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Chapter Three

Operations (cont)

PSYOP Radio Shows as Information Operations

PSYOP teams in MND-N, operating out of base camps, successfully used local radio shows as a medium to conduct information operations during Operation JOINT GUARD (OJG) to reinforce Information Campaign themes and to provide the SFOR position on developing events. The Information Operations Field Support Team OIC, who oversees the actions of the IO Battle Staff, which includes PSYOP, is responsible for Information Campaign themes, of which PSYOP themes are a part.

During OJG, a "network" of 43 local radio stations within the MND-N Area of Operations disseminated information, in the form of SFOR and TFE press releases, and PSYOP messages. The network covered most of the AO and included stations that were marketed toward each of the three entities. Many of the stations in the affiliate network provided this service at no cost to TFE and were receptive to reading the PSYOP-scripted messages, playing the pre-recorded music tapes with Euro-pop, or using the press releases provided by the PSYOP Task Force (POTF). Some stations, mostly in the Republika Serpska, had to be induced into playing the tapes and scripts with payments of about 9 DM per minute.

The Brigade PSYOP Support Elements (BPSEs) assigned to support Battalion Task Forces in the Base Camps distributed to the indigenous radio stations pre-taped shows (known as "Mir-Mix tapes") consisting of popular European pop music, interspersed with messages supporting Information Campaign themes and explaining the SFOR mission and desired end state. Most radio stations in the AOR were willing to play the pre-recorded shows as the taped shows contained newer and more popular music than they themselves could obtain. Some stations required financial inducement to play the pre-recorded shows. During OJF, Mir-Mix tapes were also distributed to local cafes to be played out loud during business hours.

The PSYOP staff officer arranged radio interviews with local radio stations for Battalion Task Force Commanders, XOs, and other officials. These interviews were both live and recorded for airing at a later time. Before the interview would take place, the PSYOP staff officer would obtain the questions the interviewer would ask, and would suggest issues important to the success of the SFOR mission that the commander would like to talk about. The PSYOP element would prepare answers to the questions provided and get the JAG and PAO staff officers to review the questions and answers to ensure synchronization. The commander could then review the question/answer report and use it as a preparatory tool before the interview, or as a crutch during the interview. This technique, while effective, was intensely time-consuming to prepare and execute and should, therefore, be balanced with other aspects of the information campaign. The radio stations were paid for conducting the interview after the show aired to ensure that the interviewer would not stray too far from the original plan or attempt to pursue a emotionally charged or politically loaded line of questioning.

Another technique using local stations was to ensure that official press releases, which discussed events, policies, or programs which reinforced PSYOP themes, were translated and provided to the local stations for broadcast. These press releases served as scripts for the local broadcasters who relied heavily on external news sources. The local populace then heard a recognized local newscaster giving the SFOR press releases and thus supporting SFOR PSYOP themes. The advantage of this technique is that the radio-listening public is more likely to lend credence to the report when it is presented by a local radio personality. The PSYOP team monitored the radio broadcast, either on-site at the studio, by listening to the broadcast, or by tasking other elements to monitor the broadcast, to ensure that the intended message is getting out to the listening public.

Local radio shows are an effective medium for conducting information operations aimed at the local population. Both interviews of military leaders and pre-recorded programming can support Information Campaign and PSYOP themes in a convincing and effective manner.

Radio PSYOP Supports Information Operations Campaign

During OJG, SFOR PSYOP expanded its reach into the arena of non-military information systems by building a commercial-style radio station, Radio Mir, to broadcast popular music and live shows with PSYOP themes interspersed within them.

The Military Information Environment (MIE) includes several Nonmilitary Information Systems including commercial and government-run news media.(35)In combat conditions, PSYOP has the capability to broadcast on adversary frequencies.(36)In Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), such as the Peace Enforcement operations in Bosnia, these products are subtler than the combat products designed to weaken the enemy's morale and induce him to surrender. Successful PSYOP in MOOTW "are based on projection of truth and credible message.[that serve to discredit] adversary propaganda or misinformation against the operations of U.S./coalition forces [which] is critical to maintaining favorable public opinion."(37)Although U.S. Forces did not face an "enemy" in Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD, the FWFs did spread propaganda that was counter to SFOR's objectives and interests.(38)

During initial operations early in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, TPTs established the technique of using local host-nation stations to air live broadcasts of interviews with PSYOP soldiers.(39)Task Force Eagle PSYOP radio operations included using civilian commercial radio stations to air pre-recorded music programs that contained "commercials" in between popular music songs that reinforced PSYOP themes. One risk with this approach was, given these radio stations were outside military control, they could, potentially, broadcast propaganda masquerading as "news" that could counter the PSYOP messages.

