CHAPTER
8
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
by CPT William Carter1. GENERAL. There are numerous articles on combat operations where authors state that commanders are responsible for setting conditions before going into battle. This setting of conditions also applies to logistics operations. His start point in controlling this operation begins with his company headquarters, the executive officer, first sergeant, and supply sergeant who, according to FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, is the element responsible for coordination and execution of combat service support (CSS) operations within the company. In most cases, an armor platoon receives their supplies directly from the organic headquarters element of their company. The infantry commander must control the flow and timeline of this resupply action to ensure it does not interfere with his own operational requirements. The best way to do this is to ensure that CSS operations for the company and armor platoon are jointly coordinated. They cannot and must not be coordinated separately regardless of the command relationship.
Having a fuel HEMTT arrive at your company assembly area 30 minutes before crossing the line of departure will definitely have a negative effect on the overall operation, especially if the commander is not expecting it.
2. DOCTRINAL BASE. According to FM 7-10, "sustaining his company in battle is one of the greatest challenges to the infantry company commander." With the addition of four tanks from a tank platoon placed under his operational control, a commander's responsibility and challenges greatly increase.
Issue: Adding tanks to the equation requires an infantry company commander to anticipate additional support requirements. The question is: How does he do so without interfering with his operation?
Discussion: As in most JRTC rotations, an armor unit is attached to the brigade. That tank company will arrive with limited assets from its company's headquarters and battalion to support it. These assets will most likely include fuel HEMTTs, cargo vehicles, medical assets, and an organizational maintenance slice, as well as a direct support (DS) maintenance component. The company can suballocate these CSS assets to tank platoons as the mission requires. If these tank platoons are allocated out to support infantry battalions and companies, they cannot operate without some support from the infantry companies and battalions, regardless of the command relationship under which they are sent to support those subordinate elements. They will depend on some sort of CSS support to accomplish their mission. This heavy reliance on CSS is something new to most infantry company commanders. The trick for the infantry company commander is to ensure that support of this temporary armor asset does not interfere or disrupt his operations.
3. PLANNING. The bottom line for an effective joint CSS operation is to know and anticipate current and future CSS requirements. Additionally, the units must determine how and when the supplies will arrive. The company commander should receive a backbrief from the armor platoon leader on the logistic status and logistic plan for the platoon. Ideally, the armor platoon leader or platoon sergeant and the infantry company's executive officer will develop and forecast their supply requirements together. The armor platoon leader will send his requirements to his company headquarters element that is usually located in the brigade support area (BSA). The executive officer will pass his company requirements to the battalion S4 and the company supply sergeant along with the armor platoon's requirements. The battalion S4 and the company supply sergeant should coordinate this resupply operation with the battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) commander and the armor company supply sergeant or commander. If properly organized and coordinated, this redundancy of passing information concerning supply requests should make for a more effective resupply operation and minimize the use of vehicles. This coordinated effort may prevent this type of scenario:
The armor platoon sergeant makes a request to his headquarters element for resupply of ammunition and a two-day supply of meals, ready-to-eat (MREs) for his platoon. The infantry company that he is supporting, Alpha Company, also submitted a request for water and some class VIII (medical) items to their battalion S4. The armor company sends a logistics package (LOGPAC) to his platoon located near "Carnis village." The infantry battalion sends its LOGPAC to Alpha Company's trains location just north of Carnis village. This infantry LOGPAC left the BSA 15 minutes after the armor LOGPAC. All the vehicles on both LOGPAC are half-filled with supplies. When both LOGPACs are at the site, they create a large signature and reveal the company's location to the enemy. The Cortina Liberation Front (CLF) quickly fired 10 rounds of 81-mm mortars on the company's area, destroying the HEMTT and all the supplies from both LOGPACs. Incidentally, the armor platoon had extra water and the infantry company had extra MREs.
This scenario is due to poor planning and coordination back at the brigade support area (BSA), but the company and the armor platoon leader will be the ones most affected. The company commander and armor platoon leader working together can avoid the problems associated with such a situation. Units should not use two separate trucks or two separate LOGPACs to carry supplies going to the same location just because different units sent the request. A small LOGPAC is easier to secure and does not give as large a signature as a large LOCPAC or numerous LOGPACs. To make this work takes coordination between the infantry company, the Forward Support Battalion, the infantry HHC commander, and the armor company. Prior planning and coordination is required to succeed in CSS operations.
ARM - The armor platoon leader must have a plan for redistribution of ammunition and be prepared to brief the infantry commander on this plan. After an engagement, the platoon should redistribute ammunition among the tanks. It is better to have four tanks with 20 rounds than two tanks with 40 rounds.
FIX - The commander must understand that tanks need to conduct Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) daily. He must allow this to occur, but can determine when based on METT-T. The armor platoon leader needs to brief him on the maintenance status of the tanks and inform the commander of any changes to that status. The armor platoon leader must ensure his soldiers do the PMCS by the technical manual and not by memory.
The commander needs to consider contingencies for inoperative tanks. He must have a plan to support and provide security for maintenance and recovery operations. The tank crew will conduct operator repair and self-recovery operations, if possible. The ideal scenario is to repair the equipment as far forward as possible. If it cannot be fixed within two hours, the commander must have a plan to secure the maintenance/recovery team while they evacuate the tank for repairs. The armor company headquarters elements will transport the tank to the unit's maintenance collection point for repair. The commander must be aware that an M113 armor personnel carrier (APC) and possibly an M-88 medium armored recovery vehicle, a 56-ton vehicle, will be working in his area of operations during repair and recovery operations. Tank maintenance operations provide a large security problem. Noise, light, and activity are inherent in any type of armor maintenance, repair, or recovery operation.
