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INTELLIGENCE BOS (cont)


TREND 9: Integration of Air Defense into the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).

PROBLEMS:

1. Task force (TF) staffs routinely omit or fail to integrate the air portion of the IPB during the TF planning process.

2. Most S2s integrate air avenues on the SITEMP, but few conduct a detailed air threat analysis.

3. The most likely COA for enemy air is rarely identified.

RESULTS:

1. The TF commander, staff, and company commanders gain little appreciation for the enemy air threat and capabilities.

2. Air defense plans are oriented on unit movement instead of concentrating available assets to defeat the air threat.

3. The TF commander's guidance to the air defense officers (ADOs) is unfocused (Example, ADA: protect the force).

Techniques:

1. The S2 should draw on the ADO for expertise on enemy air threat capabilities. Begin by referring to FM 34-130, Appendix C, reference the three dimensional IPB.

2. The air associated IPB cannot be treated separately. It must be used to show the synergy of air and ground threat.

3. During the mission analysis, the air threat must be briefed to the TF commander up front. This allows the commander to "see" critical points on the battlefield where the unit is most vulnerable to air attack. The commander can then prioritize ADA coverage IAW the threat and his intent/maneuver scheme. ADA assets will be positioned to defeat the air threat while the force postures to take active or passive air defense measures.

4. A standard 1:250,000 map should be used to conduct a detailed analysis of the terrain and refined using a 1:50,000 map.

5. The air IPB should include:

a. Key Terrain:

  • Airfields
  • LAS and DZ
  • FARPs
  • Choke Points

b. Air Avenues:

  • Type of Aircraft
  • Max Ceiling
  • Attack Profile
  • Weapon Systems
  • Target to be Attacked

c. Weather:

  • Visibility
  • Wind Speed and Direction
  • Precipitation
  • Cloud Cover
  • Temperature

d. Threat Evaluation:

  • Enemy Aircraft/Missile
  • Air Order of Battle
  • Aircraft Capabilities
  • Ordnance
  • Tactical Flight Doctrine
  • Priorities of Attack
  • Command and Control

e. Threat Integration:

  • SITEMP
  • Air Avenues of Approach
  • Determine best use terrain given aircrafts' own capabilities and attack profile.

f. Event Template:

  • Aerial NAIs
  • Terrain constraints on air avenue to potential target
  • Decision Support Template

g. Decision Support Template:

  • Air Avenues
  • Air Borne and Air Assault Objectives
  • LZs and DZs
  • Ranges of enemy systems
  • Aerial TAIs
  • Decision points

6. References: FM 34-130, IPB, Appendix C; FM 44-43, BSFV Platoon and Squad Operations; FM 44-64, FAAD Battalion and Battery Operations; TRADOC PAM 350-16, Heavy OPFOR Doctrine.

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)


TREND 10: (LTP) Air Defense Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Development.

PROBLEM: Air Defense Officers (ADO) have a tendency to wait until the brigade receives the formal order from Division before they begin the aerial IPB process. They rarely develop an aerial IPB based on the initial Warning Order (WARNO). Therefore, the brigade ADO rarely develops the aerial portion of the IPB prior to mission analysis.

RESULT: The ADA BOS rarely incorporates the third dimension analysis into the maneuver S2's IPB prior to COA development.

Procedures: The Aerial IPB results in a predictive analysis of when and where the brigade will most likely see enemy air. Appendix A of FM 44-100, Air Defense Operations, specifically addresses the Aerial IPB process. It emphasizes that the aerial IPB is a time consuming process that is an integral part of the IPB process.

Techniques:

1. The ADO's development of the aerial portion of the IPB must begin immediately following receipt of the Division's Warning Order.

2. The Air (Aerial) IPB must be a part of the brigade combat team's (BCT's) enemy situational template (SITEMP).

(TA.5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)


TREND 11: (LTP) Brigade S2 maintenance of enemy Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).

PROBLEM: The tracking of enemy BDA consistently provides a challenge for brigade S2s.

  1. There is no system in place to track enemy losses as they are identified on the battlefield.

  2. There are routinely no dedicated OPs that can provide surveillance of the enemy forces during the battle.

RESULT: Without an accurate enemy BDA, the S2 cannot identify weaknesses or vulnerabilities as they develop as a result of the actions during the battle.

