Chapter II. Planning: SEARCH AND ATTACK! TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

Chapter II
PLANNING

As in most military operations, success begins with the planning process. The plan must be simple and facilitate flexibility during execution, yet provide sufficient detail. The commander and staff must be capable of developing and issuing such a plan in a very short amount of time. The plan must integrate all available assets in finding, fixing and finishing the enemy. Although the search and attack is characterized by decentralized small unit actions, each of those "muscle movements" must be supported by the battalion in some way. Whether it is by positioning the battalion surgeon with an advanced trauma life-saving (ATLS) capability vicinity the main effort, analyzing and disseminating information obtained from satellite imagery, or coordinating attack helicopter support, the battalion/brigade headquarters must integrate and synchronize the operation - and "get every dog in the fight." This chapter will highlight some of the common problems units experience while planning search and attacks, and will also provide TTP to help resolve some of the issues.

"Conventional wisdom indicated that the enemy had drifted into an area southeast of Pleiku, and we were directed to conduct operations there. Shortly after the operation started, Major General Stanley (Swede) Larsen, the Corps Commander, visited us and asked how things were going. I told him we had no contact to speak of and didn't expect any. Whereupon Larsen asked, "Why are you conducting operations there?" My response: 'That's what you order in writing directed us to do.' The general answered that our primary mission was: Find the enemy and go after him."--Conversation between BG Richard T. Knowles, Assistant Division Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, and MG Stanley Larsen, Corps Commander, regarding operations vicinity of Plei Me, 12 November 1965.1

Issue: Units typically have problems developing a simple restated mission that clearly identifies the unit's task and purpose (mission=task+purpose) providing a clear and common picture throughout the chain of command.

Discussion: This shortfall often creates confusion within the chain of command, and ultimately leads to an unsynchronized, and poorly integrated execution of the operation. As previously stated, the search and attack is not an operation, only a technique used to conduct the MTC (FM 7-20, p. 3-18). As a result, the operation that is most appropriate is the MTC. The purpose portion of the mission statement should be a very clear, yet simple statement that identifies the "why" of the task.2

Typically, unit mission statements from battalion to squad level will be ". . .conducts search and attack/MTC operations in assigned areas to locate and destroy the enemy to prevent him from . . . ." This mission statement may be fine for battalion level, but provides insufficient detail for levels below battalion. The mission analysis process must be conducted throughout the entire chain of command. If the term MTC appears in every squad and platoon mission statement throughout the TF, something is probably wrong. Each company, platoon, and squad play a significant role, but each of these subordinate unit missions is probably different. Each subordinate unit mission statement should be aligned with, and reflect one of, the find, fix, and finish functions of the search and attack. The following scenario illustrates this issue. (This example includes D company as part of the unit's task organization.)

TF mission statement: TF 1-23 conducts a movement to contact in AO Blue NLT DTG to locate and destroy the enemy battalion supply point (BSP) to deny the enemy the essential supplies needed to operate in the AO.

TF 1-23 scheme of maneuver: Scout platoon conducts an area reconnaissance vicinity NAI 1 and 2 to locate the BSP (find element). TM A (Fix element) blocks enemy ingress/egress along infiltration routes 1 and 2 to deny the enemy the ability to move to/from or to reinforce the BSP. TM D clears Route Apple to support movement of TM B, resupply, and casualty evacuation operations. TM C attacks to locate and destroy the enemy's mortars NLT DTG to prevent the enemy from adjusting indirect fires on TM B. TM B, main effort (finish element), on order, attacks to destroy the enemy BSP to deny the enemy the essential supplies he needs to operate in the AO. TM SPT conducts resupply and casualty evacuation to ensure sustainment of the main effort.

With the above scheme of maneuver, subordinate unit mission statements might read as follows:

Scout Platoon: Scout platoon conducts area reconnaissance vicinity NAI 1 and 2 to locate the enemy BSP to facilitate the destruction of the enemy BSP by TM B.
Team A: Block enemy egress/ingress on infiltration routes 1 and 2 to support complete destruction of all enemy forces.

