Basic
Support of Battalion Scouts
by
SFC Bill Mounce
The
light infantry battalion scout platoon is an important asset to the battalion
commander in seeing the enemy, anticipating the enemy's actions, and most effectively
employing the infantry battalion to engage the enemy. However, proper utilization
and support of the scout platoon by its higher headquarters is an absolute
MUST if it is to survive and be successful.
At
the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the scenario all too often unfolds
as follows.
The
battalion staff, in order to get the scouts into the box and on an operation,
will create a mission with uncoordinated tasks and little synchronization.
The S-2 often has not talked to the S-3 and usually neither has asked the commander
what his guidance is. The scout platoon leader receives a fragmentary order
(FRAGO) with little time to plan or coordinate on his own. The scout platoon
is inserted with the promise of " if you need anything, just give us a call...we
will try to get it for you." This results with the deployment of the scout
platoon with little or no idea of available fire support, how they will be
resupplied, or how they will receive casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), if needed.
Additionally, planning or even addressing their extraction does not occur until
after three to five days into the mission when they are out of food, water,
and batteries. This lack of support results in an ineffective scout platoon
and severely reduces the opportunities for mission success.
A
better approach to utilization and support of the battalion scouts needs to
become the standing operating procedure (SOP) across the light infantry units
in the Army. We expect these soldiers to go into the enemy's backyard in four-
to five-man squads, observe, report, and survive, but consistently fail to
support them after their departure from the battalion Tactical Operations Center
(TOC).
There
are four basic areas where battalion scouts require support from their higher
headquarters BEFORE and AFTER their insertion on a mission.
1.
FIRE
SUPPORT.
Scouts
carry only M-16s rifles and M-203s grenade launchers for their defense. This
is very light firepower when considering the potential firepower the enemy
can bring to bear on the scouts while deep in the enemy's own territory. Thus,
the battalion scouts must have some type of fire support and should have a
priority of fires from at least one type of indirect fire weapon system. Without
either aerial artillery, battalion mortar support, or field artillery fire
support, the scout platoon's chance of breaking contact from a determined enemy
and surviving is extremely poor. Additionally, when the scout platoon is in
contact they need those supporting fires immediately. If they have to wait
for the guns to swing around to their direction and plot the mission, it will
be too late by the time the first round impacts. RECOMMENDATION.
Involving
the battalion Fire Support Officer (FSO) in the planning of all scout missions
is essential. In doing this, he will become aware of their locations and fire
support requirements. The scout platoon leader should have an accurate list
of targets, call signs, and frequencies of the supporting elements prior to
departure from the TOC. He must ensure the rest of his platoon has the same
information. The scout platoon, for pure expediency, should be able to call
for fire directly to the supporting elements that will require rapid clearance
of fires. Every member of the platoon must be an expert at calling for an adjustment
of fires. 2.
CASEVAC.
The
scout platoon is often deployed well forward of all other battalion units and,
depending on the level of conflict and the theater, may be well forward of
any friendly units. If they take a casualty during movement or during a contact,
they are totally dependent on support external from the platoon for evacuation.
All too often, during rotations at the JRTC, the mission goes on hold or the
wounded/injured soldier is left as is, then cached en route because there is
no plan or coordination for evacuation. This contributes to a high died-of-wounds
(DOW) rate within the battalion and a morale degradation issue for the platoon.
American soldiers should be able to expect their higher headquarters to do
everything possible to evacuate them when they are injured or wounded. RECOMMENDATION.
The
scout platoon sergeant (PSG) should pick a tentative casualty collection point
(CCP) central to the platoon's area of operations when possible. This CCP should
be within a kilometer of all of the squad's locations, if feasible, to preclude
long-distance casualty transport by the squads. Each squad leader should choose
a tentative squad CCP near his operational area. All of these tentative CCPs
should be coordinated and briefed to the battalion staff prior to insertion.
Upon arrival in the areas, the leaders must verify the usability of these CCPs
based on expected means of evacuation. Leaders must do this before the need
arises for evacuation. If terrain, enemy, or vegetation prevents using the
planned CCPs, leaders must chose another viable site and relay its location
through the platoon headquarters to the battalion TOC. Every member of the
platoon must know the locations of these CCPs. The scout platoon must be extremely
proficient in first aid and intermediate life support to increase the odds
of soldier survival until the planned CASEVAC arrives. 3.
RESUPPLY.
A
scout platoon traditionally carries extremely heavy rucksacks on every mission.
Their missions preclude many comfort items and dictate their mission-essential
equipment packing list. Items, such as AN/PVS-7s, binoculars, spotting scopes,
field-expedient antennas, SINCGARS, HF radios, TACSAT radios, squad radios,
personal camouflage materials, and other as-the-mission-dictates essentials,
leave limited room for rations, ammunition, and batteries. This usually translates
into a three-day maximum, on-hand supply of food, water, and batteries. Yet,
battalion staffs tend to send the scout platoon out on five-day plus missions.
