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"Incoming!!!" How to Reduce the Effectiveness
of Enemy Indirect Fires

BLUFOR units frequently suffer heavy, even crippling losses to enemy indirect fire -- sometimes even before they make contact with significant enemy ground forces. These losses are typically caused by pre-planned enemy targets plotted on obvious crossroads, defiles, and other such targets. While losses to this indirect fire cannot be completely avoided, there are several countermeasures BLUFOR units can use to reduce its effectiveness. Although the techniques discussed below are aimed particularly at company commanders, they apply at all levels.

Determining the likely locations of the enemy's pre-planned targets.

Determining the likely locations of the enemy's pre-planned targets is an integral part of the commander's "intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)" process. In the offense, such locations include breach locations, "support-by-fire" positions, key crossroads, chokepoints, and the objective itself. In the defense, additional locations to consider include the unit's battle positions and hide positions.

Selecting the right mix of countermeasures.

Once the commander has identified likely enemy indirect fire targets, the next step is to select the proper mix of countermeasures for each one. Countermeasures vary according to terrain and situation. They include:

Avoidance. Obviously, one of the countermeasures is total avoidance. If the commander can accomplish his mission without passing his forces through obvious chokepoints and key road junctions, he should do so. However, complete or even partial bypass is often impractical or impossible. The commander must have contingencies ready to execute. This requires planning and rehearsing other countermeasures.

Dispersion. All too often, units bunch up far more than the tactical situation requires. Thus, when enemy indirect fire lands, it blankets entire platoons or even multiple platoons, rather than only one or two vehicles. As played by the "Simulated Area Weapons Effects (SAWE)" system at CMTC, a typical circular indirect fire sheaf is 250 meters across and a linear sheaf is 300 to 400 meters long and 100 meters deep.

• Maintain reasonable dispersion of 75 to 100 meters between vehicles, especially near likely enemy targets, to improve unit survivability under enemy artillery fire.

• Proper planning improves the effects of dispersion. Proper use of graphic control measures, reporting, and cross-talk will reduce the tendency for units to "accordion" into one another.

EXAMPLE: As units advance, an unexpected delay to one element often causes following platoons and companies to pile in behind the leading elements, thus limiting the maneuver room for the units to their front.
RESULTS: Elements get caught in the traffic jam right at an obvious chokepoint, unable to move either forward or back.

Driving through Chokepoints. Another aspect of the fight that requires planning and rehearsal is the seemingly simple task of driving through a chokepoint or similar likely target.

EXAMPLE: A unit must pass through a key chokepoint prior to making contact with enemy ground forces. Typically, a BLUFOR unit will simply flow through in a steady stream, accepting their losses to indirect fire. As more and more vehicles are damaged or destroyed, the traffic flow becomes more and more obstructed and slowed, causing losses to mount even faster.

• Closely control the passage through the chokepoint. Launch one platoon-sized element at a time at high speed. Stagger intervals to further complicate the triggering problem for enemy observers. When an element reports clearing the "gauntlet" and moving a safe distance beyond, launch the next element. If an element takes losses, it should report back on the current trafficability of the chokepoint, allowing following units more time to react.

• Obscure the enemy observers' view of the target with smoke. But avoid placing smoke directly on the route to be used by friendly forces. Such smoke often does more harm to friendly forces (by slowing and confusing them) than it does to the enemy.

Occupying Targeted Terrain. Despite the above techniques, there will be times when a unit has no alternative but to occupy terrain that has been targeted by the enemy. Such locations include battle positions, breach sites, and support-by-fire positions. In this situation, the only way to reduce the effects of enemy artillery may be with counterbattery fire. While most aspects of counterfire are beyond the scope of this article, one aspect that the maneuver company commander should concern himself with is the "Critical Friendly Zone (CFZ)."

• The Critical Friendly Zone (CFZ). A CFZ is a box or circle on the map that is "observed" by friendly target acquisition radar. When the radar detects enemy indirect fire weapons firing into the CFZ, it generates a fire mission on the enemy weapon location. This forces the enemy weapons to either move or stay in place and be attritted. Either way, the result is reduced volume of indirect fire on friendly forces.

• Do not ignore CFZs. Maneuver company commanders often feel that CFZs are strictly fire support business, or that they are too complicated to get involved with. Wrong. No one has a more personal stake in the proper placement and timing of a CFZ than the commander whose breach site or support-by-fire (SBF) position the CFZ covers. (This does not mean that the maneuver company/team commander should necessarily be involved in controlling the use of CFZs during the fight. But his involvement during the planning and preparation phases increases the likelihood that the CFZs employed by Task Force and Brigade will support his scheme of maneuver.)

• Participate in the IPB process. Do not rely entirely on the task force S2 or Fire Support Officer (FSO) to do the IPB and planning when your company's welfare is at stake.

• Plan a CFZ on a Task Force's most critical breach site and SBF position.

• Cover key battle positions and chokepoints whenever possible.

• Use the flexibility of CFZs. Target acquisition radar can cover up to nine "zones" active at one time (and there are several types of zones besides Critical Friendly Zones). The key word is "active." Other CFZs can be planned, and turned on or off as the battle progresses.

  EXAMPLE: During the approach march, the CFZ covering a key chokepoint is active. Those covering the breach site and support-by-fire positions near the objective are inactive. As lead companies approach the objective, breach site and SBF, those CFZs are turned on and the chokepoint turned off. Use of pre-planned CFZs increases the likelihood that this process will happen effectively, even if the company Fire Support Officer becomes a casualty.

• Discuss CFZs during the operations order and rehearsal at both task force and company levels. If an FSO cannot provide a code name or number and detailed dimensions (map overlay), it often means that the planning process has been inadequate and the promised CFZ(s) will be ineffective.

Antennas. One final indirect fire countermeasure that a unit should consider is the supply of extra antennas. The MILES II/SAWE system at CMTC simulates several types of vehicle damage short of "catastrophic kills." One of these is the "communication kill," in which a vehicle loses the use of its radios, but is otherwise undamaged. Communication kills are one of the most common results of indirect fire at CMTC. While not a direct cause of casualties, the loss of synchronization and control once a unit suffers a number of communication kills can have a severe impact later in the fight. Often a communication kill is simply the result of a vehicle's external antennas being blown away. If the antenna mount/matching unit is undamaged, replacing the antenna(s) restores communication.

• Carry at least a few additional antennas for use by key leaders to improve their chances of retaining command and control after being hit with artillery fire.

• Remove and store extra antennas. Many vehicles have two antennas but only a single radio. Remove the extra antenna and store it inside an armored vehicle until needed to reduce the impact of commo kills on the unit.

No Guarantees

These techniques are no guarantee that your unit will not incur losses. But you will certainly experience a marked reduction in loss rate by using these techniques to reduce enemy indirect fire effectiveness.

"The 4 Basics" of Air Defense Planning

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