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Military

Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)
Planning and Execution

by CPT Michael C. Kasales and CPT James H. Adams

Enemy Krasnovian forces have attacked the country of Mojavia to seize key terrain in the vicinity of Fort Irwin Military City. Several hours ago, an American Army squadron successfully defended against the Krasnovian's 171st Motorized Rifle Regiment. As the squadron conducts consolidation and reorganization activities, the squadron commander (SCO) asks the squadron's operation officer,

"Who's supposed to be on the screen line?"

The S3 looks at the operations map and quickly responds,

"B Troop, sir."

SCO:

"Are they there yet?"

S3 (gulp):

"No sir. Not yet."

SCO (jaw clenched):

"Get 'em there now!"

As soon as the SCO steps out of the tactical operations center (TOC), the S3 frantically reaches for the radio.

"Bandit 6, this is Sabre 3!"

The B Troop commander responds:

"Bandit 6, over."

"I need your troop to establish a screen along Phase Line Saddle, over."

"Roger, Sabre 3, when do you want the screen established? Over."

"Now! Over."

Meanwhile, Krasnovian reconnaissance forces have already penetrated Phase Line Saddle and are establishing observation posts in depth throughout the squadron sector.

The following definitions are quoted from FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 30 Sep 97.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan: ".a plan prepared by the G2 or S2, in close coordination with the G3 or S3, that assigns tasks to subordinates to develop information which satisfies the intelligence requirements the commander has established. It will focus on the targeted areas of interest (TAIs) and the named areas of interest (NAIs)."

Reconnaissance: ".a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area."

Surveillance: ".the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means."

Security zone: ".area that begins at the forward edge of the battlefield and extends as far to the front and flanks as security forces are deployed. Forces in the security area furnish information on the enemy and delay, deceive, and disrupt the enemy and conduct counterreconnaissance." Reconnaissance and surveillance operations are normally conducted in the security zone.

THE PROBLEM:

Although the opening example may be slightly exaggerated, it is not far from ground truth. Planning for and executing reconnaissance and surveillance is a deficiency in most units conducting rotations at the National Training Center (NTC). NTC observer/controllers have observed several factors contributing to this deficiency:

S2s are not conducting complete intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). In particular, S2s are not developing more than one detailed enemy course of action and the associated enemy event template during the threat integration phase of the IPB process.

Task force/squadron commanders and S3s do not emphasize the R&S planning process during the planning and preparation phase of the operation.

R&S forces (cavalry troops, TF scouts, GSR, COLTs) do not understand, nor execute, R&S tasks to standard.

A MORE SIMPLE DEFINITION OF R&S:

The definitions in FM 101-5-1 make R&S seem like an extremely complicated operation. Actually, it is not complicated. The following overview presents it all in a logical sequence of events.

1. The S2 and S3 develop a plan, based on IPB products, that:

a. Directs reconnaissance forces where to look for enemy activity (named areas of interest).

b. Tells them when to look for enemy activity (enemy event template).

c. Tells them exactly what enemy activity to look for (based on the commander's priority intelligence requirements and the S2s refined specific information requirements or specific orders or requests).

2. The reconnaissance forces then deploy into the reconnaissance area of operation, in accordance with the respective tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and look for a specific enemy activity at the specified place and specified time.

3. The R&S teams confirm or deny enemy activity and report the information to the commander in a timely manner.

4. Based on the information received from the R&S teams, the commander makes tactical decisions for the employment of his main body forces.

BOTTOM LINE: Reconnaissance and surveillance operations tell commanders what they need to know in time for them to act. The success or failure of an R&S operation directly affects the success or failure of the main body's mission.

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

There are several keys to successful reconnaissance and surveillance planning. They include:

1. Having a clear commander's intent and well-defined priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
2. Conducting a proper IPB.
3. Developing good enemy situational templates and event templates.
4. Issuing a well-planned and coordinated R&S order (overlay and matrix).
5. Deploying R&S forces early.
6. Providing continuous coverage throughout the depth of the battlefield.
7. Using all possible assets.
8. Providing timely and accurate reports to the commander.