1st Platoon, A Company: 1/A establishes a platoon ambush vicinity grid NE123456 to block enemy movement to/front the BSP to prevent the enemy from hindering TM B's attack. (This is one example of a platoon mission statement to show how the mission statement is constantly tailored throughout the chain of command.)

TM B: (TF Main Effort) On order, attacks to destroy the BSP to deny the enemy the essential supplies he needs to operate in the AO.
TM C: Conducts area reconnaissance to locate enemy forces, and then attacks to destroy the enemy mortars to prevent the enemy from hindering TM B with indirect fires as they attack.
TM D: Clears and maintains Route Apple to ensure unhindered movement along the MSR facilitating sustainment of the main effort.
TM Support: On order, conducts resupply and casualty evacuation operations in effort to sustain combat units.

Subordinate unit mission statements must be tailored to their specific role. Each subordinate unit is not conducting a MTC or search and attack. Instead, they are fulfilling or supporting one or more of the find, fix, or finish roles which contributes to the TF mission of conducting the MTC.

TTP:

A detailed mission analysis must be conducted throughout the entire chain of command. Subordinate unit mission statements must be simple, detailed, and specifically describe that unit's mission.
Mission statements should be aligned with one of the find, fix, finish, or the sustainment of those functions (clear LOCs, casualty evacuation, resupply operations). For subordinate units, these tasks typically include locating the enemy by conducting area or zone reconnaissance, fixing/blocking the enemy by establishing platoon ambushes or blocking positions, or destroying the enemy by attacking him.

Issue: During the mission analysis process, the S2 is often the only officer involved in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process.

Discussion: Because the S2 is primarily the only staff officer normally involved in preparing the IPB, the mission analysis process often gets bogged down and causes delays in the planning process. Not only does this issue create delays in the planning process, but also limits the accuracy of the IPB process directly to the experience level and skills of the S2. The S2 should be the resident expert on the IPB process, but this does not make him the only expert on all aspects of the enemy. Who should know more about the employment of enemy air defense systems than an army aviator or an air defense officer? Who should know more about the employment of enemy obstacles than the engineer who is expected to breach them? Each battlefield operating system (BOS) staff representative should know as much, if not more than the S2, about the enemy regarding his area of expertise. The S2 should be responsible for integrating all this information into a consolidated IPB effort. This approach to the IPB process not only helps prevent delays, but also creates a more detailed and accurate picture of the enemy situation.

TTP:

Other BOS staff officers must assist the S2 as he prepares and conducts the early stages of the IPB process (terrain analysis and development of enemy situational templates).
The XO should ensure that each BOS staff officer does not get so involved applying only their assets that they fail to assist the S2 in the early stages of the IPB process.
Clearly identify what each BOS representative is expected to contribute during the IPB process. If necessary, have the S2 prepare and conduct classes for those who require them. Ensure your NCOs attend these classes; they may be the appropriate individual to assist the S2 in developing and refining the IPB process.
Once you have identified your procedures, use them, conduct AARs, and adjust as necessary.
The S2 should be responsible for integrating the input of all staff officers/NCOs into a coordinated and integrated IPB effort.

The commander identifies decisive points where he can generate superior combat power in relation to the enemy. These points may result from his terrain analysis (locations on the ground which provide an advantage or put the enemy at a disadvantage), from the enemy analysis (an identified enemy weakness that can be exploited), or possibly time analysis
(a time when combat potential of the enemy force is degraded).--FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company (p. 2-19)

Issue: When planning a MTC using the search and attack technique, units typically struggle to identify the decisive point that will focus their effort throughout the operation.

