Military

4. If any changes to the scheme are made:

5. Brigades often experience spans of time when a particular fire support asset is not used (or in the case of CAS, diverted) due to deviation from the original plan. If the task force FSO has a plan for these assets that supports the task force scheme of maneuver, often the brigade will re-allocate assets to the task force.

6. The FA battalion must be able to provide the fire support that maneuver forces require. This means the battalion must plan for repositioning. Coordination of real estate requirements with the supported maneuver unit is a continuous process.

7. Brigades must better integrate the use of CAS and artillery fires to set the conditions for success on maneuver objectives. This is accomplished with an effective observation plan and scheme of fires specifically focused on destroying the motorized rifle platoon (MRP) at the point of penetration.

8. Suppression and obscuration fires facilitate the positioning of the support-by-fire (SBF) force and fires to support the breach, followed by fires to support the assault of the objective. These fires must be event-driven versus time-driven (i.e., the support force commander lifts smoke/suppressive fires when he is ready to begin his mission in the support-by-fire position). Suppression and obscuration fires must be defined in terms of specific areas and duration.

9. CAS employment must be wargamed during the planning process to ensure proper focus. This must include use of ACAs and SEAD. ALOs must be involved in this process.

10. Task force staffs must improve clarity and specificity for priority of fires and triggers to shift priority of fires. This must be articulated in a clear, detailed concept of fires.

11. During COA development and wargaming, staffs must consider smoke and suppressive fires to help set favorable conditions in the close operation.

12. The commander must clearly state his intent/concept for fire support. To be useful, the commander's intent/concept for fire support must be both understood and feasible, and must articulate:

13. The FSO and battalion commander should mutually articulate and understand what fire support can and is expected to accomplish during an operation.

14. The commander's requirements must be within the capabilities of the resources available.

15. The FSO must know and communicate fire support capabilities, limitations, and risks during the process of developing the commander's intent/concept for fire support.

16. The fire support plan outlines the way artillery, CAS, and other fire support systems will be used to complement the scheme of maneuver and provides instruction for executing those fires. It is used to rank targets in priority order, match them with available fire support systems, eliminate duplication with the targets of the echelon that the attack helicopter battalion (ATKHB) is supporting, and allow fires to be executed quickly without specific direction from the commander once the battle starts.

17. CAS is normally planned through FSO channels to the Air Force tactical air control party (TACP) located at a ground maneuver brigade, division, or corps headquarters. Because each member retains his own C2 system, mission planning must be a coordinated effort. Constant coordination is required between the ground maneuver commander, aviation commander, TACAIR flight leader/ALO, and FSO. As elements of the mission change, all members must be informed so that they can adjust their plans accordingly. Success depends on proper synchronization of assets and how well each member understands the operation.

18. The task force S3 and FSO ensure that fire support is completely integrated into the wargaming process of the military decision-making process (MDMP). Refer to FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, FM 6-20-20, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Battalion, Task Force, and Below, and ST 100-9.

19. The FSO advises the task force commander and S3 when they have asked fire support to execute unrealistic tasks.

20. Fire support tasks and events are arranged in time and space in relation to terrain, the enemy, and the TF scheme of maneuver in order to develop adequate triggers.

21. The end-state should be a complete scheme of fires, an observation plan, and refinement submitted to brigade. This end state produces a plan that provides all targeting functions (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) per FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process.

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Fighting and Observation Positions/Observation Planning

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task forces (TFs) have difficulty synchronizing the establishment of support-by-fire (SBF) positions. (TA.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Company/teams are given inadequate clarification of the SBF purpose and associated tasks. They continually assume they have a destroy mission when, in actuality, a fix or suppress mission may accomplish the purpose of the SBF.

2. TF staffs do not accomplish a detailed terrain analysis of the planned SBF position and generally establish an SBF within the enemy "kill sack."

3. Little consideration is given to the effects of weather, enemy disposition, and the need to establish conditions prior to occupying the SBF.

4. Effective triggers, assault positions, and observation points are not planned, and, if planned, usually ignored during execution.

5. Smoke plans are rarely made, and coordination of the targeting process between fire support and maneuver does not occur.

6. TF mortars are given the task of obscuring an enemy position in order to permit occupation of the SBF. Even with 120-mm mortars it is difficult for a mortar platoon to initiate and maintain a smoke screen of any significant size.

7. Inability to establish an effective SBF will normally result in the breach and assault force not accomplishing their mission. The rapid demise of the SBF element gives the enemy freedom to reposition at will.