To achieve more control over the medium, one of the Brigade PSYOP Support Elements (BPSE) established an FM radio station, Radio Mir, in the ZOS near Brcko at Camp McGovern to provide a radio platform under SFOR control that would provide the listening public on both sides of the ZOS a credible and unbiased source of information. Mir stands for Military Information Radio and is the Serbo-Croatian word for Peace. Radio Mir consisted of an FM transmitting tower and equipment belonging to the JPOTF (Joint PSYOP Task Force), supplemented with civilian sound equipment housed in a wooden building constructed by Brown and Root Services Company, and sound-proofed with locally-purchased materials. The 1st Infantry Division purchased civilian sound-mixing equipment and sound-proofing materials and coordinated with Brown and Root to construct the facility.

Before the new station was built, the BPSE had only been able to transmit pre-recorded shows on the transmitter and lacked any facility from which to broadcast live, or to record interviews or programs involving local leaders and civilians. The new facility allowed the BPSE to conduct live broadcasting to include call-in shows, and to coordinate, prepare, and subsequently transmit shows recorded in-house.(40)

Initially, Radio Mir only broadcasted pre-recorded shows sent from the JPOTF (known as the Coalition Joint Information Campaign Task Force or CJCICTF) in Sarajevo, but planned to air live interviews with SFOR and local civilian leaders, and call-in shows for young people to discuss peace. Initial operations were designed to build a listening audience by broadcasting primarily popular music. Having a radio station under direct military-control expanded the relationship built up between the BPSE and local radio journalists and broadcasters and added a new dimension to the BPSE's capability to produce shows that would appeal to all of the entities within the station's broadcasting radius.

Radio Mir's location on the ZOS made it accessible to journalists and broadcasters from all sides. Local broadcasters on hand for the grand opening were duly impressed with Radio Mir's technological capabilities and were already discussing ideas with the BPSE about what could be done in cooperation with the station. The BPSE Commander's concept for the station was to involve the local populations as much as possible and have them reinforce the PSYOP themes in their own words. Programming on Radio Mir included:

• Current news five times a day.
• "Classic" rock and roll, "Top 40" hits, Rhythm and Blues, local area music, Eurohits.
• Interviews with SFOR commanders and the Office of the High Representative.
• Broadcast talk shows with guest radio station personalities from local stations.

TTP: U.S. and Coalition Forces can expand their reach into the non-military INFOSYS of commercial radio by creating their own commercial-style FM radio stations equipped with the latest in broadcasting and sound-mixing technology. This expanded access can strengthen PSYOP within the station's broadcasting radius and improve the public perception of the U.S. and Coalition Force and its objectives.

BPSE Commander and Interpreter at Opening of Radio Mir

Airborne PSYOP in Bosnia - Commando Solo

A multi-purpose asset capable of conducting both PSYOP and EW, the EC-130E, Commando Solo, is an airborne platform "primarily designed for PSYOP."(41)Commando Solo can conduct psychological broadcast missions in the standard AM, FM, HF, TV and military communications bands. Missions in Bosnia were flown at maximum altitudes possible to ensure optimum propagation patterns. Highly specialized modifications had been made to the latest version of the EC-130E. These included enhanced navigation systems, self-protection equipment, and the capability of broadcasting color television on a multitude of worldwide standards throughout the TV VHF/UHF ranges.

Three Air National Guard EC130E Commando Solo aircraft were deployed from the 193rd Special Operations Wing in Harrisburg, PA, to a base in Italy, an hour flight across the Adriatic Sea from Sarajevo. This was a direct response to persistent hostile Bosnian-Serb radio and television propaganda from the Karadzic faction. This same wing flew missions into Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY to broadcast messages under the call sign of Radio Democracy on one AM band and three FM bands.(42)

Operating from Brindisi, Italy, the Commando Solo EC-130Es were equipped with high-power transmitters for TV, AM, and FM radio broadcasting. The plane's EW capabilities also allowed it to operate as a jamming device. In this mode, Commando Solo had the potential to jam Bosnian-Serb hard-liners' television and radio broadcasts or simply overpower their signal and replace propaganda with PSYOP programs. When used to broadcast programming over the adversary signal, the aircraft is performing a PSYOP function. The aircraft executed three test flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina in September, testing radio broadcasting equipment as a non-violent "show of force" by SFOR.

