Military

The engineer force does not understand mounted or dismounted movement formations and the characteristics associated with each, e.g.:
- When one movement formation is used rather than another.
- What the advantages and disadvantages are of the various techniques.
Engineers do not plan for the employment of engineer company direct fire weapons systems as part of the actions on contact plan. Engineer companies have historically left the direct fire fight to the maneuver elements and taken a mobility/countermobility/survivability only posture during mission planning, preparation and execution.
By not utilizing their own organic weapons systems (M2, MK-19, etc...) the engineer force has not fully taken advantage of all available assets to protect themselves and complete the mission.
Engineers do not plan for the direct fire fight because they do not understand it's importance, nor have they made it a priority training requirement.
Engineers do not understand the elements of calling for fire. Engineers do not plan for the use of observed fires or understand the importance of posting the fire support overlay on their maps. Engineers normally look at observed fires as a maneuver issue that bears no relevance to the mobility/survivability BOS.

Techniques:

1. Before planning any combat mission, engineer leaders at all levels must understand:

2. For the engineer force to survive on the battlefield and kill the enemy, engineer leaders must ensure he and his subordinate leaders understand, and are trained on, these critical combat tasks.

1.1.1.1 Prepare for Movement

* (CSM trend) Boresighting of weapon systems: Maneuver units often fail to boresight their weapon systems before moving to a tactical position.

Technique: Success against OPFOR depends on correct boresight. Confirm boresight daily.

1.1.1.4 Close into Tactical Position

* Task force actions on the objective: Task forces continue to show a weakness in actions on the objective.

Techniques:

1. Units continue planning through the assault.
2. Rehearse actions on the objective.

* Selection of fighting/observation positions by Fire Support Team (FIST):

Inadequate selection of initial observation positions during defensive operations results in fire support teams (FISTs) not being able to execute assigned targets.
FISTs do not refine initial observations positions to get a better view of the battlefield.

Technique: Conduct reconnaissance of all planned observations positions to ensure target execution responsibilities are viable.

1.2 Engage Enemy

* Actions on contact: Company/teams rarely execute effective actions on contact.

Commanders do not visualize how the enemy will use his combat multipliers to shape the battlefield or attrit the force.
Company/teams do not rehearse actions on contact for each operation prior to crossing the line of departure (LD).
Reaction to enemy contact often consist of halting in place and attempting to return fire, often at targets beyond maximum effective ranges.
Commanders do not plan for simultaneous forms of contact.
Many leaders at team and platoon level do not understand or plan for actions on contact.
Because actions on contact planning is nonexistent, target acquisition is not organized or purposely linked to direct fire planning.

Units react to enemy tactical initiatives and complicate leaders' efforts to accomplish their assigned tasks.
Very often units are forced off of their base plans prematurely as they gain physical contact with enemy security forces.
The unit is quickly rendered combat ineffective at little cost to the enemy.

Techniques:

1. At Home Station, develop and thoroughly practice battle drills which support a combination of fire and movement (maneuver).

2. Establish a base of fire, and depending on terrain move aggressively to covered and concealed positions.

3. Establish fire superiority before attempting to close with the enemy position.

4. Vehicle commanders must learn to be effective killers and survivors, while reporting correctly and succinctly to their higher headquarters.

5. Using these techniques will buy the platoon leader and company commander the time to bring additional combat power to bear without loss.

Procedures:

FM 17-98 and FM 17-97 have excellent discussions about actions on contact. These discussions should be modified and incorporated into FM 17- 15, FM 7-7J and FM 71-1.
The definition of contact as out lined in the latest version of FM 17-15 should be universally applied to all platoon, company, troop, task force and squadron doctrine.

* Maneuver unit surveillance planning and target acquisition:

Leaders do not execute a surveillance plan to support direct fire execution and actions on contact.
The imperative of gaining visual contact early through effective recon and surveillance does not seem to be understood.
Tactical units usually move before looking.

Soldiers, crews, squads, sections, platoons and teams too often fail to gain visual contact with the enemy before gaining physical contact after the enemy has opened fire.
Units learn of the presence of enemy forces only after having sustained losses.

Procedures:

FM 17-12-1 and FM 23-1 provide clear discussions on the target acquisition process.
FM 17-98 provides a superb discussion of how target acquisition supports the tactical requirements of actions on contact.
Include in future editions of FM 17-12-1 and FM 71-1, discussions on offensive surveillance planning and how it links to our existing doctrine about target acquisition, direct fire planning, formations, movement techniques and decision making.

1.2.1 Employ Direct-fire

* Fundamentals of direct fire planning: Company/teams generally lack understanding of the fundamentals of direct fire planning.

Company/teams tend to develop a scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire and maneuver to find, fix, mass, and distribute fires to kill the enemy.
There is often insufficient graphic control measure to allow the company/team to mass their fires or to cover the depth of the zone to allow for flexibility and contingency planning.
Engagements are normally individual vehicle versus platoon or company/teams.

Technique: Home Station training must include the principles of direct fire planning and must be understood down to platoon level. Include direct fire planning in the task force OPD/NCOPD program. Reference guides include: Armor Magazine article, "Direct Fire Planning", Nov 93 and Jan 94; FM 23-1, FM 7-7J, FM 17-12-1-1, FM 17-15.

1.2.1.1.1 Select Direct-fire Targets

* (CSM trend) Range cards and sector sketches: Too many units are not preparing weapon system range cards and sector sketches to standard, if at all.

Technique: Platoon and section sergeants must ensure range cards and sector sketches are completed to standard IAW the applicable FM for the weapon system.

Table of Contents

Section I: TA. 7 Combat Service Support BOS

Section II: TA. 2 Fire Support BOS