Military

c. What help does doctrine provide? R&S planning difficulties should not come as a surprise when one considers how little attention it receives in our doctrinal manuals.

• Planning for reconnaissance is not mentioned in Chapter 5 of FM 101-5.

• Doctrinal discussions of the staff planning process do not mention when R&S planning should take place.

• FM 17-123, the "bible" for heavy force operations at brigade level and below is three inches thick, but only includes several paragraphs on R&S.

• FM 34-130, Reconnaissance and Surveillance, approaches the subject from a narrow perspective, focusing on surveillance and technical collection.

• Doctrine does not articulate a clear framework for reconnaissance that clearly assigns responsibilities and divides labor among echelons from battalion through corps.

2. PREPARATION PROBLEMS

a. Most units devote very little energy nor place sufficient emphasis on preparing to accomplish R&S operations.

• Units tasked to accomplish R&S missions receive very little planning time and usually inadequate guidance.

• Scout platoon leaders often get a list of NAIs and instructions to move out in an hour.

• Junior leaders often cannot develop their own adequate control measures nor promulgate those devised by higher command echelons.

RESULTS:

• Confusion and lack of control.

• Units do not accomplish proper troop-leading procedures. Soldiers cross the line of departure (LD) often without the proper equipment and supplies.

• Situational awareness is usually poor to nonexistent. Reconnaissance units have great difficulty recognizing fleeting tactical opportunities.

• Lack of preparation time prevents the accomplishment of required coordination with adjacent or forward units. Many scouts are killed by friendly forces as they attempt to transit the friendly security area.

• Scouts do not understand the enemy situation, leading to inappropriate movement techniques and poor decisions.

• Lack of flexibility. Without sufficient control measures, redirecting elements is extremely difficult should changes to the plan be required (which is always the case).

b. Thus, normally having received an inadequate plan and given little time to prepare on their own, the reconnaissance forces have a very low probability for success even before they cross the LD. Now it is time to execute the plan. Will high levels of tactical proficiency and internalized SOPs among our forces redeem their preparatory failures? According to performance trends, no.

3. EXECUTION PROBLEMS

a. The biggest execution problem:

Most of our scouts are not trained well enough to infiltrate or penetrate enemy positions.

• Home Station training and doctrinal manuals focus on security missions in conjunction with making contact with the enemy and developing the situation in the advance guard role.

• Techniques designed for these security mission tasks, or for traveling or bounding overwatch (all that cavalry manuals really cover), are insufficient for the conduct of the close-in, stealthy reconnaissance needed to gather information on an enemy defensive position.

b. Many argue that some of the reconnaissance practices at the NTC are unrealistic; in "real war," we would not attempt to insert scouts as deep as units normally attempt to do at NTC. Some also maintain that national intelligence means would normally provide units with much more intelligence about the enemy than the NTC provides. Regardless,we can be certain that some close-in reconnaissance of enemy positions will be required in the next war--either to confirm or update what the satellites have told us.

• To be effective, such a reconnaissance must penetrate enemy counter-reconnaissance elements and will most likely be required to penetrate some enemy defensive positions as well.

• These tasks require well-developed and rehearsed techniques which most scout or infantry platoons have not worked out.

RESULT: Prohibitive losses as units clumsily attempt to weave their way through enemy counter-reconnaissance.

c. Most units poorly monitor their reconnaissance efforts.

• Consumed by planning for the next mission or preparing for the current one, they listen "with half an ear" at best to the progress or lack thereof in the fight for enemy information.

  • Information gained is lost or left unexploited
  • The plan (or what exists of it) is not changed to suit the situation
  • Casualties go unreported
  • No one is tasked to pick up the missions of destroyed elements

• Commanders often remain unaware until far too late that friendly casualties have made their plan for gathering information about the enemy no longer relevant. They continue unaware that critical aspects of the operational plan can no longer be carried out because key observers are not in place, or key NAIs that drive decision points lie uncovered.