The show of force was in response to inflammatory anti-NATO and anti-SFOR propaganda broadcasted by Serbian Radio Television (SRT). SFOR had forcibly secured SRT transmitter towers in September 1997, returning them to SRT control after securing written assurances that the propaganda would stop, that more even-handed reporting would follow, and that international programming on the progress of the peace operation would be aired. The SFOR commander warned that failure to follow through on these promises would result in decisive action by SFOR.(43)Commando Solo gave SFOR the non-lethal means of quickly neutralizing SRT transmissions in the case of non-compliance. The Commando Solo successfully relayed broadcast programs from the SFOR radio station "MIR" (Peace) without disruptions.

In mid-October, unidentified elements inside the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Serpska or RS) sabotaged television transmitters, taking the legal government's programming off the air in much of the eastern part of the RS. The pro-Karadzic faction resorted to propaganda to claim that the lack of normal programming was due to the "illegal" actions of the Stabilization Force. Shortly afterwards, SFOR used Commando Solo in a live mission to transmit on a frequency normally used by Bosnian Serb TV, actively countering the adversary propaganda by explaining that the absence of normal programming was due to the actions of the Bosnian-Serb leadership.

Airborne PSYOP - Leaflet Operations

The MC-130E Talon aircraft is equipped for leaflet-drop PSYOP missions.(44)Aerial leaflet operations in Bosnia, however, were conducted primarily by helicopter aviation. During the October 1997 operations centering on curbing Bosnian-Serb broadcast propaganda, TFE launched a parallel, supporting information campaign to the SFOR program to counter the Serb broadcasts. The division commander appeared on local television outlets, both in person and by videotape to counter the anti-NATO and anti-SFOR broadcasts. However, as much of eastern Bosnia was outside the range of these television stations, leaflet operations presented a means to ensure broader coverage. Air distributed leaflets were a medium of communication that could reach this audience. PSYOP personnel prepared the leaflets with organic assets.

The leaflets were written in a tone meant to educate, rather than inflame passions. These products stressed such themes as the role of officials in a democratic society, especially the role of police as enforcers of the law rather than political police. Other leaflets presented the facts concerning international aid and the enforcement of the GFAP.

These leaflets were distributed from helicopters over key cities and towns in the American-led peace enforcement zone in northeastern Bosnia and adjoining areas. This included every major Serb-held area in northern Bosnia where anti-NATO and the state-run media broadcast attacks on the GFAP. About 43,000 leaflets were distributed from the air and by soldiers on the ground. The leaflets presented information about democracy and responsible government, quoting democratic thinkers including such icons as Thomas Jefferson, John Locke, Plato and others.(45)

On 16 October 1997, TFE delivered by air, over the city of Brcko, leaflets which urged the inhabitants not to vote for Karadzic and his supporters, noting that the unequal distribution of funds from the international community (IC) was due to the recalcitrance of the Karadzic faction to back the DPA.(46)Later that month, U.S. helicopters dropped leaflets on the city of Bijeljina, in the RS, in preparation for the November municipal elections. These leaflets supported the Plavsic regime in Banja Luka.(47)

Leaflets represented a very small fraction of the printed PSYOP products used in Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR/GUARD as other, more effective print media were available to disseminate PSYOP messages. These other printed media included comic books, magazines, newspapers, and posters. Air-dropped leaflets in Bosnia achieved mixed results. Some citizens complained about their towns being "polluted" and having to clean up the litter after the air-drop operation, ridiculed the grammatical errors, and were insulted that such a technique was used.(48)The Bosnian population during Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD was media-savvy and consumed information from established media sources with predictable regularity. Accordingly, airborne leaflet drops were not deemed profitable, and leaflet operations were suspended after the conclusion of OJG.

PSYOP Print Operations(49)

The IFOR Coalition Joint Information Campaign Task Force (CJICTF), supporting the peace operation in Bosnia, arguably produced more diverse printed products than any other mission to date. They produced newspapers, newspaper articles, handbills, posters, magazines, comic-books, and flyers for both the military and civilian implementers of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The CJICTF employed both organic and local print production facilities and both organic and non-organic assets for disseminating them.

