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History has shown that leaders who know their unit's tactical capabilities and limitations meet with greater success. The best place for leaders to learn the strengths and weaknesses of their organizations is during HST. Commanders who know their units adopt the best possible plan for tactical employment. The message is clear; HST is not training conducted in isolation by small units without resources or command involvement. HST is the very foundation for success of the unit's wartime mission.

Today's leaders must train soldiers to fight not only major combined arms battles, but also engagements traditionally fought by local police . . . and everything in between. Leaders must interpret situations fast. Not overreact, but have the right mix of combat power for the threat. Diversity, change, flexibility, and high tempo are today's realities. Commanders must have timely, filtered information so their attention can be directed to the essential, correct elements required to make decisions. Never in our history has information been so critical. Never has the amount of information and the means to transmit it been so sophisticated. And never has the requirement to filter and synchronize this information been so great.

Training the Task Force's intelligence system is critical to the accomplishment of its mission. It is important to note that we speak of the intelligence system. It is a system and must be trained as a system with all of its components. Each part must function correctly if the information is to be processed into useful intelligence. Therefore, the S2, Scout Platoon, Ground Surveillance Radars (GSRs), Civil Affairs Teams (CATs), Fire Support Teams (FISTs), and other attached intelligence elements must train as an intelligence organization. Leaders and soldiers should train with the complete system whenever possible.

TRAINING AT HOME STATION

HST is the most critical phase of training. HST as defined here does not imply the fixed location of the organization, but rather where the organization spends most of its time. This might very well be at a base camp of a deployed Task Force. Commanders must show the same amount of interest in HST as they do in the training conducted at the National Training Center.

There is no more important training objective than the training of small units. And there is no better place to train small units than at Home Station. It stands to reason that where the unit spends most of its time is where most of the training should take place. At Home Station, small units can always find a place to train. They can even train in a front yard. Training should be conducted from the bottom up. Individual teams, squads, sections, and platoons fight the task force commander's battle, but often these very units have to plan and conduct training without the top priority they deserve.

Technique: Train units at different echelons simultaneously.

EXAMPLE:
Mission: Conduct intelligence/scout training by attaching a squad from each maneuver element to conduct patrols.

1. Issue an operation order for each training event. Simultaneously conduct a battalion CPX and scout training at a local training area.

2. Conduct training with the proper maneuver slice. The scout platoon might be organized with a GSR section, engineer squad, fire support and a retrans station.

Training Methodology

HST methodology is the same as for any other type training. Leaders should adhere to the principles reflected in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101.

Techniques:

1. The battalion commander and leaders must identify and prioritize training requirements.

2. Plan the training in advance.

3. Make sure that all leaders have input.

4. Use ARTEP 17-57-10 MTP as a reference. It provides the following training tasks most of which can be completed at a local training area.

   Task Title Establish an Observation Post Employ Operation Security (OPSEC) Measures React to an Antitank Guided Missile (ATGM) Emplace a Hasty Protective Minefield Remove a Hasty Protective Minefield Prepare a Track Vehicle for a Chemical Attack Decontaminate a Track Vehicle Install a Thrown Track on a CFV/M113 Start a CFV/M113 with Slave Cables Start an M998 with Slave Cables Conduct Vehicle Maintenance

   Task Number 17-5-1039 17-5-1080 17-5-5895 17-5-2710 17-5-2730 17-5-5265 17-5-5840 17-5-5130 17-5-5740 17-5-5963 17-5-5278

5. Reconnoiter the site.

   • Leader conducts a reconnaissance before any training event.
   • Battalion staff performs a terrain analysis
   • Identifies all key terrain and
   • Selects sites for the following activities:
   1. Situational Training Exercise {STX}
   2. OPFOR Positions
   3. Assembly Area
   4. Leaders Training Sites
   5. AAR sites
   6. Logistical Support locations
   7. Command Post locations
   8. Retraining area
   9. Retrans location
   10. Helo Pad
   11. TOC

6. The inprocessing SOP should ensure that all leaders visit each training site.

Tactical Training

Issue: The commander's number one priority is the scout platoon's difficulty breaking contact under pressure at night, conducting a battle handover, and executing a passage of lines.

Technique:

1. Leaders should walk the terrain during day and night, before the troops are deployed.

   • Saves time
   • Provides a better environment for training.

2. Take advantage of HST's capability to allow for leader training before the event is conducted with troops. Bottom-up training means the platoon can execute one training phase while the leadership is planning for the next event.

Integrated Training

Technique: When possible, integrate additional subject(s) with the main topic.

EXAMPLES:

1. Integrate safety into a land navigation event.
2. Include preparing casualties for movement into a medic's evacuation by surface and air.

Special Emphasis Training

Technique: Use the results of previous training exercises to determine what tasks need more work.