Doctrinally, the task force/squadron develops the R&S plan based on three requirements:

1. Intelligence acquisition tasks (these task are contained in the higher unit's collection plan or tasks to subordinate units).
2. Internally driven PIR.
3. Requests for information (RFIs) from subordinate units.

The staff then develops the R&S plan and provides a copy back to the higher headquarters for consolidation as part of the higher unit's overall collection plan. Even if no collection plan or acquisition tasks are received from the higher unit, the subordinate commander and staff are not relieved from their responsibility to conduct R&S planning and execution. Commanders at every level need answers to specific questions about the enemy or terrain to successfully employ forces at the decisive place and time on the battlefield. Even without an order from the higher level, the staff can develop a feasible R&S plan to ensure the success of the main body's mission. Staffs should work aggressively to obtain needed information. Regardless how the R&S requirements are established, the plan should be developed very early to deploy the R&S forces as soon as possible.

Task force/squadron commanders and staffs must dedicate more effort to R&S operations. The commander must provide guidance for the R&S mission to focus the staff's efforts. This guidance should include the commander's initial concerns about the enemy and his concept for deploying R&S forces.

Planning and executing R&S operations often takes a back seat to the planning process associated with the main body's mission. In fact, most units develop and issue the R&S plan with or after the unit's main OPORD. When R&S forces deploy late in the operation, critical information needed during the military decision-making process (MDMP) is lost. To overcome this, the R&S planning process must be given early designation on the unit's timeline and must be strictly enforced. Below is a recommended R&S planning timeline.

MDMP

R&S Planning

The R&S planning process should be conducted just as any other mission planning process. The S3 or XO should assume responsibility for the R&S plan and ensure the staff is completely integrated into the planning process. Additionally, the staff must have a clear understanding of their responsibilities and actions during the planning and execution of reconnaissance and surveillance operations. R&S planning follows the same course as the MDMP.

Step 1. Conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The entire IPB process must be completed, but the most important IPB product needed for successful R&S planning is the enemy event template. This template depicts where the enemy will be, in relationship to friendly forces, in time and space. The enemy event template drives the reconnaissance plan. The likely enemy locations or avenues of approach now become the NAIs/TAIs on which R&S teams focus their reconnaissance and surveillance. An event template must be developed not only for the likely enemy main body avenues of approach (MBAAs), but also for the likely enemy reconnaissance avenues of approach (RAAs).

Step 2. Reconnaissance mission analysis. During this step, the staff must:

1. Define the reconnaissance area of operations (AO). The S2 must establish the limits of the reconnaissance AO and the S3 must develop the appropriate graphic control measures that designate the AO.

2. Identify specified and implied R&S tasks. The specified tasks are received from higher headquarters in the form of intelligence acquisition tasks, or from the task force/squadron commander in the form of PIR. These identified PIR must be clearly articulated and prioritized to focus the R&S effort.

3. Identify mission-essential R&S tasks. These are the tasks that must be completed for the R&S operation to be successful.

4. Identify reconnaissance objectives. The reconnaissance objectives must be clearly defined. These specified objectives serve to focus the R&S effort on the most likely enemy COA and ensure the commander's PIR are answered. Reconnaissance objectives take the form of NAIs and TAIs, each having an associated PIR or SIR.

5. Identify available reconnaissance forces. The staff must identify all of the available R&S forces that are at their disposal. Some of these forces are organic (scouts), some are attached or operationally controlled (GSR, chemical reconnaissance, COLTs), and some are assets from the higher headquarters that will operate in the task force/squadron reconnaissance AO (BRT, COLTs, IEW).

6. Identify available reconnaissance equipment. The staff must identify what equipment is available to dedicate to the R&S operation. More importantly, the S2 and S3 must understand the capabilities and limitations of available reconnaissance equipment (REMBASS, GSR, IEW).