• Rarely at the NTC do units change plans on the basis of information gathered through intelligence operations. This is an indictment of both the quality of data gathered and of the flexibility of which our rotational units are capable.

d. Units poorly process information that they do receive.

• Critical data gets recorded without analysis, even when declared a commander's PIR.

• Mechanisms do not exist to promote integrated staff analysis of information. Thus, data which in the correct hands could provide critical intelligence, goes unappreciated.

• Most units do not schedule periodic reviews or update briefings to commanders or other key leaders.

• Few units change their R&S plans or redirect their scouts on the basis of changed situations or the determination that information is needed at another place.

Units often continue executing their R&S plan regardless of its continued relevance.

e. Combat support and combat service support is often spotty.

• Artillery units focus on preparation for the main operation and are not ready to support reconnaissance elements.

• The lack of logistical planning manifests itself in inadequate CSS during operations.

  • Died of wounds rates among scouts runs between 70-100 percent.

  • The great majority of units have not developed, internalized, and practiced SOPs for resupply or medical evacuation of reconnaissance elements inserted into or behind enemy positions.

Reconnaissance is one of war's most critical tasks -- and one of the most difficult. The techniques presented here are not easy. They must have command attention, and require training and practice. But the training and practice will be rewarded with improved unit performance in reconnaissance missions.

To achieve successful reconnaissance, a brigade must adhere to four main principles:

1. Treat reconnaissance as a major phase of every mission.
2. Publish a written R&S OPORD, complete with five paragraphs.
3. Plan ahead -- stage reconnaissance forces for the next operation before the current one ends.
4. Appoint a Chief of Reconnaissance.

1. TREAT RECONNAISSANCE AS A MAJOR PHASE OF EVERY MISSION. Approach it as an operation, using operational and not technical control mechanisms.

2. PUBLISH A WRITTEN R&S OPORD, COMPLETE WITH FIVE PARAGRAPHS. In keeping with the premise that R&S is a major operation, publish an R&S OPORD. The length of this order will depend upon circumstance and a unit's SOPs (the more complete and inculcated the SOP, the shorter the order). The creation of a separate Reconnaissance OPORD may necessitate the constitution of a separate reconnaissance planning cell.

The Reconnaissance Order

This quality product should resemble a full, five-paragraph field order at brigade, and, if time exists, at task force level. Completeness is critical; length is not. In fact, the length of the order will be inversely proportional to the quality of the unit's SOPs. Two 8 1/2" x 11" sheets plus an overlay would make a reasonable target length. The reconnaissance operations order or fragmentary order must provide clear direction to subordinates, coordinate their activities to achieve desired results, and provide for the effective support of the operation. "R&S" matrices alone do not do these things.

Paragraph 1, SITUATION. Address the reconnaissance situation, both friendly and enemy.

• Friendly sub-paragraph covers higher and adjacent reconnaissance efforts and makes the higher commander's reconnaissance intent clear.

• Enemy sub-paragraph covers the overall enemy situation briefly, but focuses on his anticipated security forces and counter-reconnaissance effort. Take special care to make the description of the enemy's counter-reconnaissance as complete as possible; task forces do not have the staff or the time to spend much effort here.

Paragraph 2, MISSION. The mission statement should delineate the reconnaissance mission, not the overall mission. Articulate in operational terms, since reconnaissance is an operation (see Figure 1). Note that the purpose of the effort is to assist the commander in making decisions about how he will conduct his operation. The S2's enemy SITEMPs will help drive the effort, but our purpose is not to confirm or deny our S2's guess.

Paragraph 3, EXECUTION. Continue with the emphasis on operational terminology.

• Include a commander's intent statement (see Figure 2). The statement is focused on the commander's priority information requirements (PIRs), and states the critical things that he must have his effort accomplish, and by what time. It then describes the desired end state. He may briefly touch on method, but the purpose of an intent statement is to provide subordinates with an idea of what to do when the specifics of the plan no longer apply.

• The Concept of Operation sub-paragraph describes the overall effort in general terms, so that subordinates may understand the "big picture." It also covers things that all units must accomplish (see Figure 3).

