CHAPTER
6
COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE
by 1SG Timothy Ross1. GENERAL. The infantry company commander was on edge. This counter-reconnaissance mission was new to him. His soldiers had almost never worked with tank or aviation support. On top of that, the previous night had been a miserable failure. The enemy's divisional reconnaissance force had successfully infiltrated his sector and was now operating somewhere in the rear. His company had occupied the sector late in the day. They neglected to reconnoiter the area properly to confirm the S-2's intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). He had no Class IV or Class V to build obstacles. The tank section had not linked up until after dark. Their positions had not been identified. Weapon systems failed to fire. He could not talk to the Kiowa Warriors that buzzed overhead. No information was coming over the net from battalion. It was impossible to know who was where in the sector. None of the supporting assets had been present when he put his plan together.
Excuses? Poor planning? Incompetence? It made no difference to the innocent, young soldier who was wounded during chance contact the previous night. He died of wounds before he could be evacuated. None of this would happen again if the commander had his way.
The company commander and the first sergeant spent the remainder of the first night reviewing and synchronizing the plan, coordinating assets, and confirming times and places. At the first sign of light, unit priorities shifted from personal hygiene and breakfast to reconnaissance and security patrols. The company commander's directive was to reconcile the actual terrain with the map and select the best ambush and obstacle locations for the brigade counter-reconnaissance fight. Anyone who can read a map knows that the ground often differs from what is on the map itself.
The unit completed its reconnaissance, determined the likely enemy avenues of approach in the daylight, and refined the obstacle and ambush sites. The first sergeant and platoon sergeants supervised the emplacement of obstacles and dissemination of information to the lowest level. Platoon leaders provided the commander sector sketches. After careful consideration of the tank section leader's advice, the company commander determined the best place to position the tanks. The fire support officer coordinated with unit forward observers to develop a fire support plan that supported the company commander's scheme of maneuver.
The company commander developed detailed graphic control measures that facilitated identifying the location of the enemy and calling for indirect fires. These control measures allowed an easy handover if the enemy passed through the depth of the zone. The company commander included the location of all friendly elements, preplanned targets, and obstacles. He made sure all elements received these graphics. He reinforced engagement criteria, engagement priorities, and measures for identification of friendly forces. Finally, the company commander imposed a "no-movement time" in the zone before the anticipated arrival of the enemy's reconnaissance forces. This simple move significantly reduced the amount of time required to clear direct and indirect fires and enhanced his unit's ability to acquire the enemy early. Simply stated, if it moves, it is enemy -- kill it.
As darkness fell, the unit completed its final communications checks. The tank section leader, platoon leaders, squad leaders, Kiowa Warrior pilots, fire support officer, and company commander are glued to their handsets. Soldiers lay in wait contemplating the outcome of the upcoming fight. They are READY!
The soldiers of the fire team overwatching the obstacle kept their ears close to the ground. They hear the rumble of vehicles at the same time the observation post calls in the spot report. Without speaking a word, the rest of the squad is alerted and prepares for the engagement. AT-4s are up. M203s are loaded with illumination and high-explosive rounds. The machine gunner has the butt of his weapon against his shoulder. Tension eases as the adrenaline rush takes over. The tank, positioned to cover the mounted enemy avenue of approach, rotates its turret down the trail beyond the obstacle.
The enemy reconnaissance vehicles roll into the engagement area. They discover the obstacle. The squad leader whispers into his handset, "Two BRDMs, checkpoint two, time now." Several enemy soldiers exit the vehicles. They cautiously approach the obstacle. Suddenly night turns to day. The tank main gun fires, and the lead enemy reconnaissance vehicle erupts in a ball of flames. The M203 gunners fire their illumination, while the AT-4 gunners engage and destroy the trailing BRDM. Tank machine-gun fire joins the M240 and SAW fires to sweep the area clear of dismounted enemy. Team leaders fire claymores. Riflemen throw grenades. The squad leader reports "Two BRDMs and all personnel destroyed, time now."
The company commander smiles as he reports to the battalion commander that this enemy element will never see the main defensive area.
2. DOCTRINAL BASE. Counter-reconnaissance begins before initial occupation and continues throughout the depth and time of the defense. Traditionally, heavy forces (armor and mechanized infantry) or air cavalry units conduct counter-reconnaissance missions. The screen is a common counter-reconnaissance mission. It is often the cornerstone of a successful defense. The purpose of a screen is to identify and destroy enemy reconnaissance assets before they reach a unit's main battle area. Counter-reconnaissance forces provide the commander with invaluable information for formulating his defensive plan while preventing enemy reconnaissance forces from gaining information valuable to their attack.
There is little mention of techniques, tactics, and procedures for conducting counter-reconnaissance operations in light infantry field manuals. According to FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, "This operation entails denying enemy reconnaissance elements from gaining accurate information on friendly preparations through destruction of enemy recon or through deception." The mission is executed as a series of reconnaissance and security (R&S) patrols during daylight hours and ambushes (personnel and anti-armor) during hours of limited visibility. Observation posts are well forward and occupied continually. Forward observers man the observation posts. The unit places obstacles on mounted avenues of approach and early warning devices on dismounted avenues of approach.