7. Restate reconnaissance missions. The S2 and S3 must develop a clear mission statement for the R&S effort. The mission statement must have a clear task and purpose for conducting the R&S operation and directly relate to the success of the main body's mission.

Step 3. Mission analysis and reconnaissance course-of-action (COA) development. During this step, the staff must:

1. Identify required reconnaissance forces and equipment. Based on the information requirements, the staff must compare the tasks to be completed with the forces available. By understanding the capabilities and limitations of the R&S forces and equipment, the S2 and S3 can assign R&S forces tasks that they are able to accomplish.

2. Determine the reconnaissance scheme and assign a clear task and purpose to each asset. The reconnaissance scheme ensures that forces are placed within the reconnaissance AO to best exploit their capabilities. Each element of the R&S force must be assigned a clear, achievable task with a clearly understood purpose that relates to the success of the reconnaissance and surveillance mission. The reconnaissance scheme must also include a fire support plan. The FSO must plan for indirect fire support at designated TAIs and assign responsibility for these fires to specific elements.

3. Determine task organization and C2relationships. Unity of effort is the key to successful R&S operations. Each element in the R&S force, at each level, must report to one source. This focuses the collection of all intelligence information resulting in a clearer enemy "picture." This requirement also increases situational awareness among the R&S forces, thereby reducing the potential for fratricide incidents.

4. Develop control measures. Graphic control measures must be established to ensure that R&S forces provide coverage throughout the width and depth of the security zone. The established control measures should not be restrictive and should provide enough flexibility that allows the S2 and S3 to adjust the R&S "set" during the course of the operation, if needed.

5. Determine CSS requirements. The S4 must be involved in planning the Combat Service Support requirements for the R&S operation. The plan to support the R&S effort must address casualty evacuation procedures, resupply of class I, III, and V, and maintenance recovery procedures (see "CSS Operations Made Easy" in CALL Newsletter No. 99-6, CTC CSS: The Tail Talks, Jul 99).

Step 4. COA analysis and wargaming. The reconnaissance COAs are analyzed, and wargaming is completed. The commander decides on the reconnaissance COA.

Step 5. R&S order development. The staff develops and prepares the R&S order, consisting of an R&S overlay and matrix. The order must also include a fire support and CSS execution matrix and overlay. After all of this planning has been completed, the R&S order is issued to the reconnaissance force leader.

R&S Preparation

An important point to remember is that there are two distinct phases of R&S operations:

Phase 1 is enemy reconnaissance. During this phase the R&S effort should focus on the enemy reconnaissance avenues of approach and the identification and destruction of those enemy reconnaissance assets (see Figures 1 and 2). It is important to understand that counter-reconnaissance is not a mission; it is an inherent and critical sub-task associated with all reconnaissance and security missions. A force with sufficient combat power to destroy enemy reconnaissance must be placed in the security zone and synchronized with R&S assets to complete this task.

Phase 2 focuses on the identification of enemy main body elements. (See Figures 3 and 4.) R&S forces may be required to reposition when the focus of the R&S operation changes from the identification of the enemy reconnaissance to the identification of the enemy main body.

Step 1. Subordinate R&S leaders complete their plan and issue an OPORD.

The plan should include:

1. The techniques and routes for movement into the security zone.
2. NAI responsibility to subordinate R&S teams.
3. Tentative observation post (OP) locations for teams to observe assigned NAIs.
4. Primary and alternate observers for each NAI.
5. Reporting priorities and communications architecture.
6. Contingency plans for enemy contact.
7. Follow-on missions.
8. Fire support target responsibilities.
9. CSS procedures (medical/maintenance recovery and resupply).

NOTE: Detailed coordination must take place between all R&S forces prior to crossing the line of departure (LD). This coordination ensures that each R&S element has a clear understanding of the task, purpose, routes, and locations of other R&S forces. The coordination includes the exchange of radio frequencies and call signs, internal graphic control measures, routes into and out of the AO, locations for observation posts, NAI/PIR responsibilities, and target handover procedures.