• The Tasks to Subordinate Units sub-paragraphs are critical. They specifically describe what the subordinates units are to do. Assign tasks to the task force, battalion, or separate company, not to their scout platoons directly. Unless specifically stated otherwise, the subordinates can accomplish their tasks with whatever sub-units they choose. Speak in terms of objectives, not OPs and NAIs. Example: Do not task the subordinate to observe NAI 21. Tell him to find the enemy AT reserve--which might be at NAI 21, and he might find it if it is not at our anticipated location (see other sample tasks at Figure 4).

• Give tasks to all or nearly all subordinate units. The FSB might conduct patrols in the rear area, or a signal node may watch for an enemy flanking movement. Reconnaissance operations must be coordinated efforts of all relevant assets. This is why an order is vital.

• In the fires paragraph, describe how fires will support the reconnaissance phase, not the main operation.

  Example:

  • Target enemy security forces.

  • Plan preparations to aid infiltrations.

  • Describe when fires are available for reconnaissance units and how to get them should the reconnaissance units get in trouble.

  • Include SEAD for aerial insertions and deceptive fires as appropriate.

  • Cover engagement criteria. Determine which targets you would be willing to fire at with DS artillery and expose your units to counterfire.

• Coordinating instructions are as important for reconnaissance as they are for the main operational fight. Well-developed SOPs will reduce the requirement for numerous instructions, but some carefully-considered instructions will be crucial. Measures that should always be included are:

  • Passages of lines
  • Flank coordination
  • Special reports line of departure (LD) times
  • Fratricide avoidance

Paragraph 4, SERVICE SUPPORT. Logistical support of reconnaissance must be addressed primarily by SOP if it is to be accomplished in a timely and efficient manner. Nevertheless, Paragraph 4 remains critical to a reconnaissance order.

• Planners must delineate measures for:

  • Aerial resupply
  • Supplying elements that have penetrated into the depths of enemy positions
  • Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) responsibilities
  • Casualty collection point designations
  • Ambulance exchange points
  • Aerial medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)

• This paragraph should set in motion resupply activities that transpire during the staging phase. Remember, this phase occurs while the previous operation is still underway.

Paragraph 5, COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Signal measures should also rely heavily on SOP, but any changes to normal procedure, the deployment of retrans, and any unusual reporting requirements should be covered here. Any changes to normal command and control practices must also be included.

The Reconnaissance Planning Cell

Reconnaissance planning must be accomplished quickly and efficiently to publish an adequate order in time to permit proper troop-leading procedures at lower levels. Construction of the reconnaissance plan (order) cannot wait until after the general planning staff completes the main operational plan. Nor can the main planning group wait until after reconnaissance planning is complete before beginning operational planning. Reconnaissance planning must occur simultaneously with other planning. This drives the requirement for a specially constituted planning cell. Suggested members of the planning cell are:

This is an ad hoc cell, because personnel limitations in brigade staffs preclude a permanent constitution. The cell would meet during the planning phases of every major operation and whenever significant changes are required in the current plan. Units must exercise this group repetitively to ensure that it can produce the reconnaissance plan (order) in timely fashion.

THE RISK: With two separate planning groups simultaneously producing a reconnaissance plan (order) and a main operations plan, there is a risk that the two planning groups will diverge, resulting in a reconnaissance plan (order) that does not support the main plan.

THE ANSWERS:

• Clear planning guidance from the commander.

• Brigade S3 or XO (whichever is the principal driver of brigade planning) spot-checks to ensure synchronization.

• Reconnaissance plans that support an array of possible courses of action, and are flexible enough to handle significant changes.

• Reconnaissance efforts that cover all enemy positions, avenues, or courses of action.

3. PLAN AHEAD -- STAGE RECONNAISSANCE FORCES FOR THE NEXT OPERATION BEFORE THE CURRENT ONE ENDS.

The R&S plan (order) must be published early, and usually before the main OPORD is issued. Interestingly, despite the fact that U.S. Army doctrine addresses the planning process in great detail, it does not mention when within this process reconnaissance planning should occur.

