CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 3d Qtr, FY 99, No. 99-14, Oct 99; OPFOR

OPFOR Reconnaissance, Command and Control

by MAJ John Hort, Executive Officer, 2d Squadron, 11th ACR

This article describes selected reconnaissance and command and control (C2) tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by the National Training Center's Opposing Force (OPFOR). These TTPs have been developed and refined through doctrinal modification, experience, and observation of what works at the National Training Center (NTC). Additionally, these TTPs have generally become battle drills for most OPFOR soldiers because of their familiarity with the terrain and training redundancy. Visiting brigades should consider these issues when developing and executing their own scout and C2plans.

SCOUT TTPs

ISSUE 1: Reconnaissance company (scout platoon) communications architecture.

Discussion and TTPs:

a. The structure of the OPFOR operations & intelligence (O&I) radio nets differs greatly from the standard BLUFOR design. All OPFOR reconnaissance troops, whether division or regimental reconnaissance assets, attached ground surveillance radar (GSR), chemical reconnaissance vehicles (RkH), or engineer reconnaissance patrols (ERP) transmit and receive on a single net. These patrols report to the reconnaissance company commander, who, in turns, reports directly to the Chief of Reconnaissance (COR, or S2) on the very same net. All deploy to prominent high ground to collect and report vital HUMINT communications. The COR often talks directly to each reconnaissance asset, particularly during the battle phase of the operation. This direct link with all assets ensures the rapid processing of real-time HUMINT information from the COR to the maneuver commander(s).

b. The drawback to having all BLUFOR reconnaissance forces on one radio net is that the net can quickly become overloaded. OPFOR reconnaissance troops counter this problem with intense communications discipline, using the following control measures:

(1) During infiltration, OPFOR reconnaissance patrols maintain strict radio listening silence. The silence is broken only if they make contact, establish their observation post (OP), or have a real-world or maintenance emergency.

(2) Prior to the fight, the Chief of Staff (or XO), COR and reconnaissance company commander establish a reconnaissance focus for each asset. This focus is phased throughout the enemy advance using transition points, called "report lines" (RLs). The RLs are similar to U.S. phase lines and mark transitions from deep, to middle, to shallow OPs.

(a) During a defensive mission or meeting battle, for example, the deep reconnaissance teams (normally two or three) have priority on the net. Their PIR might include the LD of the BLUFOR's lead company team, or the LD of the lead task force and company team compositions. All other reconnaissance teams maintain radio listening silence during this phase. Their silence is broken only if they observe emplacement of FASCAM (air, artillery or vehicle delivered), COLTs, Apache gunships, or closer light infantry locations.

(b) As the fight transitions from LD to the close fight, middle scout OPs have radio net priority. The mid-range reconnaissance focus might include locating the expected main and supporting BLUFOR attacks, and identifying company team composition and engineer assets. The reconnaissance company deputy commander (scout platoon sergeant) typically controls the net during this phase of the battle.

(c) At the expected or templated location of direct fire contact, the reconnaissance company commander, along with his remaining shallow OPs, takes control of the radio net. The shallow OP's reconnaissance focus could include identifying BLUFOR movement direction, point of penetration, company team composition, or use of brigade reserves.

(3) To prevent extensive relays from tying up the radio net, OPFOR reconnaissance troops, platoon leaders, and COR are required to attain a position that allows them to communicate with each other, either directly or through the retransmission station. Efficient communications pave the way for accurate battle tracking and effective indirect fires. The COR's terrain requirement is also driven by his need to communicate with the reconnaissance company commander, deputy commander, and senior section sergeant. The COR must maintain communication with these assets regardless of the success or failure of O&I retransmissions.

ISSUE 2: The Operations & Intelligence (O&I) Retransmission Station.

Discussion and TTPs:

a. If accurate and timely intelligence reports from reconnaissance troops is viewed as the lifeblood of the reconnaissance company, then radio retransmission (retrans) is the heart that pumps it. With teams stretched across NTC's desert floor from Drinkwater Valley to the Valley of Death (30 kilometers), a retrans network that is properly used and protected can mean the difference between victory and defeat.

b. For protection, OPFOR retrans vehicles are paired with reconnaissance sections and typically cross the LD a short distance behind the reconnaissance vehicles. The reconnaissance team leading the retrans vehicle is responsible for route clearance, retrans location, and local security. If the reconnaissance team determines that either the route or the position is not clear, it will escort the retrans team to one of two alternate sites to set up operation. The escorting reconnaissance team does not complete its mission until the retrans site is operational. This ensures not only that the retrans survives, but that it also successfully navigates to the correct site(s).

ISSUE 3: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Planning.