FUEL - Keeping the tanks fueled is the most critical requirement faced by the armor platoon leader. The armor platoon leader must constantly keep the company commander abreast of his fuel status. The armor company's headquarters elements should conduct refueling operations in conjunction with the infantry company's LOGPAC operations. Units with tanks attached should always incorporate fuel HEMTTs as part of every company LOGPAC no matter what the fuel status of the tanks. It is essential to keep the tanks topped off. It is dangerous for everyone involved conducting a "911 emergency resupply mission." A nonscheduled fuel draw from the BSA, which has minimum fuel-holding capability, can affect the whole brigade operation. An emergency fuel mission will disrupt the battle momentum of the company.
MAN - The infantry company commander should have his platoon medics and combat lifesavers practice techniques for extracting wounded soldiers from tanks and loading them to litters on an M113 APC ambulance. All armor headquarters elements have at least one M113 APC ambulance and usually configure their maintenance APC to carry litters too. FM 8-10-6, Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, details techniques for extracting wounded from tanks without causing further injury and for loading procedures for the M113 APC ambulance. The senior medic in the company should request additional class VIII, such as burn pads and IVs, for treating burns.
TRANSPORT - Tanks can carry additional supplies for the infantry company. This transportation asset is rarely considered by commanders. Tanks are ideal for carrying additional water, critical supplies, wounded or injured men, and ammunition (to include mines and mortar rounds).
4. EXECUTION. Always incorporate the armor platoon's LOGPAC with the infantry company's LOGPAC. This eliminates the need for coordinating twice for vehicle security. Additionally, it should reduce the signature that multiple supply operations create. The HHC commander in the BSA should coordinate with the headquarters element of the armor company concerning LOGPAC operations or vice versa. Before sending a supply request, the commander must determine the type of resupply technique he wants to execute and understand the pros and cons for each. The commander should execute a resupply technique based on the battalion commander's guidance and METT-T.
-
"In-Position," also called the "Tail Gate" technique -- supplies come directly
to the elements in the company trains. For this technique, units do not have
to move the supplies from one location to another, but this operation may provide
the enemy a signature of the company's location (see Figure 8-1).
Figure 8-1
-
"Out of Position," also called "service station" technique requires the tanks
and the soldiers to leave their current position to receive the supplies. This
technique allows the resupply operation to take place away from the company's
area of operations (AO) or positions and helps prevent the supply operation
from revealing their exact location to the enemy. However, company vehicles
or soldiers will be used to transport the supplies to their final destination
(see Figure 8-2).
Figure 8-2
Company commanders can also use a combination of these techniques. The company must have a plan on how it will receive supplies. The company must rehearse and develop battle drills to ensure quick and secure resupply operations.
Having the supplies just show up in the company's AO, then choosing PVT Smith and Jones, who happen to be in your vision, to get the supplies off the HMMWV can have a devastating effect, especially in "Cortina."
- Another
resupply technique not discussed is "pre-positioned" or "cache." Chapter 8,
FM 7-10, covers these resupply techniques in more detail. An additional consideration
a commander must make concerning resupply operations with an armor platoon
under operational control is where to receive the supplies. The commander must
find a location for the operation that is covered and concealed and in unrestricted
terrain for fuel HEMTTs to travel. This can be part of his IPB process. These
vehicles are not able to go where the tanks can. Just because a tank got to
a position does not mean a HEMTT can go there too. If a fuel HEMTT became stuck
or damaged, it would affect the whole brigade's operation. This asset is hard
to replace on the battlefield.
Finally, vehicles should not return empty to the combat trains or BSA. The infantry company commander should use the LOGPAC vehicles to backhaul soldiers killed in action, routine casualties, enemy equipment, equipment needing further repair, sling sets, and trash.
TTP:
- Infantry commanders must have well-developed plans to execute and support resupply operations.
- The armor platoon leader must brief the commander on the armor logistic plan and status.
- The armor platoon leader should develop his supply request in conjunction with the company first sergeant or executive officer.
- Include HEMTT fuel trucks in all company LOGPAC operations.
- Plan to have inoperative tanks evacuated to a unit maintenance collection point if it cannot be repaired in a far forward area within two hours.
- Medics and combat lifesavers need to know the techniques for extracting and treating wounded tankers.
- The commander must thoroughly plan the technique and choose the location that his company will receive and distribute supplies.
- Commanders need to pick suitable terrain for HEMTT conducting resupply operations.
- Use LOGPAC to backhaul personnel and material to the combat trains or BSA.
5. CONSIDERATIONS. The following information will assist leaders in planning the support requirements for tanks.
- Refueling and rearming of a tank platoon--four tanks--is approximately 30 minutes under ideal conditions.
- A single tank takes 10 minutes to refuel.
- A tank platoon can only operate for nine to 10 hours without refueling.
- The drain on the batteries from thermal sights requires the tanks to run their engines approximately every hour for about 15 minutes.
M1A1 (ABRAMS) - Main Battle Tank
Fuel Capacity: 520 gallons
Consummation
Rate: A tank will need approximately 300 gallons every eight hours; this will
vary depending on mission, terrain, and weather.
Mobility
Characteristics:
Basic
Load for a Tank:
References:
Chapter
7: Security of Key Assets
Appendix
A: Infantry Riding on M1 Tanks - Extract
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