Techniques:

1. Recommend that S2s develop enemy BDA charts that reflect an enemy in the defense by platoon positions and in the offense by each component echelon of the attacking force, rather than gross numbers of combat systems.

2. The R&S plan must address the assets that have surveillance responsibility during the battle. These assets must be tracked and queried to provide updated combat information to include BDA.

3. The subordinate units that have the task of destroying a particular enemy element are also responsible for providing the disposition of the threat they are required to act upon.

4. Commanders must crosstalk on the command net, and S2s must crosstalk on the O&I net.

(TA.5.2.2.5 Conduct Post-Attack Target Damage Assessment)


TREND 12: Task Force (TF) S2 terrain analysis. TF S2s often inadequately analyze the terrain in sufficient detail.

PROBLEMS:

1. TF S2s accurately depict enemy avenues of approach (AA) into their sectors/zones; however, they are not maximizing the MCOOs and other products for terrain analysis.

2. S2s identify enemy kill sacks, potential friendly engagement areas, defensible terrain, and specific system and equipment locations but do not integrate their product with the TF engineer.

3. S2s do not routinely use the TERRA BASE products or the 1:24,000 scale maps.

RESULT: The commander and staff are denied opportunities to exploit the terrain when determining friendly and Threat COAs.

Techniques:

1. S2s should train to produce detailed terrain analysis using TERRA BASE products and 1:24,000 scale maps. Use of these products would allow the commander and staff to "see the terrain" in greater detail prior to mission execution.

2. S2s should guard against making general assumptions regarding the "open terrain" in the desert.

3. TF S2s must improve in their ability to articulate how the terrain will impact COAs. S2 use of terrain analysis during mission analysis and COA development would greatly improve both their and the S3 threat and friendly COAs products.

(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)


TREND 13: (LTP) Engineer unit use of the Terra Base computer software program.

PROBLEMS:

1. Although FM 5-71-3 devotes an entire appendix (Appendix C) to the uses and capabilities of Terra Base, it is not routinely used at brigade or below.

2. Most engineer units are unfamiliar with the Terra Base computer program and use either "stubby pencil" line-of-sight (LOS) diagrams or completely ignore their "analysis of terrain" responsibility in the engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) process.

Procedures:

1. Terrain analysis is an engineer responsibility.

2. Appendix C to FM 5-71-3 explains that Terra Base is a computer software program that aids in the analysis of terrain. It does the following:

  1. Creates line-of-sight profiles.

  2. Assesses placement locations for weapons, radar, and radios.

  3. Views three-dimensional representations of terrain.

Technique: Terra Base or other terrain analysis tools should be required during Home Station training.

  1. Train key personnel.

  2. Identify the required brigade and task force products during Home Station training.

(TA.5.3.2 Evaluate Physical Environment Information)


TREND 14: Event templates and matrices.

PROBLEMS:

1. Task force S2s are generally not producing their event template or event matrix.

2. Those that are produced are incomplete.

3. S2s do not understand the use of the event template or items incorporated on the event template.

RESULTS:

1. S2s do not include a friendly COA development product.

2. S2s omit the R&S Plan product.

Techniques:

1. TF S2s must learn the importance of the event template. They cannot delete this step from the planning process.

2. Read and comply with FM 34-130. Phase lines, NAIs, and enemy decision points are critical to friendly COA development.

3. Use the event matrix as a companion to the template. Use of the event matrix should also help distinguish between the enemy COAs.

4. Conduct Home Station drills to develop the S2 section.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)


TREND 15: Situation Templates (SITEMPs) for use in R&S Planning.

PROBLEMS:

1. SITEMPs are often not available during the R&S planning.

2. TFs are not able to distinguish between when infiltration is possible and when infiltration is required to achieve the recon objective.

3. TFs repeatedly underestimate the enemy's commitment to counterrecon.

4. There is a lack of understanding of planning factors for recon.

RESULTS:

1. HMMWV scouts frequently selecting or being given routes right through enemy security zone positions.

2. The lack of understanding of planning factors for recon results in unrealistic expectations.

Techniques:

1. Dismounted infiltration is the only method that provides a reasonable probability of success when scouts are employed in this role. However, dismounted operations are also very limited in their scope and sustainability. More success is observed when OPFOR security forces are identified and destroyed, thereby opening a lane for the recon force to penetrate the enemy's security zone.