Two factors dictate the timing of reconnaissance planning:

1. Its publication must allow sufficient time to subordinate units to permit adequate planning and troop-leading. procedures.

2. Reconnaissance units must depart early enough to penetrate enemy positions, gather information, and get that data back to the commander in time to make decisions.

During continuous, sequenced operations, reconnaissance elements should depart in support of an operation as soon as possible after the previous one ends--or even before it ends if practicable. Ideally, the staff should plan for reconnaissance one battle ahead of the current fight. This basically requires staffs to separate reconnaissance from main operational planning. (See Figure 5.)

• As soon as the commander receives an order from higher, or identifies the need for another OPORD, mission analysis commences. At this time, the Reconnaissance planning cell should convene to begin their own mission analysis of the reconnaissance requirements for the operation. At the very minimum, SITEMPS can be developed and some intelligence requirements can be identified.

• Once the commander issues his planning guidance, reconnaissance planning begins in earnest. Such guidance must provide the reconnaissance planning cell with clear direction. A well-drilled cell can then produce a reconnaissance order quickly -- perhaps in an hour -- if that much time is available.

• Reconnaissance planning might be completed before course of action analysis (wargaming) finishes, or perhaps even starts. This may make some staffs uncomfortable, because the wargame could certainly identify additional reconnaissance tasks and targets. But waiting for the completion of the wargame delays publication of the reconnaissance order, and cuts into troop-leading time available to subordinate elements. The usually minor refinements generated by the wargame is not worth the loss of troop-leading time by subordinate elements. Good commander's guidance, quality SITEMPs, careful mission analysis, and more important, a well-understood notion within the staff of how the brigade usually fights, can keep such potential changes to a minimum.

4. APPOINT A CHIEF OF RECONNAISSANCE (COR).

The Chief of Reconnaissance (COR) is an officer from the battalion and brigade staff who is taken out of hide to head the planning, coordination, and management of reconnaissance and surveillance for the commander when the unit is tactically deployed on training exercises or in actual combat. The officer's "normal" position could be Assistant S3 or Assistant S2. An A/S3 would probably be best. It is important that this officer has no other major duties during operations so that he can focus on this critical area -- comparable to the brigade staff member whose focus is chemical operations. The officer must be given appropriate authority and access to communications.

• The COR should work out of the brigade main command post and the battalion TOC.

• He should have his own FM radio net, but probably is best served operating on the O/I net for operational matters and other appropriate nets for support.

• Probably subordinate to the S3, he would almost certainly best be served working out of the S2 track on the move and "in between" the S2 and S3 sections when the TOC is stationary.

DUTIES:

1. Directs planning IAW the commander's intent and under the guidance of the S3/XO, who ensure that reconnaissance planning is in synchronization with other operational plans.

2. Monitors and enforces execution of the plans.

3. Maintains situational awareness.

4. Adjusts the plan as necessary (with the approval of the Cdr/XO/S3), redirecting "eyes" IAW the situation or replacing lost OPs.

5. Links to CS and CSS assets so that he may call upon them to support the reconnaissance effort.

The Force-Oriented Zone Reconnaissance

Brigade-level tactical techniques for reconnaissance are relatively straightforward. Although it may conduct route or area reconnaissances, the most commonly used form for the brigade is the zone reconnaissance.

• The task to a subordinate unit must clearly articulate that the zone reconnaissance is oriented on the enemy force. A force-oriented reconnaissance will not consume time collecting data about culverts, bridges, etc., unless specifically directed.

• Achieve focus for the effort by specifying the time by which the zone reconnaissance should be completed.

• Designate reconnaissance objectives and named areas of interest to make guidance clearer. The objective would be the focus; NAIs would be sub-divisions of the objective or other smaller locations of interest that they may or may not examine.

• Brigades may conduct zone reconnaissances by dividing its zone into subordinate zones either abreast or in depth (see Figure 6.) A combination of zones abreast with one in depth is also possible. These techniques permit focusing TF efforts at the area of its most likely attack.
  
