Military

Brigade fire support planners routinely assign reinforcing MLRS battalions the critical fire support tasks of counterfire against the regimental artillery group (RAG) and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) fires. Although MLRS is well suited for these missions, the range and lethality of the system could be maximized by employing MLRS fires against maneuver high payoff targets in the brigade zone or sector.
Fire support planners seldom compensate for the total amount of time required for MLRS to respond and deliver fires.
Generally MLRS fires are employed close to friendly troops, after the enemy has deployed into battle formation. During this phase, the enemy is more widely dispersed and harder to neutralize or destroy with massed indirect fires. RESULT: Large volumes of fire piecemealed against individual tanks and armored personnel carriers.
There is a 2000 meter danger close requirement for the M26 DPICM rocket. When established around COLTs and scouts forward of the FLOT, these no-fire areas (NFAs) create large areas where MLRS fires must be cleared or cannot be fired.
When the brigade does employ MLRS fires against maneuver targets, it plans and fires point targets under circumstances where area targets would achieve greater effects.
a. A point target is defined as 250 meters or less in length and width (FM 6-20-20).
b. Routinely, MLRS fires 24 to 36 rockets against these point targets.
c. One M26 rocket has a 150 by 200 meter submunition dispersal pattern on the ground.
d. Rarely in the brigade area will a maneuver target of company or larger size occupy an area less than 250 meters.
e. The same trend is seen in defensive operations where the enemy can place vehicles as much as 300 meters apart.
Brigade planners often overlook the capability of MLRS to deliver high volumes of fire much faster than the direct support cannon battalion.
a. A single launcher can deliver the same amount of lethality with 12 rockets that a 155mm howitzer battalion does with 86.4 rounds (4.8 battalion volleys).
b. Each can deliver this volume in about the same amount of time. However, a single MLRS platoon, firing 36 M26 rockets, can deliver the equivalent of 10.8 battalion volleys. A MLRS platoon can do this in one minute, whereas a cannon battalion would take from 3 to 10 minutes.
One limitation of MLRS that planners seldom account for is the launcher response time for a call for fire.
a. If the target was moving and the method of control was when ready (WR), the trigger does not normally account for the distance the target traveled in the elapsed time.
b. Once the launcher receives the call for fire, it must travel to the firing point, lay on the assigned target, then fire.
c. Once fired, time to warhead event for an M26 rocket can reach 100 seconds at maximum range.

Techniques:

1. Brigade fire support planners must know and maximize the capabilities of MLRS.

2. MLRS has shown the greatest effects on maneuver high priority targets (HPTs) when:

3. If the target is moving, use At My Command (AMC) as the method of control with a well planned trigger, to minimize crew response to the command to fire and time to warhead event.

4. Use area targets (linear, rectangular, or circular) to maximize the area covered by high volumes of the M77 submunition to cover the entire area of the enemy formation, both in the offense and defense.

2.2.1.2 Adjust/Illuminate Fire Support Targets

* Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) use of Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designators (G/VLLDs):

COLTs are not using their G/VLLDs to obtain refined target locations to obtain first round fire for effect.
When they are not given a specified mission to lase, teams usually opt to leave their G/VLLDs at the brigade main.

Technique: COLTs should always carry the G/VLLD, regardless of their assigned task. Based on the COLT's mission to either provide terminal guidance for precision munitions, recon/surveillance, or as a primary observer for a specified target, the observer must be cable of lasing to refine the target location. The best tool currently available for both day and night is the G/VLLD.

2.2.1.3 Request Air-to-Ground Attack

* (CSM trend) Call for fire: Leaders often do not know how to call for fire.

They do not know who to call.
They do not know what radio net or frequency to use.
They do not know how to describe the target or its location.

Techniques:

1. NCOs must be informed about how to call for fire. Develop SOP at Home Station and practice call for fire drills during Home Station training.

2. Include leaders in the decision-making process to familiarize them with the fire support plan.

Table of Contents

Section II: TA. 1 Maneuver BOS

Section II: TA. 3 Air Defense BOS