EXAMPLES:

1. Scout platoon leader spends too much time waiting for the OPORD. NAIs are not covered.
   Fix: OPORD is completed before the scout platoon arrives.

   Scout platoon's sleep plan is ineffective. Leadership does not get the minimum sleep required resulting in the platoon leadership being slow and degraded.

   Fix: Enforce the plan.

Rehearsal

Training that cannot be rehearsed should not be conducted. Too often HST is not rehearsed because of meetings or other urgent requirements.

Techniques:

1. Rehearse all training whenever possible.

2. Use whatever method is appropriate; e.g., chalkboards, sand tables, rock drills, and terrain walks.

Execution

Technique: Do not execute training unless the rehearsal was a success.

• Tactics learned wrong are very difficult to change.
• Self-confidence and confidence in leadership may be lost.

After-Action Review (AAR)

The trainer provides the participants with a go/no-go rating for each event. The AAR is facilitated to bring out both good and bad points as individuals move forward and "discover." The objective is to train soldiers and units always ensuring that more emphasis and resources are placed on training than on evaluations.

Techniques:

1. Conduct the AAR in such a way that most of the input comes from the personnel who have received the training.

2. A successful feedback technique for small units is to allow the soldiers to provide input before the officers and NCOs talk.

Retraining

The S3 should have the unit's training history as well as a current assessment of where the unit's training life is, and what resources are required to ensure the unit can complete its wartime mission.

Coordination

The objective is to train all elements in receiving, processing and disseminating intelligence. If the intelligence is provided to the unit one hour prior to crossing the line of departure, at best the unit will only be able to conduct a hasty attack.

Involve the engineer and fire support elements in the R & S planning. Foster a good working relationship between the S2 and the scout platoon leader in garrison as well as in the field. According to FM 34-2-1: " A scout platoon leader that understands what the S2 needs and an S2 that understands the capabilities and limitations of the scout platoon." The S2 should coordinate with the S3 and the FSO to provide information that confirms or denies enemy locations and possible courses of action.

The S2 must prepare and provide to the units a timely and complete, all-source intelligence update. This intelligence update should be issued at least 24 hours before the tactical event. This means that the brigade should issue its update 48 hours prior to the battalion tactical operations.

Preparation

Soldiers at a training site lose confidence when the unit sends a vehicle back because the leadership forgot a small but essential item such as chalk. "What if we were in a real firefight; could the leadership get ammunition on time; could they evacuate the wounded?"

Two important training objectives are developing soldiers and developing leaders. Mutual confidence begins when soldiers know that the unit is combat ready. A clear understanding of the training plan combined with the knowledge that resources are available and have been thoroughly inspected instills pride and a sense of power in individuals and the unit. Nothing is elementary in training; the smallest detail must be physically inspected.

The preparation phase is the first step where the leadership is evaluated by the soldiers. Leaders, who are hard, but fair, leaders who soldier for the men and women in the unit, will have the men and women soldier for them. Soldiers understand that everyone makes mistakes. These will be overlooked. But soldiers will never forgive leaders who know what must be done, but take short cuts such as sending a subordinate to conduct the inspection because of the perception of more important commitments.

Execution: Rules of Engagement

1. Organizations which do not train hard and are not physically and mentally challenged are relatively undisciplined. Using common sense and not harassment, units and individuals must be challenged to the point of near exhaustion.

2. There is no substitute for the commander's personal involvement.

3. There is no substitute for leadership conducting a personal reconnaissance of the training site.

4. There is no substitute for the commander changing the plan to fit the situation.

   • It has been said that "no plan survives contact;" however, it is known that a plan is also a reference for change.

   • A good plan allows the leadership to move from a known to an unknown.

   • Commanders should direct the staff to write and issue an operation order for every tactical event in the execution phase.

   • FRAGOs should be issued as required.

5. Always train with the "maneuver slice" or as much as possible. Whatever the go-to-war task organization is, that is also the organization that is trained.

Phase I: Tactical Road March

Technique: Play real time and distance as much as possible.

EXAMPLES:

1. If the training site is close by, plan a march that, at the minimum, equals the unit's go-to-war mission distance requirement.

2. Have leader's checklists available reflecting unit's strengths and weaknesses. It stands to reason that leader attention is required in these areas.

Phase II: Occupation of the Assembly Area

Duties and responsibilities of the quartering party are selection of positions, NBC sweep, local security, cover and camouflage, and preparing fighting positions.

Technique: Develop a priority work plan to name critical tasks that must be spelled out in the unit's SOP.

