TA.5 INTELLIGENCE BOS
Positive Performance
TREND 1: Crater analysis. Commanders at all levels are becoming more aware of the importance of conducting crater analysis after the receipt of opposing force (OPFOR) indirect fires. The information being provided in the shell report is being passed to the S-2 to conduct predictive counter-mortar analysis of the enemy situation. This information has led to the successful capture of several OPFOR mortars during the low-intensity conflict (LIC) phase.
(TA
5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)
TREND 2: Analysis and control team (ACT) integration into the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). Military intelligence companies continue to benefit from integration of the ACT into the physical layout of the brigade TOC. In doing so, intelligence analysts are able to participate in TOC battle drills and maintain a high degree of situational awareness. The most successful configurations locate the ACT adjacent to the brigade S-2, facilitating analytical cross-talk and battle tracking.
(TA
5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)
TREND 3: Battlefield area and threat evaluation. S-2s and their supporting management of information control officer (MICO) continue to arrive at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) with a clear understanding of the enemy's capabilities and limitations, as well as a good macro level understanding of the terrain and its effects on both friendly and enemy operations.
(TA
5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)
TREND 4: Development of the battalion situation template. The battalion S-2s are becoming noticeably more effective at predicting enemy locations and activities. This is especially true during the initial entry/movement to contact phase of operations, when S-2s regularly refine the division and brigade enemy situation template to the level where individual mortar firing positions are located. On more than one occasion, these templates have proven remarkably accurate, often missing the locations of high-payoff targets by less than 100 meters.
(TA
5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)
TREND 5: Staff integration. S-2s solicit input from other staff members on battalion and brigade staffs about enemy employment of enemy battlefield operating systems (BOSs). In particular, input from the fire support and air defense representatives consistently improves the S-2 portrayal of enemy employment of these systems.
(TA
5.3.1.2 Consider Enemy Doctrine)
TREND 6: Mine template. Units have demonstrated a marked proficiency in templating the locations of enemy minefields. Usually produced as a joint endeavor between the battalion S-2 and the engineer platoon leader, many recent templates have accurately predicted the locations of more than half of the enemy's minefields.
(TA
5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)
TREND 1: Use of scouts. Scouts must be involved in reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning.
PROBLEMS:
1. Units continue to have difficulty with the employment of their scouts in the execution of their R&S plans.
2. R&S planning is often conducted independent of the daily targeting meeting and seems to be an afterthought to the course-of-action development process rather than the driver for situation development and confirmation.
RESULT: Poor use of the scouts produces real time intelligence lacking the necessary situational development and not confirming intelligence already gathered by other means.
Techniques:
1. The planning staff identifies a dedicated R&S planning group (i.e., S-3 air, battle information coordination center (BICC), fire support NCO (FSNCO), medical platoon leader) to develop priority intelligence requirements (PIR) for continued planning and an R&S plan to confirm the enemy situation template immediately following mission analysis.
2. Reference: FM 7-92, The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad. Chapter 1, discusses the relationship between the battalion staff and the scout platoon during planning, while Chapter 2 focuses on the battalion's role in command and control (C2) of the reconnaissance platoon.
(TA
5.2 Collect Information)
TREND 2: Terrain products. Divisions are now deploying elements of their organic terrain analysis detachments to support maneuver commanders and intelligence officers.
PROBLEMS:
1. Commanders and their staffs are not familiar with the capabilities and limitations of terrain teams.
2. Commanders do not routinely request a package of standard terrain analysis products to support operations.
3. These products, once delivered, are not generally "pushed" to the rotational unit because of the lack of habitual training relationships.
RESULT: Units do not use the tools available to determine the impact of terrain on operations. Notable examples include the impact of terrain on:
- Mobility.
- Direct fire engagement for long-range weapons.
- Line-of-sight communications.
- Locations of suitable water sources.
- The rain and its effect on the strength of local soils.
Techniques:
1. Review FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
2. Request standard terrain analysis from the division terrain team and train extensively on its use.
3. Integrate slice element requirements, such as civil affairs and psychological operations, into terrain analysis requests in accordance with FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.
(TA
5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)
TREND 3: Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. Employment of HUMINT assets must be planned and executed in a timely manner.
PROBLEMS:
1. The HUMINT section organic to the MI direct support company continues to be under utilized and poorly focused.
2. Brigade and battalion S-2s do not understand how to employ HUMINT assets, and they consistently fail to incorporate teams on the brigade collection and battalion reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans.
3. MI company commanders fail to relate HUMINT capabilities and limitations to supported maneuver commanders and routinely lose focus of detached HUMINT teams.
RESULTS:
1. When HUMINT information is gathered, it rarely makes it way to the analysis control team (ACT) in a timely manner.
2. During civil military operations, brigade and battalion commanders entrust civil affairs (CA) attachments with intelligence collection and fail to include HUMINT soldiers in the collection planning process.
Techniques:
1. MI company commanders must increase their focus on HUMINT planning. The key to success is for the R&S platoon leader, in conjunction with the interrogation and counterintelligence technicians, to develop specific HUMINT collection guidance.
2. While at Home Station, the HUMINT section must coordinate with the supported battalion S-2 sections and provide them with the capabilities and limitations of civilian internee (CI)/HUMINT teams.
3. Comprehensive standing operating procedures (SOP), which address specific missions and reports that the teams are required to execute, must be developed and utilized.
(TA
5.2.1.3 Collect Information on Social/Political/Economic Environment)
TREND 4: Intelligence input to targeting. The targeting meeting is essential in working out the targeting priorities and details.
