UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Military

Acquainting the Paladin Section Chief
with Battery Troop-Leading Procedures

by CPT Christopher Irrig
THE SITUATION

The mobility of the new and improved M109A6 Paladin places new demands on the Paladin chief of section (CS). Significant improvements in the Paladin's reliability, availability, maintainability (RAM) and survivability/vulnerability upgrades allow Paladin batteries to be positioned within close proximity (1km to 5km) to maneuver forces which enhances the brigade's ability to fight the enemy deep with fires. Technological improvements in the howitzer enable it to make short frequent survivability moves while increasing responsiveness. These improvements give Paladin batteries new independence, which is good. But the increased independence also requires the Paladin CS to have a much greater battlefield awareness. He must now understand the fundamentals of battery Troop-Leading Procedures (TLPs), and must be skilled in assessing the tactical situation and the threat, to survive and be successful with Paladin and the future Crusader.

THE PROBLEM

The Paladin chief of section (CS) does not have the tactical skills necessary to operate in pairs/triplets and survive on the battlefield. He has received very little formal training in the NCO education system in terms of the TLP, tactical situation and the threat.

a. At this point in his career progression, a CS will have attended two courses in leadership:

  • The Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), and

  • The Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC).

These courses provide an NCO with a solid foundation in terms of leadership skills necessary for their career progression.

b. The Field Artillery School offers the Paladin Commander's Course for staff sergeant and above. This course discusses operational considerations for the offense and the defense as well as logistical operations. These three courses, although adequate for their indended purposes, do not provide the Paladin CS an understanding of TLP, nor do they teach tactical situation or threat assessment skills. The CS must know and understand these issues to survive with Paladin and the future Crusader.

TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

The TLP provide a mental framework for the battery commander so that he can ensure complete preparation, dissemination and execution of the battery mission. This process provides a checklist for the battery commander from receipt of the mission to execution. The TLP may not follow a specific order, and often several steps are conducted simultaneously. The TLP is an eight-part process:

1. Receive the Mission
2. Issue the Warning Order
3. Make a Tentative Plan
4. Initiate Movement
5. Conduct Reconnaissance
6. Complete the Plan
7. Issue the Order
8. Supervise

Based on observations at the National Training Center (NTC), Paladin battery commanders (BCs) have difficulty completing their plan and issuing the battery operations order (OPORD). They tend to use the battalion Field Artillery Support Plan (FASP) when briefing the Paladin battery leadership. This creates a great deal of confusion for the Paladin CS because the commander does not specifically identify all his essential battery tasks.

Techniques:

1. Paladin battery commanders must conduct their own mission analysis based upon the FASP and brief their own battery mission to the target audience.

EXAMPLE: The battalion has three Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs) to accomplish for the brigade to be successful.

No. 1. Shoot Copperhead to destroy the combat security observation post (CSOP).

No. 2. Shoot smoke at the point of penetration to obscure the enemy's ability to observe the breach operation.

No. 3. Shoot counterfire to suppress the enemy's regimental artillery group (RAG).

During the FASP briefing, the battalion S3 identifies one essential fire support task (EFST) for each battery to accomplish. Bravo battery will shoot Copperhead to destroy the CSOP. The battery commander takes this battalion EFST and develops his own battery essential field artillery task (EFAT) that must be accomplished for the battery/battalion to be successful.

During the battery OPORD, the commander specifically identifies which section is the Copperhead shooter and which is the backup shooter. The BC addresses specific rehearsals to be accomplished between the Platoon Operation Center (POC) and the howitzer section. Additionally, the commander identifies who the observer is, his call sign and frequency for the POC to rehearse with the observer.

The Paladin CS must understand that the OPORD is just the beginning of the battery TLP.

2. Toward the end of the OPORD, the commander discusses the battery timeline. The timeline addresses the specifics of the TLP and should be perceived as a contract between the CS and the battery leadership. The timeline includes numerous critical events such as:

  • time and location of the battery rehearsal.

  • pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs) to be completed.

  • priorities of work.

  • specific rehearsals to be accomplished.

  • SP times and in-position, ready-to-fire times.

3. Always conduct a battery rehearsal. The purpose of the battery rehearsal or battery "rock drill" is to:

  • allow the commander the opportunity to asses his unit's level of understanding of the mission and its readiness.

  • give the BC opportunity to update the battery leadership on any late changes to the mission.

  • cause the CS to brief the commander on the concept of the operation, his section's status, ammunition distribution plan, essential tasks assigned to his section, the threat by phase and any maintenance or personnel issues. This detailed backrief helps the CS develop his own battlefield awareness.

4. Design a simple map board for the CS to organize his information. The map board is 18x18 inches and made of wood and Plexiglas. One side of the board has a map of the area of operation and the other side has a fill-in-the-blank battery operations order format (see example OPORD format and timeline, below). The CS records critical information on, and briefs his section directly from, his map board. The CS takes his board to the battery "rock drill" and records any changes to the battery mission based upon the BC's participation in the battalion "rock drill."