Discussion and TTPs:

a. OPFOR R&S planning is completed during the wargame and refined during the Regimental rehearsal or motorized rifle battalion (MRB) coordination meeting, yet remains highly flexible. The key to OPFOR success is flexibility. R&S for the OPFOR means identifying specifically, "Where is the enemy?" and "Where is he not?"

b. The OPFOR develops and covers named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs); however, OPFOR scout teams are also required to understand the following four basic principles prior to infiltration:

(1) Commander's intent.

(2) For offensive operations, each OPFOR maneuver course of action, and for defensive operations, the main effort of the MRB commander (where he wants to destroy the enemy brigade).

(3) Commander's decision points.

(4) The fire support plan for each COA.

c. The OPFOR reconnaissance company commander does not just plan to cover templated NAI/TAIs; rather, he plans reconnaissance to cover the entire sector. He employs his assets to observe every meter of the area of operations. This may seem impractical, but remember--the OPFOR's R&S plan is driven by the enemy, not by the template!

d. For each battle, whether it is offensive or defensive in nature, the OPFOR R&S plan will have specific TAIs requiring coverage. The reconnaissance company commander will typically organize his assets so that only the most experienced and seasoned troops cover these TAIs. The TAIs are normally terrain-oriented where indirect fires will have the maximum effect. Examples include:

(1) Mobility corridors that transit a significant choke point.

(2) Possible FASCAM targets near terrain features or defensive engagement areas.

(3) Possible persistent chemical strike locations.

ISSUE 4: Infiltration.

Discussion and TTPs:

a. OPFOR infiltration techniques differ from the TTPs taught at Cavalry AIT or the Scout Platoon Leader's Course. The bottom line is, OPFOR reconnaissance will insert wherever a weakness or seam is suspected. This may mean that the majority of the reconnaissance troops deploy through a gap in the BLUFOR's security effort, move rapidly into sector, and then infiltrate back through the BLUFOR to occupy planned OPs. Reconnaissance BMPs are often used to located the weakness in the BLUFOR's security operation, penetrate it, and exploit this penetration with BRDMs going deep into sector.

b. If the BLUFOR has orchestrated a vigilant security penetration, OPFOR reconnaissance troops will halt short of it in a hide position and then continue movement at 0300 to penetrate a tired and sleeping enemy.

c. OPFOR reconnaissance troops do not typically conduct ground-level zone reconnaissance during offensive operations. They focus instead on gaining their planned OP, where high on a hilltop they can maximize battle space coverage. Determining the start and end points of a wire and mine obstacle is much easier from an elevated position than from the desert floor.

ISSUE 5: Battle Handover Lines.

Discussion and TTPs:

a. The OPFOR uses battle handover lines sparingly. Reconnaissance troops have responsibility for tracking enemy units and call indirect fires until the enemy reaches the defending MRB's obstacle belt, whereupon the (MRB) takes responsibility. This technique allows the MRB to concentrate on its direct fire fight. If the situation does not enable the OPFOR reconnaissance troops to completely track the BLUFOR into the obstacle belt, the MRB will take over. These situations often involve an assailable flank.

b. Adjacent motorized rifle regiment (MRR) reconnaissance troops continue reporting on enveloping units until they can no longer see the BLUFOR attacking into the flank or the rear of the MRB. These vulnerable points are identified early and briefed at the defensive coordination meeting the day prior to the fight.

(1) During the meeting, the COR informs the MRB commander where his surveillance ends and where the MRB must assume tracking responsibility. The MRB commander will normally task one of his organic Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP) teams to cover this "dead spot."

(2) Initially, these CRPs remain under MRB C2; however, once a BLUFOR threat has penetrated the surveillance zone, the CRP team will jump to the MRR O&I net, keeping one radio transmitting on the MRB command frequency. This technique allows the COR, Chief of Staff, and Chief of Artillery (fire support officer) to maintain control over HUMINT information on the enemy and continue to provide the proper focus of indirect fires. Additionally, this allows the MRB commander to continue his focus on the direct fire fight while simultaneously monitoring reports from his CRPs.

COMMAND AND CONTROL TTPs

ISSUE 1: Positioning the Senior Commanders and Staffs on the Battlefield.

Discussion and TTPs:

a. During the deliberate attack and meeting battle, the OPFOR regimental, deputy, and MRB commanders and staffs are well forward, at decisive points on the battlefield. On the day prior to offensive missions, the chief of staff (COS) coordinates senior commander locations. Commander locations are critical for maintaining C2. Proper location also facilitates rapid maneuver force decisions.

(1) Regimental commanders deploy with the AGMB or FD main body during a deliberate attack or meeting battle. To support the commander, the regimental deputy will move with the forward security element (FSE). Key leaders position themselves in each formation so that timely and accurate decisions are made during the attack. The regimental commander continually assesses the combat success of the AGMB or FD while the deputy commander makes assessments and recommendations based on the success or failure of the FSE.