Early in the peace operation, the CJICTF prepared, produced, and distributed a newspaper called The Herald of Peace. This weekly paper was developed as a means of informing the population of Bosnia about the roles of IFOR and the civilian agencies and some of the particularly sensitive articles in the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). The articles were written by members of the CJICTF Product Development Center (PDC), subject matter experts from IFOR, or were taken from open-source news articles. The paper, each edition of which numbered 150,000 copies, was initially published in Stuttgart, Germany, later in Zagreb, Croatia, and finally in Sarajevo, BiH. (50)

When they were published in Germany and Croatia, IFOR air assets transported them to Sarajevo, where they were distributed throughout the country. One of the non-organic assets used for distribution and dissemination was that the CJICTF made a contract with a local publisher to transport about 50,000 copies to kiosks, located throughout the Federation. Before the situation stabilized, members of the CJICTF "escorted" a local commercial printer's transport vehicles through the confrontation lines around Sarajevo to Kiseljak; from there, the trucks were able to travel safely to their destinations. The remaining 100,000 copies were disseminated by traditional methods where Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPT) conducted face-to-face distribution. The CJICTF published this newspaper for about 16 months, when it was replaced by a monthly magazine named the Herald of Progress. Both of these periodicals proved to be popular and effective organs for information, primarily targeting the adult audiences in both entities, while serving the needs of the military and civilian administrators of the GFAP.

The Herald of Progress (HOP) was a dramatic departure from former, traditional PSYOP print journalistic endeavors. It was a "Madison Avenue-quality" monthly journal with pertinent articles, color photos, and political cartoons and commentaries. Additionally, the CJICTF decided to diminish the divisive nature of language by publishing articles in both Latinic and Cyrillic alphabet. (51)The HOP editor and the PDC Chief chose to experiment with combining articles in both alphabets in one edition. Use of this format more than doubled the number of articles that could be produced in a single edition.(52)Except for several negative comments from hard-line Croats, who refused to accept any publication in Cyrillic, this format received positive comments from all Bosnians: Moslem, Croat, and Serb alike. Many people who responded to a survey could not immediately recognize a different format, since they all read both Latinic and Cyrillic equally well. The market segment or target audience of the HOP was the adult audience.

The German OpInfo Battalion, assigned to the CJICTF, decided to "market" or target their magazine, Mirko, to teenagers. This periodical was one of the most popular and successful PSYOP products. The five-man German team in Sarajevo developed concepts and aligned each edition to support selected PSYOP campaign objectives. This method reinforced PSYOP messages to the whole Bosnian population. Mirko served as an excellent vehicle for opening a dialogue between TPTs and local adults through their children. Surveys indicated that adults enjoyed the magazine as well.

One of the most interesting and potentially far-sighted products was a "Superman" comic book, published by DC Comics. This comic book, conceptualized and supervised by CJICTF officers and linguists, showed Superman assisting several Bosnian children out of a minefield near their home. The product was lauded by the Mine Action Center (MAC) for being one of the most effective products they could use to educate children about the dangers of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). UN representatives indicated their interest in using the comic book in other MAC-sponsored mine awareness initiatives, hoping to translate the product for other countries rife with minefields, also.

The CJICTF also produced millions of copies of fliers, brochures, handbills, and posters, the majority of which served to inform the local population about some aspect of the GFAP or a specific situation, such as voter registration, elections, freedom of movement, and responsible activities in a democratic society. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) testified that the CJICTF's print efforts were singularly and clearly responsible for successes in their areas.

The dissemination method that held the greatest potential for future positive PSYOP distribution was an initiative where the CJICTF had articles and advertisements printed in local newspapers and magazines. Many influential local news organizations agreed to print PSYOP products as a form of "public service announcement." The CJICTF paid for these advertisements, as would any other credible journalistic or advertising agency. This offered the potential for continued relationships when the military force inevitably draws down and a leaner PSYOP force remains in country.

The CJICTF deployed an organic Modular Print System (MPS) from home station as a primary print shop for most handouts and pamphlets. It was used to publish several editions of the Herald of Peace newspaper until contracts could be assured in Bosnia. Not counting the millions of copies of products produced for IFOR and SFOR, the MPS printed about 12 million copies of products for the civilian implementers of GFAP by mid 1997.