Keys to success in the counter-reconnaissance fight are:
- Unity of command
- A well-planned concept
- A mix of finders and fighters
- A contingency withdrawal plan
3. PLANNING. The counter-reconnaissance zone is typically a large area. The execution of the plan is decentralized. Such an operation calls for a simple, yet well-planned, concept.
Issue 1: How is the light infantry commander's plan affected by the addition of a tank platoon or section?
Discussion: Rarely do light infantry and tanks operate in unison. This creates gaps in knowledge of how to employ tanks in with the light infantry. Tanks provide the light infantry commander with capabilities that he normally does not possess. To maximize the integration of these capabilities, the light infantry commander must understand them. In addition to considering mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T), he must adjust his perspective to consider how the addition of tanks to his force may influence execution. Failure to do so in the planning process almost certainly leads to failure in execution.
EXAMPLE: Tanks play a major role in the light infantry commander's observation plan. The gunner's primary sight reads heat signatures out to 4,000 meters. The planner considers the best employment of his tank platoon/section. The armor asset can fulfill the roles of finders or finishers. The armor can execute its counter-reconnaissance role from a fixed site or by maneuvering to engage the enemy at different locations. The factors of METT-T and information provided by the subject matter expert that assists the planner determine the best role.
TTP:
- Execute task organization of the company team at issuance of warning order.
- Integrate the tank platoon/section leader in the planning process.
- Focus on the roles of each participating element and how they support each other (overlap).
- Realize the tank platoon/section leader is a subject matter expert.
Issue 2: Terrain will have the greatest impact on how the light infantry commander plans to employ the tanks in his zone.
Discussion: Light infantry can traverse any type terrain. The addition of tanks in the counter-reconnaissance zone affects how the commander must look at the terrain. Tanks require more open and firm terrain. They can become mired in low-lying areas. They slow down in densely wooded areas. And they need open areas to engage targets. It is critical that the planner uses all available sources of terrain data to build his plan. The map is a good starting place, but not always accurate. The planner must analyze the terrain from his own standpoint and the perspective of the enemy. He must possess a firm grasp of how to use the terrain to his advantage to properly utilize all of his assets, maximize the stand-off range of tank weapons systems, and integrate the gunner's primary sight into the observation plan.
TTP:
- Seek out all information available about terrain in the area of operations (maps, aerial photographs, information provided by residents of the area).
- Conduct ground or aerial reconnaissance before the occupation of the zone and completion of the plan.
- Do not fall prey to the idea that vehicles are bound to the existing road network.
Issue 3: The addition of tanks to a light infantry unit drastically changes Combat Service Support requirements. These changes must be determined and accommodated during the planning process.
Discussion: Light infantry unit resupply issues for counter-reconnaissance missions are customarily small. The unit normally deploys with enough Class I and Class V to be self-sustaining. Class IV is air-dropped or pushed forward with engineer support. Contingency plans usually provide for emergency resupply with air or by truck insertion.
Tanks expend Class III and Class V in greater quantities. Develop a plan to meet these needs before you occupy the zone. It takes time to refuel a tank section or platoon. Build this into the plan to prevent running of out these essential supplies at a critical point in the counter-reconnaissance fight. Planners must consider routes in and out of the zone, location of the resupply points, and rates of consumption. Tanks require maintenance. Build time into the plan to compensate for maintenance.
Tanks are a mobile platform. They can assist light infantry by hauling additional Class I and Class V without increasing soldier load. This requires coordination with the armor element to ensure that space is available.
TTP:
- Integrate tank platoon/section leader in planning process to ensure understanding of requirements.
- Build timelines that allow for maintenance and resupply.
- Fix and fuel forward.
Issue 4: The relationship between the armor element and the light infantry commander must be clearly defined.
Discussion: An armor element can be attached or placed under the operational control of the light infantry commander. When under the operational control of a light infantry commander, the tank element usually has follow-on missions. This has a distinctive impact on the commander's plan. The light infantry commander has to establish a solid command relationship with the armor element. Planners have to ensure that additional missions are not imposed on the armor while performing the mission in zone.
TTP:
- Define clearly the relationship, OPCON or attached; it impacts planning.
- Do not give the armor element additional parent unit missions that interfere with its role in the counter-reconnaissance zone.
- Clarify and confirm exact start and end times of the relationship.
- Remember that an element can support only one commander at a time.
4. PREPARATION. The preparation phase of any operation is critical. Preparation begins with the receipt of the warning order and continues through the unit's "not later than" (NLT) time. It is the time for procuring assets and conducting rehearsals and pre-combat inspections. Everything is checked, rechecked, and then checked one more time.
Issue 5: Battle drills differ between light infantry and tanks. Rehearsals prepare the units to operate as a combined force and provide a forum to enhance success.
