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Chapter III

SETTING THE CONDITIONS

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This chapter focuses on the events that occur from the point the order is issued to the point initial contact with the enemy is made. During this time conditions are set or fail to be set to facilitate the desired outcome when contact with the enemy is made.

Issue: Units do not have established procedures to facilitate conducting a continuous assessment of the current situation that results in timely modifications to the existing plan and contributes to maintaining the initiative.

Discussion: Units typically develop a detailed plan to initiate the search and attack. This initial planning process generally follows the doctrinal Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), and most commonly uses the abbreviated decision-making process. This initial plan outlines the basic concepts and procedures used to locate the enemy, and then how to destroy the enemy. You should continue to use the initial plan until sufficient information becomes available that causes you to adjust your plan. The current plan and situation must be constantly evaluated and adjusted as the tactical situation develops, and more information becomes available. These future planning sessions should evaluate the current situation, and determine where and how future operations are to be conducted. These future planning sessions may more closely resemble a targeting/synchronization meeting using the abbreviated decision-making process as opposed to the formal MDMP. These planning sessions should include representatives from all staff sections, and should be as formal as time allows. At battalion level, these planning sessions should be focused on the next 12 to 24 hours. At brigade level, these planning sessions should be focused on the next 24 to 36 hours. These sessions may result in only slight modifications to the existing plan, or may create significant changes to the plan in terms of task organization, area of operations, and methods of search. If major changes are required involving large-scale air assaults or other similar type operations, more time may be necessary to plan. Regardless of what modifications are required, your goal should be to produce and issue any orders or FRAGOs early enough to facilitate troop-leading procedures by subordinate units. (See table below for an example timeline.)

	D-2	D-1	D	D+1	D+2	D+3
BDE/PLAN	ISSUE ORDER	ISSUE FRAG 1	ISSUE FRAG 2	ISSUE FRAG 3	ISSUE FRAG 4	ISSUE FRAG 5
EXECUTE			ORDER	FRAG 1	FRAG 2	FRAG 3
BN/PLAN	ORDER RECEIPT/PLAN	ISSUE ORDER	ISSUE FRAG 1	ISSUE FRAG 2	ISSUE FRAG 3	ISSUE FRAG 4
EXECUTE			ORDER	FRAG 1	FRAG 2	FRAG 3

TTP:

• Do not become so focused on the current fight that you fail to analyze the bigger picture. Continue to analyze the enemy situation to anticipate what he is going to do in the future. Use the targeting meeting process to determine how you can influence future operations.

• The planning process is not a one-time effort. The situation must be constantly evaluated and assessed to determine if modifications to the existing plan are required.

• Proposed composition of the planning team includes the following: Cdr, XO, S2, S3, S3 Air, FSO, ALO, TF Engineer, TF Air Defense Officer, S1, S4, Chemical officer, and Signal officer, and, if applicable: brigade targeting officer, ANGLICO, heavy TM LO, SOCCE, MP platoon leader, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, MI Company Commander, and aviation representative.

• Develop an agenda to conduct these daily situation updates and future planning sessions. As an example, see Appendix A.

• Develop, establish, and maintain a good routine or battle rhythm that facilitates timely, efficient, and effective situation updates and planning sessions. As an example, see Appendix B.

Issue: Units do not effectively use hours of limited visibility to their advantage while conducting search and attacks.

Discussion: Many units attempt to execute all three functions (find, fix, and finish) of the search and attack during hours of limited visibility. This approach often turns out to be unproductive and normally detracts from the unit's ability to successfully accomplish its long-term mission of destroying the enemy. Typically, if contact is made with the enemy during hours of darkness, it is often on the enemy's terms and results in numerous friendly casualties. The JRTC OPFOR most often operates in small three- to five-man teams that move much more quietly at night than rotational unit squads or platoons. OPFOR three- to five-man enemy teams normally detect BLUFOR squads or platoons as they patrol to find the enemy, thus setting favorable conditions for the enemy.

The crux of this issue centers around the find function. Infantry squads and platoons have a difficult time finding the enemy during hours of daylight. This is particularly true when attempting to locate supply points which are usually well camouflaged and buried underground. Attempting to locate (find) the same type of targets during hours of darkness is much more difficult, if not impossible. Squads and platoons are generally only equipped with AN/PVS-4s and AN/PVS-7s to aid them in actually detecting the enemy. Both systems are limited in their capabilities when fighting a well-disciplined enemy. Most light infantry units do not yet possess any small, lightweight, hand-held thermal night-vision capability that truly gives them the necessary advantage as they attempt to locate the enemy at night. However, if squads detect the enemy before the enemy detects the squads, they generally have the necessary tools at squad and platoon levels (AN/PAQ4A/B/C, and AN/PVS-7) to appropriately react to the contact.