Discussion: The identification of decisive point(s) is the result of a thorough METT-T analysis. Decisive point(s) may be logistic sites, command and control nodes, the enemy's ADA and indirect fire systems. The enemy force itself can be considered a decisive point. Some argue that enemy personnel are the only non-renewable resource, and that destruction of the enemy soldier is the key to long-term success. You may hinder his ability to fight by destroying the targets listed above, but from a long-term perspective, these critical targets will be replaced, or other methods developed to overcome the short-term problem. Food, ammunition, and radios can be replaced - - it is much more difficult to recruit, train, and deploy a replacement soldier. Nonetheless, the above mentioned critical nodes are locations where troops are concentrated, thereby providing a focus for course-of-action development. It may also be argued that events may be decisive points. Consequently, when a unit makes contact with the enemy (whether it is chance contact or a critical node that was not templated), the time and place of the contact becomes the decisive point. As a result, enemy contacts are clearly a commander's critical information requirement (CCIR) which may require an immediate decision by the commander.

Regardless of which philosophy you support, the factors of METT-T should drive your decision, and you must select a specific target to help focus your effort to locate the enemy. These targets are nothing more than tools that are available to help you template, find, fix, and finish the enemy. When determining which enemy target to attack, many units immediately select the enemy supply points, command and control nodes, mortars, or SA14 sites. These are all viable targets, but should not be indiscriminately selected. Careful analysis should be conducted to determine enemy and friendly vulnerabilities and capabilities.3Attacking the enemy strengths often leads to mission failure and high casualty rates unless overwhelming combat power can be generated and applied.

When analyzing and selecting the decisive point, the first question that must be answered is what are the enemy vulnerabilities and capabilities. Vulnerabilities and capabilities are rather standard in environments where the search and attack technique is used. Enemy vulnerabilities often include the following:

Limited ability to rapidly mass overwhelming combat power.
Limited night-vision capability.
Limited antiarmor systems.
Decentralized command and control.
Air defense systems rather simple, and generally limited to daytime operations.
Limited indirect fire support systems (normally mortars only).
Logistical support systems often tied to a supply transfer point system using company and battalion supply points as a means to sustain their force.

The enemy capabilities are typically as follows:

Much more familiar with the terrain than we are.
Very proficient in field craft, small-unit tactics, marksmanship, and battle drills.
Operates in small teams facilitating rapid movement throughout the area of operation.

These lists provide valuable information. They provide us a variety of targets to attack, and a list of enemy strengths to avoid. By developing a similar list looking at friendly vulnerabilities and capabilities, we can now begin to match our capabilities against the enemy vulnerabilities making maximum use of our limited resources.4This is the first step to success on the battlefield. Obviously we cannot focus on all of the enemy vulnerabilities. Nor can we afford to focus all of our resources against a single target such as an enemy resupply point. The enemy resupply point may or may not be in our sector. If it is not, we may spend an inordinate amount of resources looking for something we may never find. Based on the initial information available, we must select the one or two most likely and decisive targets (high payoff targets/HPT) in our area and focus our effort, energy, and resources against those selected HPTs. As the operation continues, and more information is collected, or we achieve the desired effects against initially selected targets, we may be able to refocus our efforts against subsequent targets.

Once the commander decides which targets to focus on, the S2 must then begin to develop a target description (situational template) in as much detail as possible. Little doctrinal information about the enemy is available to the S2 to assist in developing these enemy SITTEMPs. As a result, the S2 must rely on his own experience, the experience of his unit, patrol debriefs, or information from the local populace to assist him in developing these SITTEMPs. Over a period of time, the S2 can begin to identify patterns and enemy TTP associated with each target that will assist him as he develops these templates. These target descriptions must include specific and focused PIR that will facilitate locating the target, likely areas where we can begin our search effort, and what the actual target may look like. These situational templates then begin to focus the entire planning process by assisting in determining the unit task organization, reconnaissance and surveillance plan, scheme of maneuver, fire support plan, and other key portions of the plan.