2. Bradley equipped scouts are better suited for these missions. HMMWV scouts must be either escorted or carried by Bradleys to a dismount point in order to be in position to observe the enemy's defensive preparation.

3. Integrate mission analysis products into R&S planning to allow battlefield calculus to determine the required composition of the recon force.

4. Availability and positioning of mortars and artillery must be a consideration in targeting enemy engineer and artillery assets.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)


TREND 16: Task Force (TF) S2 development of enemy courses of action (COAs). TF S2s have difficulty developing complete enemy COAs to assist the commander and staff to visualize how the enemy will fight using combat multipliers and the terrain.

PROBLEMS:

1. Mission analysis is frequently rushed by the TF. S2s usually have the competence, but often do not have sufficient time to complete their products.

2. Very few S2s are able to develop multiple enemy COAs or threat models.

3. S2s too often do not incorporate all threat combat multipliers and the terrain in the enemy COA.

Techniques:

1. TF staffs must understand the importance of mission analysis.

2. Early coordination with the brigade S2 for receipt of the brigade SITEMP will allow more time to develop TF level threat COAs.

3. The TF S2 must use a checklist to cover all combat multipliers. SITEMP omission of enemy capabilities such as ADA, indirect fires, or engineers may cause the TF to encounter unexpected threat COAs during the battle.

4. S2 sections must practice SITEMP drills at Home Station so that SITEMPs are produced quickly under battlefield conditions.

(TA.5.4.2 Prepare Reports on Enemy Intentions)


TREND 17: (LTP) S2 Situation template (SITEMP) adjustments.

PROBLEMS:

1. Initially, brigade S2 situational templates (SITEMPs) generally contain a comprehensive analysis of the threat and have multiple enemy courses of action. However, as more intelligence is provided to verify or deny a specific enemy course of action, the S2's adjusted situational templates usually lack the specificity.

2. Adjusted SITEMPs usually do not differentiate between actual (based on collected intelligence) versus templated enemy positions.

Techniques:

1. S2 sections should use a checklist that includes the different elements of the threat that the brigade will encounter. Such a checklist will ensure that each element is addressed. Recommend the following:

When facing a threat force, the S2's adjusted situational template should include the following components:

When facing an attacking threat, the following components of the attack should be included:

  • Divisional Reconnaissance
  • Regimental Reconnaissance
  • Artillery range fans
  • Ambush positions
  • Combat Security Out Posts
  • Nonpersistent chemical
  • Persistent chemical
  • FASCAM. MRC positions
  • Direct fire weapon positions
  • Direct fire range fans
  • Obstacles and the consequent fire sack created by those systems.
  • Dismounted infantry positions
  • Air defense weapons systems
  • RAGs/DAGs
  • Battalion reserve
  • Regimental Reserves
  • Routes for those reserves and timelines for the commitment of those reserves.
  • Air avenues of approach for fixed and rotary winged aircraft and firing positions or rotary winged aircraft.
  • Divisional reconnaissance team positions (DRTs)
  • Regimental reconnaissance routes
  • Combat Reconnaissance Patrol routes
  • Forward Security Element axis
  • Advance Guard main body axis
  • Regimental main body axis
  • TF Angel objective
  • Task Force Destroyer objective
  • AT-5s position
  • RAG
  • Templated Nonpersistent and Persistent chemical strikes
  • Templated FASCAM
  • Air avenues of approaches

2. The adjusted SITEMPs should differentiate between items that are confirmed from the Reconnaissance and Surveillance effort and those items that remain templated.

3. Recommend other brigade staff officers be given individual responsibilities to assist the S2's development of the SITEMP (i.e., the engineer should assist in templating obstacles, FASCAM, and the employment of a Mobile Obstacle Detachment/Mobile Support Detachment. The Chemical Officer should assist in templating Persistent and Nonpersistent strikes. The Air Defense Officer should assist in identifying the enemy air avenues of approach.)

(TA.5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy Situation)


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