Or, upon their arrival into their area of operations, the platoon observes
and reports a high level of intelligence data and the battalion requires them
to stay in place beyond the original plan. For the platoon to survive and continue
to be effective, they must receive resupply. However, planning or coordinating
resupply operations seldom occurs before the platoon's insertion. RECOMMENDATION.
The
scout platoon leader (PL) and platoon sergeant (PSG) should sit down and plan
their expected resupply needs prior to every mission. This could be a very
quick conference, if the PSG has been effectively tracking the platoon's average
supply usage. He should know how much water, how many rations, and batteries
the platoon uses per day on average. The PSG should discuss expected resupply
requirements with the PL and then present them to the S-4, if available, or
the S-3 for future use. Another technique for the platoon is to preassemble
resupply packages and leave them in the TOC under a reliable individual's care
for delivery when needed. Leaders should prearrange delivery of supplies prior
to insertion. Using either ground or air to resupply the scout platoon is a
viable option. The delivery method will depend on the area of operations, enemy
situation, weather, and available assets. E ven in the lightest of infantry
battalion, there is always a multitude of empty vehicles sitting around the
battalion TOC under camouflage nets. The leaders can coordinate for a preselected
vehicle to deliver the scout platoon's supplies upon request. Secure the supply
vehicle during resupply operations with either another vehicle with a security
element or an Anti-Tank (AT) vehicle. Regardless of how, the scouts must receive
some priority from the higher headquarters for re-supply. The frequently used
"Guardian Angel" technique, where the PSG stays in the TOC to coordinate support,
is a "Band-Aid" repair to a broken support system. The scout PSG should be
on the mission providing much needed leadership and support to the PL. A detailed
and viable SOP enforced in the battalion TOC for support of the scouts would
eliminate the need for such measures. 4.
EXTRACTION.
Invariably,
the battalion staff is greatly concerned with, and active in, requesting and
providing the needed support for the scout platoon's insertion. However, there
is seldom the same concern for extraction until it is actually required. We
should never insert one of our soldiers into the enemy's area of operation
without telling him how (if possible when) he is getting out. Nevertheless,
the standard answer seems to be "we will work that out later and call you with
it." Yet when the time comes for extraction, even if it is at a preplanned
time, the means of extraction is usually not coordinated and the timeline seldom
is followed. The person responsible seems to forget the issue until the scout
platoon calls on the radio and inquires about extraction. At that time, a scramble
occurs to find transportation and security for the extraction mission. RECOMMENDATION.
The
S-3 or his designated representative, along with the scout PL, should do tentative
coordination for extraction before departure on the mission. The basic information
to be settled is when (unless extended), how, signals, and, if possible, where
to be picked up. All of this is, of course, tentative based upon what happens
during the mission but, if it should change, do not disseminate this information
until required. The battalion staff should recoordinate the same basic information
and pass it via radio to the PL. The scout platoon leadership again should
choose tentative pick-up zones (PZs) in their area of operation for whatever
means of extraction expected. These are coordinated and briefed to the battalion
staff prior to insertion and checked upon arrival into the area. If change
is required, the platoon sends the location of the new sites through the platoon
headquarters to the TOC. As in CCPs, resupply plans, and fire support plans,
every member of the platoon must know this information. CONCLUSION
At
the JRTC, battalion scouts are often tasked by the brigade headquarters to
form a "Team Scout" to be utilized by the brigade and to report to the brigade.
This creates a whole new support challenge for the scout PL and PSG. The brigade,
because they are the tasking unit, should be the supporting element, but seldom
does this occur. The brigade headquarters is too busy preparing the remainder
of the brigade for the operation to worry about the scouts and the battalion
staff has relinquished control and thus, often, in their minds, the support
concerns of the scouts. The end result is a scout platoon(s) with little or
no support. There must be some responsibility entailed in the control of the
scouts for support also. If brigade is to control them, then someone within
the brigade TOC must be the support point of contact (POC) for the scouts.
A "Scout Master" appointed for C2and
support should not be inserted with the scouts as usually happens. If the responsible
party is not at the TOC, he cannot plan, prepare, request, or coordinate any
needed support as the situation develops. The scout platoon leadership should
address and settle these issues prior to insertion. If it appears that support
at the brigade will not be forthcoming, then apprise the platoon's battalion
commander of the situation so he can apply command emphasis to remedy the situation.
Under no circumstances should a scout platoon execute a mission without proper
planning for, and coordinating support before, insertion.
The
light infantry battalion scouts are a vital and reliable source of actual "eyes-on"
first-hand intelligence to the battalion or brigade commander. To ensure mission
success and survival for future utilization, the scout platoon's higher headquarters
MUST provide well-planned and coordinated support. Scouts are a support-intensive
unit, but the potential significance of the intelligence they can provide makes
them too valuable not to receive adequate and viable support.
Acquainting
the Paladin Section Chief with Battery Troop-Leading Procedures
PSYOP
and the Maneuver Commander at the JRTC
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