TTP:

• This discussion is not advocating that infantry soldiers do nothing during hours of darkness. There are many activities that can be accomplished during hours of darkness that might facilitate more effective search and attacks. One option is to use hours of darkness to set the conditions for the next day's activities. Setting the conditions may include the following activities:

  • Conducting dismounted movement, truck movement, or air assaults into other areas of operation.

  • Infiltrating the fixing force by establishing ambushes or blocking positions along likely enemy lines of drift.

  • Conducting route clearance operations to facilitate unhindered movement along designated MSRs.

  • Conducting area reconnaissance missions on specific point NAIs.

  • Conducting resupply operations.

• Carefully and realistically assess and determine the capabilities and state of training of your unit's night-fighting skills. Once you make this determination, then decide what you expect to occur during hours of darkness.

Issue: Establishing a good battle rhythm is critical to success when conducting search and attacks.

Discussion: The term "battle rhythm" describes those events that a unit conducts on a recurring basis that facilitates setting the conditions for success. These events include the following:

• Battle update briefs
  
• Shift-change briefs
  
• Commander conference calls
  
• Staff huddles
  
• Targeting meetings
  
• Publishing of orders and FRAGOs
  
• Receipt/submission of reports
  
• LOGPACs

Establishing a battle rhythm assists the unit in developing a synchronized routine that facilitates continuous operations and maintains the initiative. During conventional operations, activity levels generally surge and subside in a much more predictable fashion, with transition periods intermixed throughout providing units time to recover, refit, and rest. Unconventional type operations generally occur over a much longer timeframe with more consistent activity levels. Success on the unconventional battlefield requires long-term commitment, tactical patience, and a well-established battle rhythm. The lack of a functioning battle rhythm creates a ripple effect throughout the entire chain of command and results in reactive versus proactive operations.

When establishing a battle rhythm, you must first determine when, during the course of a 24-hour timeframe, you intend to most aggressively pursue the enemy. Do you intend to focus your resources primarily during hours of limited visibility, during hours of daylight, or during a combination of the two? To answer this question, you must conduct a detailed analysis of all factors of METT-T (see previous issue and discussion). Your entire unit cannot conduct sustained operations 24 hours a day for much more than about 72 hours without experiencing significant degradation. Successful search and attacks require a long-term commitment, and generally cannot be won with a single decisive blow to the enemy. They require successful operations on a day-to-day basis for extended periods of time.

Once you determine when you intend to focus the majority of your resources, you must then backward plan from the time of execution to the time of mission receipt. Your mission receipt time then becomes the orders issue time for your higher headquarters. Your battle rhythm must be synchronized with your higher headquarters. All required activities must be focused on supporting the execution time. You will not always be able to maintain this detailed battle rhythm. Periodically, deviations from your battle rhythm will be necessary. There is a fine line between enforcing your battle rhythm in an effort to maintain the initiative, and becoming so inflexible that you ignore targets of opportunity as they present themselves on the battlefield. You cannot become so fixed to your battle rhythm that you fail to exploit opportunities as they occur. Conversely, you cannot jump from one event to another and become so reactive that you accomplish nothing.

TTP:

• Identify those events and activities that occur on a recurring basis.

• Decide what timeframe during the course of a 24-hour time period will be your main effort. Backward plan your timeline from there. Whatever timeframe you decide to be your main effort, ensure you use the remaining time to set the conditions for your main effort. Setting conditions could include emplacing your fixing force, moving from your current area of operations to another, conducting resupply, troop-leading procedures, or resting. Use this time to conduct anything necessary to prepare you for the search and attack. This will allow you to concentrate on nothing but searching for and attacking the enemy during your selected timeframe.

• Ensure you review your battle rhythm with your higher headquarters. Your battle rhythm must support your higher headquarters.

Issue: The role of the scout platoon in the search and attack is often undefined, and, if not well thought out, results in wasted resources.

Discussion: The scout platoon is a very critical resource, and is the only organic reconnaissance element available to the battalion task force. Typical problems associated with employing the scout platoon are as follows:

• The scout platoon often gets over tasked to conduct far more missions than they are capable of conducting (area/zone reconnaissance, linkup and guide missions, observe numerous NAIs, and call for and control indirect fires). These missions are all within the capabilities of scout platoons, but any scout platoon would have problems conducting all of them at once unless they received additional resources to conduct them.

• Battalion headquarter's inability to maintain reliable and consistent communications with the platoon.

• Scout platoons normally operate in locations where mutual support from rifle companies can not be provided if contact with the enemy is made.

• Difficulty providing logistical support to scout teams spread throughout a large area of operations.

• Difficulty evacuating casualties.