OBSERVATION 2: Observation plans often lack sufficient detail to provide the company fire support team (FIST) a focus for planning, preparing, or executing their mission. (TA.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION: None.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 2, 3-4QFY97)

OBSERVATION 2: Task forces experience difficulty developing and executing an observation plan to support essential fire support tasks (EFSTs), the scheme of fires, and the scheme of maneuver. (TA.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Observers frequently commit errors in observed fire procedures resulting in inaccurate target locations.

2. The FSO frequently does not synchronize the observer plan with the scheme of maneuver during the wargaming process.

3. Company/team level refinement of the observer plan does not always happen.

4. Rehearsals are frequently inadequate.

5. Fire support teams (FISTs) have difficulty getting into position at the right time and place to acquire the enemy before the task force finds itself decisively engaged in the enemy commander's battle space.

OBSERVATION 3: Task force observer plans are usually developed after wargaming. (TA.4.3.2)

DISCUSSION: When observer plans are not developed until after wargaming, they lack the detail and synchronization required to ensure observers are in position and prepared to execute the scheme of fires.

SUPPORT BY FIRE (SBF) POSITIONS:

1. There is one short page on this subject in FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team, leading the reader to conclude that the SBF mission is a simple task that needs little emphasis. This doctrinal reference should be expanded to thoroughly address the importance of establishing and executing an effective SBF.

2. TF commanders and staffs must realize the criticality of the SBF mission.

3. Early in the planning process, establish a clear purpose for the SBF and assign specific tasks to support that purpose.

4. Require the S2/battlefield information coordination center (BICC) and staff to complete a detailed threat and terrain analysis. Advantages and disadvantages of key and/or decisive terrain must be recognized and integrated into the wargaming process.

5. Establish criteria, decision points, triggers, and conditions during wargaming that will synchronize the establishment of the SBF. Anticipated enemy events must be included in the wargaming.

6. Develop an observation plan to execute the planned synchronization. Ensure the SBF position is not occupied until it has been reconnoitered and observation is conducted on the enemy position to be suppressed, fixed, or destroyed.

7. The TF fire support officer (FSO) should plan fires to cover the positioning of the SBF force.

8. Priority of fires should be given to the SBF force until their task/purpose is accomplished. The SBF commander should be the responsible leader for determining when fires can be shifted to support the breach force. A technique is to position the TF commander in a position where he can make that assessment.

9. Smoke plans should be developed by the S3, FSO and chemical officer to support maneuver into and occupation of the SBF. The plan must address all types of smoke, to include FA, mortar, vehicle generated, and smoke pots.

10. The S2 must continually update threat COAs, based upon gathered intelligence, and disseminate them on the command net.

11. Operational control graphics must be developed to permit flexibility. Decision points should be developed to support occupation of multiple SBFs.

12. TF commanders should require detailed rehearsals by the SBF force and elements in support. A complete understanding by everyone of tasks and purpose is critical by the end of the rehearsal.

13. TF TOCs should closely track the success or failure of the SBF force. That success or failure should be associated with a decision point to continue as planned or to execute other branches or COAs.

OBSERVATION PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION:

1. The observation plan, as an integral part of the fire support plan, should provide the task and purpose for each observer by phase of the operation. As part of the scheme of fires worksheet, the following format may be useful:

This focus enables the company FIST to plan, conduct appropriate pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs), and execute their mission according to the task force (TF) commander's intent.

2. Maneuver commanders must maintain the tactical patience necessary to allow observers to get into position and execute their assigned task and purpose, in order to set conditions for maneuver. FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, states that company/team commanders are the executors of the plan. FISTs are the maneuver commander's precision target acquisition assets. Success can be achieved with top-down planning, bottom-up refinement, and decentralized execution.

3. Construct an observer plan in concert with the S2 and S3, and use Terrabase computer programs to assist in position selection. This provides the detect functions of the targeting process IAW FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process.

4. The task force FSO must plan to have observers in position to support the maneuver commander's decisive point and each essential fire support task (EFST). Address where observers need to be, how they will get there, security measures, and communications requirements.

5. Synchronize the observation plan with the scheme of maneuver during the wargame. To do so, you must have a thorough terrain analysis, coupled with a complete understanding of the enemy's capabilities, that defines the enemy commander's battle space. The task force FSO provides the top-down plan that is refined by company FSOs in conjunction with company/team commanders.

6. The plan must be rehearsed during both task force and company/team rehearsals.

7. Initiative, cross talk, and coordination between FISTs are imperative during execution.

8. Observers must employ their precision target acquisition equipment IAW the appropriate TMs and follow the observed fire procedures in FM 6-30 for manual target location.

TASK FORCE FS OBSERVER PLANS:

1. Task force (TF) observation planning should begin during course of action (COA) development and be refined during the wargaming process.

2. The FSO should develop a checklist of OP selection tasks for inclusion in the SOP. An example listing of tasks follows: