TA.1 MANEUVER BOS
Positive Performance
TREND 1: Scout weapons team (SWT)-level tactics. Small units consistently exercise discipline in the execution of their missions. The SWT members work well in the process of communicating, moving, and shooting. They have a common understanding of proper actions of contact. They are consistently able to coordinate indirect fires, coordinate with ground units to clear direct fires, and report promptly and accurately.
(TA
1.2 Engage Enemy)
TREND 2: Enter a building, and clear a room. Units across the Army are generally very proficient at clearing rooms in a military operation on urban terrain (MOUT) environment when they are working at the squad level and lower. The techniques outlined in FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas, are usually followed with a high degree of success. This success is primarily the product of Home Station training where the units can exercise the squads in either a MOUT facility or a tire house. The training at Home Station would be even more productive if the facilities incorporated irregular-shaped rooms and included furnishings in those rooms. This would increase both the realism and the difficulty soldiers will face in a MOUT environment.
(TA
1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat )
TREND 3: Enter and clear a trench. Platoons and down are displaying the ability to quickly and efficiently clear trench lines and knock out bunkers. These trenches are often being cleared in two directions at once without suffering a break down in the command and control of the element. The fundamentals of the operation are outlined in FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, and are executed at fairly high levels by units. Incorporating live grenades in trench clearing training at Home Station reduces the hesitation of actually using them.
(TA
1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat)
TREND 1: React to contact. More live fire training would be required to improve how soldiers react to contact drills.
PROBLEMS:
1. When soldiers are using blank ammunition, these drills are usually quick and effective. When the soldiers are uploaded with live ammunition, there is a great hesitation to conduct these drills with any speed.
2. Squad leaders are very hesitant to reposition soldiers to improve the effectiveness of fires under range conditions.
RESULTS:
1. Soldiers are typically brought on line with the point man and left in that spot whether it is effective or not. This leads to poor use of cover and concealment, as no adjustments are being made, even left and right, to better utilize terrain.
2. When soldiers and leaders are asked why adjustments are not made during the execution, they almost always refer back to the training they receive at Home Station.
3. A common statement overheard concerns the extremely strict control measures that are placed on units. These conditions almost always lead to a range mentality where soldiers are afraid to fire until given permission by an observer/controller (O/C). Also, soldiers typically conduct several rehearsals on the same lane on which they will conduct the operation with live ammunition. The soldiers then pretend they do not know what they are approaching, when in fact they do.
4. This lane recognition leads to entire elements identifying enemy targets and not engaging until they all engage, rather than individuals initiating fires.
Techniques:
1. To prevent a range mentality, units should conduct rehearsals in areas other than the area they will conduct their actual mission in order to promote a realism of response during their mission.
2. TC 25-8, Training Ranges, is a good point of reference for establishing these ranges.
(TA
1.2 Engage Enemy )
TREND 2: Fire control and distribution.
PROBLEMS:
1. The use of the machine gun is a seriously deficient problem across the light infantry.
2. Units rotating through the Joint Readiness Training Center do not understand the fundamentals of fire control and distribution.
3. Fire commands are common to all automatic weapons systems but are rarely given.
RESULTS:
1. A common theme at the JRTC is assistant gunners not observing and adjusting fires.
2. Soldiers are not using their sights to engage the enemy. M60 machine gun teams are not backfeeding ammunition into containers for rapid loading and firing. They are demonstrating an inability to clear malfunctions in their weapons. This inability to clear malfunctions is magnified at night.
3. These tasks must still be accomplished and there must be someone held accountable in the platoon that has that specific role.
4. The situation in platoons with weapons squads is really not any better.
Techniques:
1. References: FM 23-14, M249 Light Machine Gun in the Automatic Rifle Role, FM 23-67, M60 Machine Gun, and FM 23-65, Browning Machine Gun Caliber .50 HB, M2 (all refer to fire control and distribution, with an emphasis on the specifics in chapter 6 in each manual).
2. The challenge is to create either a training program or competition that will improve the use of machine guns in the light infantry.
(TA 1.2.1 Employ Direct-fire)
TA.5
Intelligence BOS Narrative
TA.2
Fire Support BOS Narrative
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