TTP:

First analyze the enemy and friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities. Match your capabilities to the enemy vulnerabilities to optimize the use of available resources.
Based on the current METT-T assessment, select enemy targets that are likely to be in your area of operations that will produce the most decisive result once destroyed.
Brigades are normally resourced to focus on no more than five specific enemy targets, and battalions on no more than two enemy targets. Focusing on any more will generally hinder your ability to mass the necessary combat power as you conduct the search and attack. This may sound like too few targets, but more than likely your efforts will identify additional targets you did not originally anticipate.
The S2 must have established battle-tracking procedures to facilitate patrol debriefs in an effort to update his doctrinal and situational templates. The accuracy of these templates is critical to the success of the search and attack.

Issue: As the staff completes the mission analysis and the commander issues his guidance, units often fail to incorporate the S2's situational template into the COA development process.

Discussion: During the mission analysis process, the S2 should have analyzed the enemy vulnerabilities, identified, and recommended to the commander those enemy high value targets (HVTs) that will help focus the unit's search and attack. Through detailed analysis, the commander then decides which HVTs he wants to use to focus his unit's efforts. These targets then become high pay off targets (HPTs). Once these targets are identified and approved by the commander, they become the focal point for the staff as they begin to develop the COAs.

The commander and staff should now begin to develop the COAs using the same process as outlined in FM 101-5 (Final Draft, Aug 96). They should keep in mind the primary functions of find, fix, and finish as they develop the COAs. The commander and staff should use the backward planning technique as they develop the COAs. The finish function is the most critical function of the search and attack. This function is what actually engages and destroys the enemy forces. The commander and staff should first determine what resources will be required to meet the desired endstate once the enemy has been located. The finish force must be responsive, otherwise the enemy will rapidly attrit your forces, or will immediately break contact before you can deliver the decisive blow. Procedures must be in place to facilitate quick movement of the finishing force. These procedures include, but are not limited to, good graphic control measures, responsive means of transportation if required, and effective communications with the force in contact. The commander must be an active participant during the entire planning process. If the commander is actively involved, especially during the COA development and analysis process, he can make on-the-spot decisions and provide immediate guidance that can potentially save significant amounts of time and prevent unnecessary confusion within the staff. For a detailed discussion regarding this issue see CALL Newsletter 95-12, Dec 95, Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."

The next step is to determine how the enemy will be fixed. The purpose of the fix function is to prevent the enemy from moving his forces to or from a specific location until he can be engaged and destroyed. This is perhaps the most difficult task. Once the enemy is found, if he is not fixed immediately, he will break contact and fade into the woodline before you can destroy him. Ideally, the fix force would be in position prior to initiating the search and attack. These initial fixing positions should be determined based on the enemy SITTEMPs. More appropriately, the fix force would be pre-positioned in areas where they could most likely support the finish element. If contact is made in other areas, then the fixing element must have procedures in place to facilitate moving to where it can influence the fight. These procedures require the use of good graphic control measures and good communications to facilitate this movement. This movement often requires significant amounts of time, allowing the enemy the opportunity to escape. To help alleviate this problem, we must identify other resources that can be more responsive and help bridge the gap until the ground maneuver fixing force can arrive. These resources may include the use of attack aviation, artillery, mortars, armored or mechanized forces, or ideally a combination of any of the above resources.

Then the next step is to develop the search portion of the COA. Due to the illusive and unpredictable nature of the enemy, you will have a difficult time finding him. The assets committed to the find function should obviously focus on locating the selected high payoff target. Every member of the task force should play a role in the find function. These actions range from area reconnaissance patrols being conducted by the TF scout platoon, to the 5-ton truck driver from the Forward Support Battalion keeping his eyes open for any peculiar activity along the MSR during his supply runs. All efforts of this function should be driven by the CCIR and the reconnaissance and surveillance plan and should strive to answer those critical questions identified by the commander. Don't forget to include resources such as counterintelligence, civil affairs, and military police into the find function as well.

Complete the COA by determining how you will logistically support your COA. This not only includes resupply operations and casualty evacuation operations, but also how you will facilitate the movement of both your logistic support elements, as well as the movement of any mounted elements such as your finishing force. If you can not realistically support your newly developed COA, you may have to make some necessary modifications.

