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WARGAMING

BACKGROUND

On four previous Movement to Contacts, the OPFOR attacked in the center and south with a heavy Forward Patrol (FP) and Forward Security Element (FSE) and in the North with a MRC-sized Flank Guard (FG). The FG always headed into the large engagement area in the North known as 15 Tango. On all four previous occasions, the Main Body (MB) (composed normally of 18 T-80s and 9 BMPs) went North, following the FG's success, and tore through the western edge of 15 Tango right on to the Northern Tank Trail where they began the race to the finish, bypassing BLUFOR units at an astonishing rate of 20 to 25 miles an hour.

THE LAST BATTLE

OPFOR attacked through zone with a combined arms reserve composed of 14 tanks and a depleted mortorized rifle battalion in an advance guard formation. They were poised to fight a meeting engagement.

DISCUSSION

During the preparation for the last battle, another Movement to Contact, the S-2 developed two enemy courses of action (ECOA).

• The most likely ECOA took the OPFOR on another course through 15 Tango.

• The most dangerous ECOA took the OPFOR main body on another high speed axis of advance to the South.

The staff then collectively war-gamed only the most likely ECOA, incorporating a couple of OPFOR splinter options once the main body was found in the middle of the maneuver area.

Using the S-2's situation template and the commander's guidance, the staff determined what Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) they needed to watch to answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

The BLUFOR movement plan consisted of three troops moving abreast to make contact, with two platoons following as a reserve.

As the battle unfolded, the S-2 watched as the FP and FSE once again attacked center zone. Nobody was surprised to find the FG moving once again North, toward 15 Tango. The MB, however, did not go North. Instead they followed the route predicted by the S-2 in his most dangerous ECOA. Since this action was not war-gamed, no NAIs were programmed for collection to locate the MB in the South.

The MB was not located until 25 minutes after it began movement. When the MB was found, it was located on the South center side of the movement area, 15 minutes away from the Bravo Bowl, an engagement area SE of 15 Tango, and complete envelopment of the BLUFOR forces. Lack of time precluded BLUFOR from repositioning forces from the 15 Tango area to the South.

ANALYSIS

The S2 predicted the OPFOR movement, almost exactly in his most dangerous ECOA. Had the staff war-gamed that option and combined both wargames when creating their final event template (as depicted in the following illustration), they would have realized the importance of watching a NAI to confirm or deny either ECOA. The unit would have had more than 25 minutes advanced warning on the MB movement and intentions.

LESSONS

1. BLUFOR units need to war-game a minimum of two ECOAs.

2. The plan developed for one ECOA must include at least the basics for survival should OPFOR attack with the other.

Using these techniques enables the commander to make a prudent timely, judgements between accepting risk and taking a gamble.

"Incoming!!!" - How to Reduce the Effectiveness of Enemy Indirect Fires

Acknowledgements