Step 2. Rehearse.

A rehearsal of the R&S operation must be conducted. All R&S forces must participate in the rehearsal so they understand how the collection plan is synchronized between all elements. The rehearsal is not an OPORD briefing. It serves to confirm the actions of the R&S force and provides them a spatial and temporal picture of the operation from start to finish. The rehearsal should address:

1. The scheme of maneuver.
2. The scheme of reporting.
3. Procedures for handing over targets from one element to another.
4. Contingency plans for elements that become compromised.
5. Personnel and maintenance casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).
6. Resupply procedures.

R&S Execution

During the execution of the R&S operation, the R&S force and the main body commander and staff have unique responsibilities, and each must conduct specific actions for the operation to be effective.

R&S Force Responsibilities.

1. The R&S force must move into the security zone or area. Due to the nature and composition of the R&S forces, R&S operations can be categorized as stealthy as opposed to aggressive operations.

a. During task force (TF)/squadron (sqdn) offensive operations, R&S forces will normally precede the main body by conducting a route, area, or zone reconnaissance.

b. During TF/sqdn defensive operations, R&S forces will normally occupy a security zone (establish a screen) forward of the main body.

c. R&S forces should infiltrate into the security zone during periods of limited visibility. This provides R&S forces an additional level of security by infiltrating under the cover of darkness. If, however, R&S forces are not trained in night operations, significant delays in the R&S operation can result.

d. Routes must be planned so that R&S teams move quickly and securely to their primary OP locations. If more stealth is required or the terrain is very restrictive, R&S forces may have to infiltrate along dismounted routes. Therefore, the plan should include both mounted and dismounted infiltration routes.

2. The R&S force must understand and adhere to the fundamentals of reconnaissance:

a. Put maximum reconnaissance force forward.

b. Orient on the location or movement of the reconnaissance objectives.

c. Report all information rapidly and accurately.

d. Gain and maintain contact with the enemy.

e. Retain freedom of maneuver.

f. Develop the situation rapidly.

3. As R&S teams move forward they begin looking for enemy activity. Teams must be proficient in, and utilize all of, the doctrinal search techniques, to include ground search (rapid scan, slow scan, and detailed search) and air search (horizontal search and scan, and vertical search and scan).

a. Using all of these techniques will ensure that R&S teams adequately conduct surveillance of their assigned NAIs/TAIs. Using a combination of the naked eye, passive and thermal night-vision devices, and listening, teams attempt to identify the presence or indications of enemy activity.

b. Teams must be proficient in vehicle recognition and identifying enemy indicators. Some indicators to look for include:
  • movement.
  • dust signatures.
  • track or engine noises.
  • angular/unnatural shapes or silhouettes.
  • obstacles.
  • spoil from fighting positions.
  • voices or radio noise from dismounted or stationary vehicle elements.

4. Observation posts (OPs) should be planned throughout the depth of the security zone. This ensures redundant coverage of critical NAIs and provides R&S teams the ability to hand over targets throughout the depth of the zone.

a. When OPs are established, R&S teams should develop a direct observation plan that includes an OP sector sketch. This sketch is identical to those developed for direct fire weapons; however, it focuses on the surveillance tasks and outlines the required, reportable intelligence information.

b. Observation posts observe assigned NAIs and confirm or deny enemy activity. The specific activity the OP is trying to observe should attempt to answer the commander's PIR or the S2s SIR. The R&S matrix establishes when enemy activity should occur and when the R&S team should begin and continue reporting.

c. Timely and accurate reports, in accordance with the R&S matrix timeline, is crucial. Too many times an OP will not report the lack of enemy activity at their assigned NAI. This information is just as critical as the presence of enemy activity. Whatever the enemy activity at the assigned NAI, it must be reported. This information serves to validate or refine the S2s enemy situation template and is used by the main body commander to confirm or adjust his main body COA.