Discussion: Rehearsals are paramount to success. Attendance for all elements of the counter-reconnaissance fight is mandatory. This is the commander's opportunity to ensure all elements understand his intent and scheme of maneuver. It is the final occasion to confirm control measures, clarify questions, synchronize the fight, and adjust the plan. Rehearsals reduce the level of risk associated with the operation. Conduct rehearsals both in and out of the zone.
TTP:
- Task-organize early.
- Involve all soldiers if possible; if not possible, ensure all key leaders are present and participating.
- Plan timelines to allow maximum time available for rehearsing.
- Prioritize rehearsals (most to least important).
- Supervise at all levels.
- Rehearsals can begin at lowest level upon receipt of warning order.
Issue 6: There is often a lack of urgency and visibility of the counter-reconnaissance fight. This tends to distract light infantry and tanks from their primary focus.
Discussion: Light infantry and tanks require all available time to prepare for the mission together. These elements should focus exclusively on the impending mission. To be prepared for the counter-reconnaissance fight, the maneuver commander must receive his assets early. He cannot waste time developing an extensive tentative plan or conducting other missions. He must settle in the zone before the enemy does. The commander can complete his plan and conduct additional rehearsals in the zone, but to do so, he must have all of his assets.
The maneuver commander needs the information that reconnaissance of the zone provides him. Infiltrating the zone and conducting daylight R&S patrols gets the commander essential information. It confirms or denies initial IPB, allows time for emplacement of obstacles, identifies positions for tanks (tanks should be moved forward after initial reconnaissance clears the area), and sets the conditions for a successful execution. Armor that arrives just before the anticipated enemy movement is not prepared. They had no role in planning, missed rehearsals, and lack situational awareness.
TTP:
- Plan the counter-reconnaissance fight first.
- Give priority of assets to the counter-reconnaissance commander.
- Task-organize early.
- Initiate movement, and conduct reconnaissance immediately.
- Give this element no simultaneous missions.
5. EXECUTION. Execution is the culmination of all planning and preparation efforts. Rubber meets the road in this phase of the operation. The execution of the counter-reconnaissance fight is decentralized. It provides many challenges for command and control. Success depends on many factors:
- Disciplined and well-trained soldiers.
- Junior leaders empowered with the authority to make decisions and take initiative within well-defined guidelines of the commander.
- A solid, flexible plan distributed to the lowest level.
- Quality rehearsals, involving all elements, which will overcome the lack of combined arms (light infantry and tanks) training that exists in the Army.
Issue 7: How are armor elements integrated into the execution of the counter-reconnaissance fight?
Discussion: The light infantry commander employs armor assets in the execution phase of the operation in different ways. He has the option to use the tanks as a maneuver force, from a fixed location, or as a combination of both (maneuver and fixed). Available assets can limit his approach to employment.
EXAMPLES:
1. Tanks can be used as a finishing force and flex to the point of contact in support of the light infantry. This method works best during daylight, but can be used at night. Night operations require excellent coordination between elements, appropriate signals, and perfect situational awareness.
2. Tanks can also be employed in the find and finishing role from a fixed site. The tanks find the enemy with thermal sights or through spot reports from the infantry and kill with main gun. From a fixed sight, they provide support by fire to maneuvering infantry, have anti-armor ambush capabilities, and can overwatch obstacles.
Terrain, size of the zone, and level of combined arms experience are considerations for how to best employ the tanks. One method is to use the maneuver technique during daylight and keep the tanks in a fixed site at night. Tanks always work best as a section. Light infantry are excellent additional security elements for the tanks. They must execute in unison.
TTP:
- Use tanks in find-and-finish roles.
- Stationary tanks leave less signature at night.
- Identification of friendly forces' measures, communications, and situational awareness is key. Use reverse slope and low ground where possible to mask the presence of tanks.
- Maintain tank section integrity.
Issue 8: Does the introduction of tanks into a light infantry element affect command and control?
Discussion: An increase in the size of any element impacts command and control measures. Standing operating procedures are different. Signals, communications procedures, and tactics invariably differ. This need not affect the execution if the elements link up early and identify the differences during planning and rehearsals. Graphical control measures, identification of friendly forces' measures, and disciplined communications procedures lend to the successful execution of the counter-reconnaissance fight. Allowing squad leaders to talk to tank commanders, tank commanders to talk to aviation assets, or forward observers to talk to the commander does not undermine the control of the commander and facilitates initiative, reaction time, and clarity of information. Of course, it requires rehearsal, confidence, and discipline to be effective. Checkpoints are used to pass the enemy location through the sector until they are in a position to be engaged. "No movement times" during hours of limited visibility simplify the identification of enemy and the clearance of direct and indirect fires. The commander in this decentralized fight should locate himself where he can best observe the zone and monitor the fight on his radio while his well-trained and well-rehearsed force annihilates the enemy.
TTP:
- Cross talk at the lowest level decreases reaction time.
- "No movement times" facilitate identification of enemy forces and speed target engagement.
- Radio discipline is paramount; everyone must monitor.
- Enforce "no movement times" to prevent fratricide.
- Maintain situational awareness through use of strict control measures and reporting.
Figure 6-1
Chapter
5: Battle Positions
Chapter
7: Security of Key Assets
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