You now have objectively determined the amount of resources required for each of the find, fix, finish, and support functions. Regardless of what type of COA you develop, your COA should be based around the doctrinal functions of find, fix, finish, as well as the support function. Every resource available to your task force should be focused toward either conducting or supporting one of these functions.

TTP:

The commander must be actively involved in the entire planning process. Through active participation, the commander can make on-the-spot decisions and provide immediate guidance to the staff as necessary.
The S2's enemy SITTEMPs must be used as you develop your COAs.
Use the backward planning process to develop your COA.
- First determine what is required to destroy or finish the enemy contact.
- Next determine what resources are required to fix the enemy.
- Then determine what resources are needed to find the enemy, as well as to logistically support your COA.
If resources are not available to support your COA, consider the following:
- Request additional resources. Keep a list of possible assets available and their capabilities for future use.
- Request to reduce the size of your area of responsibility, or assign zones of action within your area of operations to help focus your effort.
- Determine how units can fulfill multiple roles; for example, can the find force assume part of the fix force responsibility.
- Develop a COA that can be accomplished with the available resources.

"One more thing, Hal. In that area be sure your companies are close enough for mutual support."--Conversation between COL Thomas W. Brown, Commander, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and LTC Harold G. Moore, Commander, 1/7 Cavalry, regarding operations vicinity Ia Drang Valley, 13 November 1965.5

Issue: Units have problems developing schemes of maneuver that are fully integrated and synchronized.

Discussion: There are numerous techniques available to assist units as they develop COAs. This section will discuss some of the most common approaches. The first approach is the Decisive Point Technique. As with all COAs, this technique centers around the S2's enemy SITTEMPs. This technique is best used when the S2 has received some indication that a specific enemy target is in his area of operations. If no specific enemy indicators are present, then he must rely on his own collection plan and pattern analysis to generate this information, ultimately resulting in the development or refinement of an enemy SITTEMP. These indicators may result from an EW intercept, mine incident, Q36 radar acquisition, or some other type of report. The S2 then analyzes this information and develops or refines his enemy SITTEMP. At this point, it is unknown exactly where the enemy is located, but based on the available information, some general indication of where and what the enemy is doing is available. This information drives the COA development process, and is planned similarly to a deliberate attack.6For this example we have received information indicating an enemy mortar site is operating in our area, and the commander designates this target as the decisive point. The following task organization, mission statement, scheme of maneuver, and COA sketch are presented to help explain the technique:

TASK ORGANIZATION

TM A
1 PLT
2 PLT
3 PLT
3/C
MORT SECT
ENG SQ
AD Sect

CO B
1 PLT
2 PLT
3 PLT
MORT SECT
AD SECT

CO C
1 PLT
2 PLT
MORT SECT
ENG SQ
AD SECT

TF CONTROL
TF MAIN CP
MORT PLT
SCT PLT
AT PLT
ENG PLT (-)
ADA PLT (-)
CBT TNS
FLD TNS
SCT WPN TM (OPCON)

TF mission statement: TF 1-23 conducts a movement to contact 010600 Dec 99 to destroy suspected enemy mortar site vicinity grid AB123456 to prevent the enemy from effectively adjusting indirect fire against our forces.

TF 1-23 scheme of maneuver: TF scout platoon (find element) conducts an area reconnaissance vicinity objective to confirm/deny enemy mortar site location. Co. B (fix element) blocks enemy movement along routes 1 and 2 to prevent the enemy from escaping or reinforcing the objective area. Team A, main effort (finish element) attacks to destroy enemy mortar site to prevent indirect fires from hindering the TF effort. Co. C follows and supports Team A. On order, scout weapons team occupies attack by fire position to assist in the destruction of the enemy mortar site.

COA Sketch:

The next technique is the Linear Technique. Once again, this technique is best used when there are strong indications that the enemy is operating in a specific area. It is also best used when there are natural linear type boundaries (roads, power lines, or creekbeds) present to assist in command and control, and the area to be searched is rather large.7This technique can be used at either company or battalion level or both.

