, thoroughly planned and closely supervised by observer/controllers (O/Cs). An example from Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM shows that soldiers were less likely to be killed in real-world operations than they are in off-duty activities at home station. This is because normal off-duty activities, including the biggest killer of soldiers (driving their privately owned vehicle), simply were not done while deployed in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The hazard was not just controlled, it was eliminated.

RISK MANAGEMENT. The process of identifying and controlling hazards to the point that potential benefits outweigh potential costs is risk management. It is "...the Army's principle risk-reduction process to protect the force...it allows us to operate successfully in high risk environments." Chief of Staff, Army, July 1995.






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