These problems often prevent units from successfully employing their scout platoon. There are no easy answers to any of these issues. Each of the above issues must be carefully considered with realistic courses of actions developed to address each of them.

The root of the issue focuses on the scout platoon's assigned mission. This issue is so critical that, if not properly addressed, will create numerous other problems that will hinder mission success. Typically, the platoon is tasked to conduct either a zone reconnaissance over a very large area, or multiple area reconnaissance missions in an effort to locate the enemy. The scout platoon then splits up into three- to four-man teams, each patrolling an area so large that it cannot be thoroughly searched in the time provided. Either the scouts fail to locate the enemy, or the scout sections locate the enemy on unfavorable terms that result in numerous friendly casualties. These casualties must then be evacuated, which completely absorbs the attention and resources of the unit, detracting from their primary mission of destroying the enemy.

The answers to these complex issues lies in what tasks you assign the scout platoon. When tasking your scouts to conduct a mission, ensure that you can provide them the necessary resources to prepare them for success. If you cannot support them with the resources required to accomplish their assigned mission, do not task them to conduct the mission. Also, consider that if the scout platoon makes contact with the enemy, the results are likely to be unfavorable. You will want to establish and maintain contact with the enemy with a force that is resourced and capable of appropriately handling the contact. This force may or may not be the scout platoon.

Also, do not feel compelled to use your scout platoon just because you have one. There may be times where you need to consolidate the platoon to provide them the opportunity to refit and plan for future operations.

TTP:

• Avoid overtasking your scout platoon. Carefully and realistically determine what your scout platoon is capable of accomplishing and assign their mission accordingly.

• Based on the assigned mission, adequately resource your scout platoon to accomplish the mission.

• Conduct a detailed risk assessment for your scout platoon. This risk assessment must realistically address the risk you are willing to accept or not accept as the platoon conducts its mission. If your scout platoon makes contact with the enemy, the results are most often unfavorable, and will require significant resources to properly handle the situation.

• Select one or two critical NAIs to let your scout platoon focus on. This will allow them to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the assigned area.

• Do not feel it is necessary to use the scout platoon for conventional-type scout missions if the situation does not provide such an opportunity. The scout platoon can serve as a TF reserve (if given mobility assets) or convoy escort security. Just realize that this is the only organic reconnaissance asset you have, and that it must be carefully managed as such.

• Rifle companies can also be tasked to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance tasks to allow the scout platoon to focus its efforts with its limited resources.

Issue: Reconnaissance assets (scout platoons, long-range surveillance teams, etc.) are not deployed early enough to facilitate having an impact on the planning process and subsequent operations.

Discussion: Late deployment of reconnaissance assets creates numerous problems. First, if these assets are to accomplish their mission when deployed late, they must often move rapidly, and sometimes during hours of daylight. Moving under these conditions significantly increases the chance of contact with the enemy. This contact often leads to casualties and loss of valuable reconnaissance assets that cannot be easily evacuated and replaced. Second, the information that is collected is often collected late and fails to influence the planning process in a timely manner. To prevent these problems, the commander must make a conscious effort to prepare and deploy the reconnaissance assets as early as possible. To facilitate this, the process should begin by the commander issuing detailed guidance specifically addressing the reconnaissance effort. This guidance should include: PIR, methods of insertion, resources to support the reconnaissance effort, levels of acceptable risk, and extraction considerations. The next step is for the staff to refine the commander's guidance and develop an initial reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. Staff members who should be intimately involved are: the S2/S2 NCOIC, S3, Fire Support Officer, Scout Platoon Leader, Signal Officer, S4, and Air Liaison Officer. This reconnaissance planning cell should rapidly develop a plan to support the deploying team. This initial R&S planning session should occur early during the MDMP or targeting process; either after the commander's guidance, or after COA development. The initial plan will form the foundation of the R&S plan and must be constantly updated as the staff continues the decision-making process.

TTP:

• The commander must provide detailed and specific R&S planning guidance. The guidance must address the following:

  • PIR

  • Insertions techniques

  • Acceptable levels of risk

  • Assets involved

  • Areas to focus the reconnaissance effort

  • The reconnaissance objective

  • Extraction considerations

• The R&S planning session must include representatives from all BOSs. It must be a combined arms plan.

• This planning team should provide the scout platoon the following:

  • The most current enemy SITTEMP

  • TF mission statement

  • Tentative TF commander's intent

  • Tentative TF scheme of maneuver

  • Mission statement for the scout platoon (task and purpose)

  • Initial NAIs, PIR, SIR

  • Fire support plan

  • Casualty evacuation plan

  • Transportation plan, if required

  • Resupply plan

  • Communications plan

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Chapter II: Planning
Chapter IV: Execution