For this example, we have received reports that the enemy has emplaced several point minefields along a road in the TF area of operations. We assume that the enemy is still operating in the area and is probably maintaining surveillance of the minefields. Through pattern analysis we also suspect that there may be some enemy activity vicinity the low ground in the western portion of the TF sector. The following task organization, mission statement, scheme of maneuver, and COA sketch are presented to help explain the technique:

TASK ORGANIZATION

CO A
1 PLT
2 PLT
3 PLT
MORT SECT
ENG SQ

TM B
1 PLT
2 PLT
3 PLT
3/C
MORT SECT
ENG SQ
AD SECT

CO C
1 PLT
2 PLT
MORT SECT
ADA SECT

TF CONTROL
TF MAIN CP
SCT PLT
MORT PLT
AT PLT
ENG PLT (-)
ADA PLT (-)
MECH PLT (OPCON)
SCT WPN TM (OPCON)
CBT TNS
FLD TNS

TF mission statement: TF 1-23 conducts a movement to contact on 010600 Dec 99 to locate and clear enemy in zone to prevent enemy mine operations from hindering movement along the MSR.

TF scheme of maneuver: The task force scout platoon conducts a zone reconnaissance to locate the enemy to facilitate its destruction. Tm B, main effort, conducts movement to contact to locate and clear enemy in zone to prevent enemy mine operations from hindering movement along the MSR. Co. A conducts movement to contact to locate and clear enemy in zone to prevent enemy mine operations from hindering movement along the MSR. Co. C will follow and support TM B. Mechanized platoon conducts mounted patrols along route in TM B's sector, and, on order, attacks to destroy enemy. Scout weapons team conducts a zone reconnaissance in sector forward of the task force in an effort to locate the enemy, and, on order, occupies attack by fire position to assist in the destruction of the enemy.

COA Sketch:

The two previous techniques rely on indications that the enemy is operating in a specific area. The third technique focuses on a situation where there is little, if any, specific information available about the enemy. During this situation you must first aggressively seek to determine where the enemy is located. This technique is called the Independent Squads Technique and is highlighted by decentralized squad-size patrols. This technique is also one of the most common, and least desirable techniques. Typically the battalion will be given an area of operations. Using this technique, the battalion subdivides its area into multiple company-sized area of operations. This process continues until eventually each company has several squad-size patrols conducting decentralized operations throughout the battalion AO.8This technique focuses on the find function of the search and attack methodology, and makes it extremely difficult to fix, and subsequently finish the enemy once contact is made. This technique is often only successful if you first locate the enemy without being detected yourself, providing you have time to mass your combat power in an effort to fix and eventually finish the enemy. Most often, the enemy locates you first, and you are now fighting against one of the enemy strengths (squad-on-squad operations).

When operating with numerous squad-size independent patrols throughout an area, it is very difficult to integrate and synchronize the support necessary to ensure success. It is difficult to accomplish the following:

Mass combat power once contact is made.
Maintain consistent communications with all subordinate elements.
Provide reliable and timely logistical support, especially casualty evacuation.

This technique has many variations. Two of the more common are:

Company splits area of operations into two platoon zones of action where platoons then conduct the search and attack. The third platoon establishes ambushes along likely lines of drift. The two platoons who are aggressively seeking the enemy attempt to flush the enemy toward the ambushes.
Once again the company establishes two platoon zones of actions where these platoons conduct the search and attack. The third platoon serves as a reserve, centrally locating itself in a place where it can move to and support the other two platoons once contact is made.