EXAMPLE:

BATTERY OPORD:

BN MSN
PROVIDE DS FIRES TO 3D BDE,
D-ATK NLT 120630 MAY 97

BTRY MSN
SUPPORT 3D BDE, D-ATK NLT 20630 MAY 97

CDR'S INTENT
MOVE QUICKLY/ OCCUPY NLT 1730

THREAT BY PHASE/PA
PHASE I : REGIMENTAL RECON
2 BMPs; 2 BRDMs
PHASE II: COUNTERFIRE

BTRY EFATS
IN POSITION RTF/NLT 1730
SHOOT COPPERHEAD
BTRY MASS MISSIONS

PRIORITIES OF WORK
MAINTENANCE
AMMO ACCOUNTABILITY

REHEARSALS
COPPERHEAD PROCEDURES
CASEVAC
REACTIONARY FORCE

PCCs
NBC
LOAD PLANS

PCIs
AMMO DISTRIBUTION PLAN/TURRET LOAD
COPPERHEAD REHEARSAL COMPLETE
W/FO & POC & GUNS

BATTERY TIMELINE:

0800 -- REC MSN

0930 -- RECON COMP

1000 -- ROCK DRILL

1230 -- PCCs COMP

1500 -- REHEARSALS COMP

1600 -- BATTERY SP

1730 -- IN POS RTF

1800 -- CLASS ONE ISSUED

1930 -- PCIs COMP

2030 -- FM TECH REHEARSAL

2130 -- FM FIRE SPT REHEARSAL

0500 -- STAND TO

0630 -- EXECUTE MSN

Once the CS feels confident with the battery's mission, EFATs, and TLP, he can then focus his attention on developing the tactical situation and the threat.

TACTICAL SITUATION

Based on observations at the NTC, the Paladin CS tends to have a poor understanding of the tactical situation. Immediately following the battery OPORD, when asked specific questions pertaining to the battery's current tactical mission (i.e., What is the battery's mission? The brigade's mission? Which task force is the main effort and what is their objective?), the CS and their soldiers had difficulty answering the questions.

a. The CS is often unaware of the importance of the position area or zone and the ramifications of positioning outside these areas. The CS must know that if he occupies an area outside an approved position he could be on the maneuver forces axis of advance which could lead to fratricide or cause the maneuver forces to slow their rate of movement during the attack.

b. The maneuver forces have difficulty identifying Paladins and are not aware of Paladin position areas or their present ability to keep pace with the advancing maneuver forces (the result of Paladin tactics and a significant reduction in the ready-to-fire times). This has resulted in the Paladins being engaged by friendly direct fire weapon systems. In fact, during the live-fire defense in sector mission at night, Paladin pairs have been positioned inadvertently forward of the maneuver forces battle positions!

Techniques:

1. Again, have the Paladin CS use his map board. The map board should have the same updated graphics that the POC uses. At a minimum, the CS should have:

  • phase lines
  • line of departure
  • battery position areas
  • known obstacles
  • maneuver support by fire positions (SBFs) and objectives

2. The CS must understand the maneuver commander's intent. With this understanding, he can then better discern his role in the battery mission. Once the CS feels comfortable with the TLP and the tactical situation, then he can focus his attention on the enemy and his capabilities.

THE THREAT

It is important that the Paladin CS understands the threat to his section by phase of the operation or by position area. It is also critical that he know how to reduce the threat to this section. Observations at NTC, however, indicate that the CS does not know what the threat is let alone how to reduce it.

Techniques:

1. During a typical battery OPORD, the commander may brief that the current threat to the battery is regimental reconnaissance assets in sector. From the battery's next position area the threat will be counterfire.

a. Initially, if the threat is enemy reconnaissance units, the CS must take full advantage of the existing concealment, such as treelines, wadis, builtup areas, or use camouflage nets.

b. When the CS receives movement instructions from the platoon leader through the POC, the chief has the tendency to take the most direct route to the new position area. This is often the most dangerous route to take because the CS does not attempt to conceal his movement. Much like the maneuver soldier, the CS should take a route which will not provide the enemy the ability to observe his movement.

c. If the counterfire threat is high during a specific phase of the operation, the CS must maximize the use of dispersion and know the displacement criteria. It is the battlefield awareness of the enemy situation that the CS must know to reduce the threat to his section.

2. The POCs are the most vulnerable sections in the battery and must take full advantage of concealment. All to often, the POCs are positioned out in the open within close proximity to the howitzers. The POCs should be positioned based upon METT-T considerations.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Address these training weaknesses and techniques during Home-Station Training:

  • The BC must accept the challenge and train the current and future Paladin CS. For example, BCs can develop a training program as part of their NCOPD or prime-time training. Eventually, this training could be incorporated into the battery's certification program or part of the battery lanes training program.

  • At the battalion level, include training in the battalion certification program with mandatory training conducted quarterly. Incorporate some aspects of the training into the battalion section evaluation competition. Senior NCOs who have graduated from the Battle Staff Course are ideal instructors.

  • Focus the training on the eight steps of the TLP. Along with the TLP, the training includes identifying/developing PCCs, PCIs and priorities of work based upon the EFATs and the battery timeline. The CS must have a complete understanding of the battery operations order and how the TLP affect the unit's accomplishment of the mission. Commanders should also include several blocks of instruction on maneuver tactics, graphics, threat doctrine and terminology.

Endstate: The CS is able to make the correct decision on the battlefield based upon his knowledge of the TLP, the tactical situation and the threat.

IN SUMMARY

The Paladin CS generally does not have the tactical skills necessary to operate independently and survive on the battlefield. To correct this and ensure they are successful, battery commanders must develop a training program which educates them on the Troop-Leading Procedures, the tactical situation and the threat.


btn_tabl.gif 1.21 K
btn_prev.gif 1.18 KEngagement Area Development and Battlefield Calculus
btn_next.gif 1.17 KBasic Support of Battalion Scouts



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list