The print medium, when properly used and presented, offered the CJICTF a viable and important means of disseminating messages to the population of Bosnia. Print remains an essential medium, but it must be tailored to the audience. The media-sophisticated audience in Bosnia presented challenges that required updated technology and flexible thinking for the CJICTF.

Tactical PSYOP Team soldier posting printed product concerning the Brcko Arbitration.

Physical Destruction

In combat operations, the commander accomplishes the mission through the application of lethal combat power in combined arms operations. He uses IO to disrupt or destroy enemy information systems, primarily through EW and physical destruction.(53)Physical destruction is the most effective means for denying the enemy use of his C2systems and achieving an information advantage in the application of force.(54)In peace operations, the principle of restraint and the neutrality of the peace operations force mean that the lethal application of combat power is rarely the means to mission accomplishment.

Of the five elements of C2W listed in Chapter 1, physical destruction (PD) may seem outside acceptable constructs for use in a peace operation where lethal force is used only as a last resort. However, physical destruction is "the application of combat power to destroy or neutralize enemy forces and installations."(55)It is primarily in the neutralization of adversary C2functions and processes that physical destruction is manifested in peace operations. "One can 'target' a (C2)] system without designating it for actual destruction," effective C2W aims to defeat the adversary C2system, "whether by physical destruction or effective nullification."(56)The destruction of a target means that the adversary capability is degraded or shut down, either permanently, or for a specified period of time.(57)Three elements of combat power, namely maneuver, firepower and protection, are applied to achieve PD effects.

Although SFOR did not physically destroy any of the FWFs' ability to command and control their elements, IO were aimed at influencing their C2decisionmakers. In Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD, C2W also aimed at co-opting the FWFs' C2apparatus to facilitate their compliance with the Dayton Peace Accord and to monitor that compliance as well.(58)FWF C2facilities were targeted for destruction during early NATO air operations supporting UNPROFOR in autumn 1995, known as Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, during which there were 3,515 sorties against Bosnian Serb military positions. This NATO air campaign is credited for having pushed the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table at Dayton Ohio.(59)During the siege of Sarajevo, the combination of attacks by NATO aircraft delivering precision air strikes against Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) positions, and an attack with 13 Tomahawk land attack missiles against VRS C2facilities, disrupted VRS C2systems and achieved the termination of the bombardment of Sarajevo and convinced Serb troops to remove their heavy weapons.(60)

PD operations in peace operations focus on the neutralization of adversary capabilities. In determining whether or not PD operations apply, the IO planner must identify the adversary's means to affect the situation, and then target those means for neutralization. Tactics employed to neutralize the adversary's ability to affect the situation or exercise command and control include:

• Occupying or controlling access to facilities used by the adversary for C3and early warning;
• Shutting down power sources for C3and early warning systems;
• Delaying groups or individuals of the adversary's support base attempting to mass;
• Arresting or detaining key individuals and instigators of the adversary support base to prevent them from fomenting disturbance at "hot spots."

Physical occupation of, or controlling access to, adversary C3and early warning facilities is a means of temporarily denying the adversary use of those capabilities. If the peace operation force cannot occupy the facility or control access to it, cutting off its power may provide a less-intrusive means of temporarily depriving the adversary use of the facility's functions. Examples of C3and early warning facilities that could possibly be targeted for PD include: TV and radio transmitting towers and stations, police stations, air raid sirens, and radio frequencies used to transmit radio or telephone communications.

The adversary may attempt to counter physical destruction operations which use maneuver forces to physically occupy facilities by conducting demonstrations of massed angry crowds. If the adversary attempts this option, alternatives to the use of deadly force include control measures such as pre-planned or improvised roadblocks, cordons, and checkpoints; warnings; and demonstrations or shows of force.(61)Delaying the movement of adversary supporters through the use of checkpoints and road blocks denies the adversary the ability to mass. Typically, demonstrations carried out in Bosnia by the FWFs involved busing in crowds of supporters from outlying towns and villages to achieve mass. The demonstrators sought to dominate the situation by stretching the peace operations force and forcing them to spread their forces thinly as they attempted to monitor and control the situation. Road blocks need not be formal, and ruses may be used to send the inbound mobs on detour after detour.

Crowds need leaders and instigators to be set into action. Detaining key leaders and instigators before the crowd assembles removes the volatile agent from the combustible mix. If the crowd has already assembled, it may be possible to remove instigators and agitators attempting to ignite the crowd into action.

Chapter Three, Operations, Part 1

Chapter Three, Part 3