TTP:

At battalion or brigade level, multiple techniques may be used simultaneously. Assess the factors of METT-T and select the technique or techniques that best support your situation.
If you have sufficient information that confirms your enemy SITTEMPs, or you receive other reports that confirm enemy activity in a specific area, use either the decisive point or the linear technique.
The S2 should develop daily (24-hour) enemy activity overlays. These overlays should graphically summarize enemy activities during a specific 24-hour time period. During a two- to three-day time period, these overlays will assist the S2 in identifying enemy patterns of activity, and will help the unit anticipate future enemy actions.
If you must use the independent squads technique, ensure you consider the following:
- Limit the size of your area. This helps create mutual support between your subordinate elements.
- Use sufficient graphic control measures to include phase lines, boundaries, checkpoints, linkup points, no fire areas, and attack by fire positions.
- Ensure you develop a realistic communications plan to facilitate reliable command and control throughout your AO.
- Thoroughly wargame how you will logistically support your COAs, specifically addressing resupply and casualty evacuation operations.

Issue: Task organizations do not always include all supporting efforts required to ensure a fully synchronized search and attack.

Discussion: Units do not consider additional assets in the task organization to augment and support the find, fix and finish forces. A battalion task force requires the synchronization of all assets to support the operation. Once a main effort is identified, it must be freed of all restraints and allowed to focus on its specific mission. These restraints include: maintaining open lines of communications (LOCs) to facilitate resupply and casualty evacuation, responsive logistical support, the burden of civilians and villages in the area, and other sources of friction which may divert the main effort's focus from either locating or destroying the enemy.

TTP: The following represents possible additions to a battalion task organization. Because of the requirements for numerous .50-caliber machine guns and MK 19s for the additional forces, the following task organization is best suited for Airborne and Air Assault units with organic Delta companies. However, varied forms of this concept may be used by standard light infantry units. If armor assets are available, they may be incorporated into any or all of the teams.

TM LOC: The purpose of TM LOC would be to clear and maintain open and unhindered lines of communications to facilitate resupply and casualty evacuation for the main effort. For Airborne or Air Assault units, this organization could be commanded by the Delta company commander. Its task organization may include two Delta platoons equipped with a mix of .50 cals and MK 19s, two engineer squads, a Stinger team, and possibly a rifle squad or platoon. For light infantry units, the team may consist of a TOW section, the engineer platoon minus, and a mounted rifle platoon. If tanks with mine plows or rollers are available, they should be incorporated into TM LOC. Opening LOCs is not a one-time effort. It requires constant attention and resources to ensure continued freedom of movement.

TM Village: The purpose of TM Village includes the following:

Monitor and assess the impact of events and activities in vicinity of populated areas.
Serve as a means of communications with the local populace.
Attempt to identify potential problems within populated areas that may hinder the TF effort.
Attempt to develop and sustain a positive relationship with the local populace.
Establish and maintain HUMINT sources to facilitate unhindered operations in and around populated areas.
If possible, establish a formal means to communicate with leaders of villages, host nation police, or governmental authorities (i.e., land line or local telephone network).

This element could be task-organized under the direction of the S5 or Civil Affairs officer. The task organization may include a tactical PSYOP team, Counter-Intelligence (CI) team, medics with an FLA, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW) team, and possibly a chaplain. A rifle platoon or an MP platoon may be task-organized with this element for security.

TM Support: The purpose of TM Support would be to facilitate resupply and casualty evacuation for the main effort. TM Support requires close coordination and support from TM LOC. This element could be task-organized under the direction of the S4 or HHC commander, with a support platoon vehicle, a TOW section for security, the Physician Assistant or surgeon with an advanced trauma lifesaving system (ATLS), medics, and FLA.

_________________

1. "We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young," by LTG Harold G. Moore (Ret) and Mr. Joseph L. Galloway.

2. COL Lynn Moore, "Search and Attack," (unpublished article), p. 4.

3. Ibid., p. 5-7.

4. Ibid., p. 8.

5. "We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young," by LTG Harold G. Moore (Ret) and Mr. Joseph L. Galloway.

6. CPT Kevin J. Dougherty and CPT Richard C. Townes, "Search and Attack," Infantry, November-December 1994, p. 42.

7. Ibid., p. 43.

8. Ibid., p. 42.