Phase III: Conduct the Training

DAY ONE
0530-0555 - 100-percent Stand-to and 100-percent physical inspection of weapons and sensitive items
0600-0700 - Tactical Class I
0700-0730 - Tactical Road March to training sites
0730-0930 - Warning Order issued; units preparing for mission; leaders receiving the order.
0930-1200 - Unit preparation/OPORD is issued
1200-1300 - Tactical Class I
1300-1600 - Rehearsals
1600-1700 - Corrective actions concerning feedback provided by rehearsal
1700-1800 - Class I
1800-1900 - Preparation for tactical road march
1900-2200 - Enroute to establish LPs/OPs. Infantry squads conduct area reconnaissance patrols
2200-2400 - LPs/OPs are established. Patrol missions continue

DAY TWO
0001-0200 - LPs/OPs and patrols begin to report. Note: OPFOR missions began at 0001. OPFOR mission is to locate the enemy's screen line and report.

0200-0215 - Contact with OPFOR dismounts. S2 monitors the R & S effort and is modifying the plan according to information received. S2 begins to analyze requirements, determines resources and capabilities, starts to task resources, evaluates reports, and updates the plan. S2 starts to task elements to look for specific types of enemy units. Informs elements that according to doctrine the enemy should have a certain type unit in the area. Additionally, he provides doctrinal input concerning when the enemy's next echelon should appear. Details are provided about what to look for and how to report it. Note: This should be spelled out in the unit's SOP. The S2 should update and refine the SOP. Reconnaissance units are taught not to become involved in useless fights.

Issue: When referring to the Field Manual concerning the "how to do" part of a tactical operation, the Field Manual advises that most required answers to questions are found in the unit's SOP. This type of tactical play must be worked out on the ground. You cannot insert personalities into FMs.

Technique: The only one way to develop a task force SOP is on the ground. There is no better place to solve this type of problem than at Home Station.

EXAMPLE: The GSR mission is to occupy the screen line and be prepared to conduct a withdrawal through TM C. Who has the responsibility for this coordination?

Recommendation: There are at least three participants: the S2, GSR section leader and the commander of TM C. The S2 acting on the behalf of the battalion commander is the common commander, the GSR section leader is the passing commander, and the stationary commander is the commander of TM C. The link-up point is specified in the OPORD and is where information is exchanged and coordination is completed.

Technique: The following is a copy of the checklist found in FM 17-98-1, Scout Leader's Handbook,September 1990. Terrain walks, rehearsals, and tactical discussions will assist the unit in the refinement of its SOP.

Exchange the following information:

1. Enemy situation and recent enemy activity.
2. Friendly situation and where friendly forces are currently located.
3. Terrain analysis, dominant terrain along route.
4. Supporting fires (what's available, smoke target numbers, location).
5. Location of any friendly obstacles.
6. Location of any enemy obstacles.
7. Recognition signals.
8. CEOI (frequencies, call signs, challenge/password).
9. Location of the friendly command post.
10. Passing unit designation.
11. Number and type of vehicles to pass.
12. ETA of vehicles, marking of the first and last vehicles.
13. Unit's mission.
14. Overwatch range of the friendly forward units.

Coordinate the following:

1. Contact points (primary and alternate).
2. Passage routes including SP, RP, and checkpoints.
3. Line of departure.
4. Battle handover line.
5. Location and number of guide and guide vehicles.
6. Routes through obstacles.
7. Alternate routes
8. CCS, Class III, Class V, medical support, EPW, maintenance.
9. Traffic control, number and type of vehicles.
10. Time of passage.
11. Rally points and assembly areas.
12. Actions on contact with the enemy during passage.
13. Routes the other unit wants you to use when leaving. If possible, do not expose their OPs to the enemy.

SUMMARY

HST has no limitations except in the minds of leaders. It allows the unit to practice and perfect its tactical ability. It facilitates development and refinement of SOPs. HST refines critical tasks until they become habitual for individuals. It emphasizes and drills teamwork. Automatic actions and reactions to tactical situations occur without orders. Patrolling, LPs, OPs, NBC sweeps, camouflage, cover, preparing fighting positions, and range cards are prepared as a matter of SOP. Units develop a priority of work and field craft that saves time and lives, and increases morale.

HST builds self-assured organizations. Leaders improve their tactical skills. Team building, bonding, and trust are established. Units mutually work out difficult tactical situations out on the ground. The "Super Bowl" pressure found at major training areas is absent. Tactical play can stop at any time, allowing for corrective training and mission replay. HST is where individuals are formed into teams, and teams are built into effective fighting organizations. HST is the foundation of an effective fighting organization.

As always, the key to any system is the human side. The advice of British Field Marshall A.P Wavell given in World War II is still valid today: " Study the human side of history . . . to learn that Napoleon in 1776 with 20,000 beat combined forces of 30,000 by something called economy of force or operating on interior lines is a mere waste of time. If you can understand how a young unknown man inspired a half-starved, ragged, rather Bolshie crowd, how he filled their bellies, how he outmarched, outbuffed, and defeated men who had studied war all their lives and waged it according to the textbooks of their times, you would have learnt something worth knowing."

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