PROBLEMS:
1. S-2s and their supporting management of the information control officer (MICO) still do not provide detailed future projections of enemy courses of action to commanders and staffs during the targeting process.
2. The S-2s are not prepared for the targeting meetings.
RESULTS:
1. A major cause of this is lack of preparation for targeting meetings. S-2s arrive at the targeting meeting not prepared to discuss recent battle damage assessment (BDA), R&S results, or collection asset availability.
2. The S-2s do not have situation and event templates of probable enemy activities for the targeting period.
Techniques:
1. A technique to improve this consistent shortcoming is to make the items listed above--BDA, R&S results, collection asset availability, and template of future activities--a part of the section's internal updates.
2. If each of these items is updated several times a day, recent products will always be available for use in either a targeting process or to support any future planning. No lengthy preparation specifically for a targeting session would be required.
(TA
5.2.2 Collect Target information)
TREND 5: The targeting process. The targeting team must combine the indicators to determine the best use of unit assets.
PROBLEMS:
1. Most units do not suffer from a lack of intelligence concerning enemy activity, but from the lack of an established methodology for turning enemy intelligence into friendly action.
2. The targeting team is unable to combine the numerous indicators, arrive at a decision about the mortar's likely location, and mass combat power against what is clearly a high-payoff target.
RESULTS:
1. The most common scenario is that of an enemy mortar located within 200-300 meters of the S-2's template location.
2. Over a period of days, the mortar is acquired by the Q36 on one or more occasion (displacing prior to counter-battery fires), is heard by scouts or infantry, is resupplied by enemy aircraft, and fires on friendly units on multiple occasions (although a subsequent crater analysis is rare).
Technique: The unit targeting process methodologies must be worked out in Home Station training with all subordinate units participating. The unit's SOP should reflect the methodology chosen and should mirror the training lessons derived from practicing the techniques.
(TA
5.2.2 Collect Target Information)
TREND 6: The targeting meeting. The targeting and synchronization meeting is an important tool used by maneuver brigades and battalions during rotations.
PROBLEMS:
1. Chemical officers generally are not involved in this process.
2. The targeting and synchronization process allows the brigade to ensure the effective servicing of targets as well as the integration and synchronization of all the brigade's battlefield operating systems.
3. Many commanders use the targeting and synchronization process to drive their operations. One of the products that comes out of the meeting is a FRAGO.
RESULTS:
1. The NBC officer not involved in the process is not effective nor are the assets he oversees.
2. The chemical officer must be involved if he is going to have any timely influence on the battle from a NBC standpoint.
Techniques:
1. The chemical officer must be involved in the process.
2. A reference to help him understand the process is FM 6-30-10, The Targeting Process.
(TA
5.2.2 Collect Target Information)
TREND 7: Collection management by the S-2.
PROBLEMS:
1. Task force S-2s at brigade and battalion level do not manage their collection assets well.
2. The leading cause of this is that S-2s are often not well-practiced in the basic techniques discussed in FM 34-2, Collection Management.
3. Additionally, S-2s are often unaware of the capabilities and limitations of the systems at their disposal.
RESULTS:
1. S-2s do not consider all systems on the battlefield as collectors.
2. This leads to systems being underemployed or expected to perform tasks well beyond the capabilities of the system.
Techniques:
1. To reverse this trend, S-2s should review and practice staff training exercises using the techniques discussed in FM 34-2.
2. S-2s must familiarize themselves and their soldiers with the basic capabilities and limitations of each system. The MICO commander and his soldiers are the best place to look for this expertise.
3. The S-2 section's field SOP and the tools used during collection management should prompt the S-2 to consider assets not often tasked, such as the FSB and other support units.
(TA
5.3 Process Information)
TREND 8: Force protection. Units must identify enemy capabilities and take action necessary for force protection.
PROBLEMS:
1. Firing batteries/platoons routinely do a poor job of identifying enemy capabilities and taking the necessary force protection measures to eliminate or counteract the threat.
2. Identifying the threat and developing a plan to reduce enemy-inflicted casualties is a continued weakness.
3. Most units have difficulty with the threat analysis and identifying new enemy capabilities that occur during mission transition from contingency operations to a mid-intensity conflict.
Techniques:
1. Develop battle drills for actions upon contact: enemy in the wire, enemy within the perimeter, mines, air attack, chemical attack, sniper, terrorist, indirect fire, and armored vehicles (special munitions procedures).
2. Refine and rehearse convoy procedures, use of counter-reconnaissance patrols, fire planning along routes and around the perimeter, obstacle employment, fire base operations, terrain gun positioning, and the use of engineer assets.
3. Read and review FM 6-50, Fire Support in the Airland Battle, and FM 6-20-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battalion.
(TA
5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)
TREND 9: Template the chemical threat.
PROBLEMS:
1. Chemical personnel at both brigade and battalion often fail to produce a template of where, based upon their analysis, they suspect the possible employment of chemical agents on the battlefield.
2. A sound template will drive the NBC decontamination and reconnaissance effort. The chemical officer must possess an understanding of how the enemy fights; this can be found in the enemy order of battle.
RESULT: Once the chemical officer understands the enemy order of battle, he need only conduct reverse analysis to ascertain where he thinks the enemy will employ agents and then depict these locations on his template.
Techniques:
1. The chemical officer must design a decontamination and reconnaissance plan that covers the depth and width of his battlespace.
2. The chemical officer must coordinate with the S-2 to ensure that they are presenting the same picture for their respective commanders.
(TA 5.4.3 Prepare Tactical Intelligence Reports)
TA.1
Maneuver BOS Narrative
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