(2) The chief of operations moves with the main body while his deputy moves with the 2d echelon. These senior staff officers assist with C2and are critical to maintaining attack momentum. They are prepared to push forward and assume the duties of the regimental commander or his deputy if either are unable to continue.

(3) Key positioning of senior leaders allows MRB commanders to focus on their MRBs. Each MRB commander and his deputy monitor and report on the regimental net. MRB deputy commanders provide the situation and combat power ("slant") reports to the COS.

b. MRB commander positioning is equally critical during the direct fire fight. The AGMB (normally the MRB commander) and FSE commander (normally an MRC commander with the deputy MRB commander) know that they must position themselves near the potential point of penetration, terrain denial engagement area, or possible friendly assailable flank.

c. Each commander conducts extensive crosstalk with the main body MRB commanders to facilitate their maneuver and momentum. The MRB commanders in the main body, once committed into the direct fire fight, position themselves to support each other's movement or maneuver. The 2d echelon commander travels with his lead MRC. This allows rapid exploitation of the main body's penetration.

ISSUE 2: "Fall Out One" Drill.

Discussion and TTPs:

a. The backbone of OPFOR C2is the fall out one drill. Sergeants, specialists, and privates are ready and able to immediately move up one place in the chain of command and take over. OPFOR tank, BMP, and AT-5 crews expect that a few senior commanders and staff officers will be killed in every battle. This is understood as part of the operation.

b. Every crew member anticipates that at some point in the battle he will have to step up to a leadership role. In most BLUFOR units, this might generate confusion, loss of momentum, or defeat. OPFOR soldiers, however, frequently assume the role of their leaders without hesitation, loss of momentum, or degradation of C2. Sergeants, specialists, and privates seamlessly assume these roles with minimal disruption, maintaining regimental momentum. T-80 and BMP crews have on numerous occasions entered the regimental net after losing their officer leadership and continued to maneuver, call for fire, and execute C2for the remainder of their unit.

ISSUE 3: Jump TOC (J-TOC) Operations.

Discussion and TTPs:

a. The nerve center for any regimental attack or MRB defense is the OPFOR's J-TOC. Every combat multiplier available to the regiment operates within the confines of the J-TOC. The COS is responsible for the control of the J-TOC and the use of these combat multipliers in support of the regiment or MRB commander. Combat multipliers within the J-TOC include:

(1) Chief of Staff (COS):
* Controls Regimental nets.
* Tracks the battle, both friendly and enemy.
* Makes course-of-action and combat multiplier recommendations to the commander.
* Issues FRAGOs during the conduct of the battle.
* Synchronizes all combat multipliers to provide maximum effect.

(2) Chief of Reconnaissance (S2):
* Tracks enemy composition, disposition, and maneuver.
* Assists the fire support officer (FSO) with indirect fire missions.
* Makes recommends to the COS on the use of friendly combat multipliers.
* Updates the commander(s) on enemy strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities.
* Provides BDA on the enemy.

(3) Chief of Artillery (FSO):
* Monitors the MRR O&I net and command net. Calls for fires based on COS focus.
* Makes recommendations and executes the use of situational obstacles and obscuration, such as persistent/non-persistent chemicals, FASCAM, and smoke.
* Updates the chemical downwind message to the COS and regimental commander.

(4) Air Direction Officer (S3 Air/Tactical Air Control Party (TACP)):
* Employs CAS and SOKOL (Attack Helicopters) in support of offense and defense.
* Develops recommendations to the COS on the employment of CAS and SOKOL in accordance with the friendly and enemy situation.

(5) Chief of Radio Electronic Combat (REC) (EW Company Commander):
* Provides jamming and SIGINT collection to the commander at critical points of the battle.
* Executes deception traffic in coordination with COS guidance.

(6) Chief of Signals (SIGO).
* Monitors division net.
* Assists the COS with C2and battletracking.

b. The success of the J-TOC is its ability to effectively communicate with all maneuver elements. It is deployed to high ground to facilitate communications. This ensures effective C2and battle synchronization, regardless of the success or failure of the retransmission team.

c. The COS deploys the J-TOC as early as possible so it is operational prior to crossing LD. This allows the OPFOR to achieve seamless communications throughout their sector. Risk is associated with this early deployment; however, a detailed map analysis is done the day prior to determine secure, yet supportable, C2positions. Reconnaissance troops infiltrate the night before J-TOC deployment to clear these areas.

d. Once established, the J-TOC operates from one common map posted for the COR, COS, and fire support. This technique greatly enhances the focus and effects of fires, clearance of fires, battletracking, and enemy disposition.

CONCLUSION: The OPFOR continually refines and modifies their TTPs during monthly rotations. BLUFOR units should investigate the feasibility of these TTPs for possible implementation when developing their own scout employment and C2plan.

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OPFOR Reconnaissance, Command and Control