5. Once R&S teams gain visual contact with an enemy element, the initial OP must maintain contact until a subsequent OP has identified and assumed responsibility for tracking the enemy force. This may require the initial OP to physically follow the enemy element. The team must ensure that subsequent OPs in depth are alerted to the enemy presence, know the composition of the element, and the direction of travel.

6. R&S teams cannot become decisively engaged with the enemy. This includes both direct and indirect fire. A team quickly loses its ability to maneuver and cover assigned NAIs if direct or indirect fire contact is made with the enemy. If a team becomes engaged, it must quickly work to break contact while ensuring the enemy element has been reported.

7. OPs cannot become fixated on one enemy acquisition. Enemy reconnaissance forces may work in pairs and the OP may not identify the second enemy element if they remain fixated on the first contact. This requires continuous surveillance of the primary NAI while tracking an already acquired enemy element. This is not an easy task to accomplish and the OP should quickly work to pass the initial contact over to a subsequent OP.

8. Depending on enemy activity or lack of activity in the security zone, the S2 may need to adjust NAIs and SIR. If this occurs, a FRAGO is issued to the R&S forces to adjust the R&S "set." R&S forces must be able to respond to FRAGOs and move to new OP locations without losing the integrity of the security zone. This may require slight adjustments in certain OPs to cover new NAIs or it may require a major shift in R&S team locations. Whichever occurs, the R&S commander must move elements in a manner that maintains surveillance in the zone.

Commander and Staff Responsibilities.

1. As the R&S force moves to establish the security zone, the commander and staff must track their employment. The staff must update the operations map in the TOC as teams report their locations, in accordance with established graphic control measures. This serves two purposes:

a. It keeps the commander and staff updated on the progress of the R&S force.

b. It allows for increased situational awareness between R&S elements, significantly reducing the potential for a fratricide incident between R&S teams and main body forces. Several fratricide incidents have occurred at the NTC due to the uncertain location of R&S forces. The most common excuse for these fratricides is, "It looked like a BRDM to me." or, "I didn't know the COLT team was on that hill." The R&S force commander must also accurately track the progress of his teams to prevent fratricide within the R&S force.

2. The staff must inform the R&S forces of any intelligence information received from adjacent units. This keeps the R&S forces abreast of the enemy situation outside the reconnaissance AO and may indicate the entry and presence of enemy forces in the security zone. This information should be passed to the R&S force leader, in the form of a SITREP, as soon as the staff receives it.

3. Once R&S teams are set, the staff should begin receiving intelligence information reports. Post the intelligence information recieved on the S2s map and the operations map. The staff must ensure that the information answers the commander's PIR provide the commander and the S2 with a clear enemy "picture." If the information received does not answer the commander's PIR, the staff must pass guidance to the R&S forces so they can collect the relevant intelligence information. This requires TOC shift personnel to fully understand the requirements, mission, and critical intelligence information to be collected by the R&S force.

4. When the S2 receives reported information, he must update his enemy SITEMP and event template. By conducting this continuous IPB, the S2 further develops and refines the enemy "picture" for the commander. This allows the staff to develop and recommend COAs to the commander for both the R&S effort and the main body's mission. Based on answered PIR, intelligence information collected, and staff recommendations, the commander is better able to make tactical decisions that will result in the overall success of the unit.

CONCLUSION

If S2s become more proficient in developing the enemy courses of action and the associated enemy event templates.and If commanders and S3s put more emphasis on the R&S planning process.and If R&S forces become more proficient in executing R&S tasks.Then more units would be able to conduct effective R&S operations.

In the future, as our Army gets smaller, there will be a higher demand for accurate and timely intelligence reports on the enemy's size, location, and disposition. R&S forces will provide commanders the critical intelligence information needed to employ a smaller force over a larger area. This makes it even more important for commanders, staffs, and R&S forces to be proficient in planning and executing R&S operations. This article outlined some of the common, observed deficiencies associated with R&S operations and provided several doctrinal and TTP solutions that can allow the force to successfully conduct R&S operations.

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