  Figure 6. Force-Oriented Zone Reconnaissance
  • A zone in depth could be used if the brigade plans to assign a deeper objective to a follow-on force. Thus, reconnaissance elements from the following TF could be sent through the zone of operation of the lead TF and reconnoiter objectives or NAIs for needed information.

  • A zone in depth could also be employed to direct the activities of brigade-controlled elements (such as COLT Teams or brigade reconnaissance troop patrols) that are penetrating deeper than TF elements. The appropriate passage of lines coordination must be accomplished.

• Use of boundaries is critical. Fratricide prevention and clearance of fires require this control measure. Boundaries may or may not be the same as those envisioned for the main operation. If they are not, the boundary change time must be clearly announced and the locations of any elements now in another unit's zone must be coordinated.

  • The brigade may wish to place elements under its direct control within the zone of a subordinate. This can be done with coordination.

  • An alternate technique would be for the brigade to attach an element to a subordinate for a specific purpose. Example: Attach a COLT to a task force with the task of going to an OP and calling fires on a specific target at a specific time. The TF would then support this team logistically and assist it in getting into position.

• Infiltration lanes are a particularly useful technique for fires clearance while reconnaissance patrols infiltrate. Fires inside the lane must be carefully cleared with all elements positively located. Fires outside a lane are more easily approved.

• Task forces should establish a clear boundary between their security forces screening or guarding in front of the main body and their units performing zone reconnaissance. Again, passage of lines coordination must be accomplished as reconnaissance elements pass through security forces on their way to the enemy.

• Force-oriented reconnaissances will routinely pass into the depth of the enemy security or main battle areas. Fire support plans for such operations are a requirement, as are plans for resupply and extraction of forces that are beyond the enemy's FLOT. Brigade or Task Force security forces could be given the task of assisting reconnaissance elements as they penetrate enemy security forces.

Route and Reconnaissance

When a brigade conducts any sort of road march or tactical movement along a single narrow axis, a route reconnaissance is a requirement. This could be directed as part of a larger reconnaissance order that includes instructions for other forms, or the order could focus solely on the route. Whichever applies, a reconnaissance order is necessary -- even if it is very short.

Area reconnaissance of a portion of the brigade sector or rear area might be conducted in support of a counter-reconnaissance effort.

Example 1: The Forward Support Battalion may be tasked to patrol some high ground in search of enemy reconnaissance elements that have penetrated into the brigade rear. This should be SOP, but must also be coordinated and monitored. Combat patrolling in the rear area, especially at night, is an invitation to fratricide unless properly controlled. Brigades must demand that battalions and task forces submit patrol plans daily to the COR (who in this case is helping to orchestrate a security operation).

Example 2: Conduct a variant of an area reconnaissance, which might be called a point reconnaissance.

• Dispatch a patrol to reconnoiter a particular hilltop.

• Air-insert a reconnaissance element to establish an OP at an overlook and conduct surveillance of a specific enemy location or number of locations. When doing this, take care to ensure the reconnaissance element understands what they are looking for. Guidance could read:

"TF 1-81, establish an OP vicinity NK123456 -- place continuous surveillance on the defile vic NK 122455 to determine and monitor the strength and composition of the enemy defense so that the brigade may determine whether to use that defile as an axis of advance."

Note we have not simply given our scout an NAI, but told him why he is looking at it and what to look for. This way our leader can exercise some initiative, and perhaps move if he cannot see well enough from his original position.

Penetrating Enemy Security Forces

Almost all close-in reconnaissance will require penetration of enemy security forces engaged in counter-reconnaissance. If we are to obtain useful information about the enemy, we must get past their security forces. We do this by force, stealth, or a combination of the two.

Stealth is essential for close-in reconnaissance. Unfortunately, few of our forces actually train for stealth. We all know that stealth in an M3 is difficult to achieve. But many erroneously believe that mounted HMMWV movement is stealthy -- the OPFOR can quickly make unbelievers out of them.

• Stealthy penetration will almost always require dismounted patrolling techniques. Heavy forces must train their scouts in dismounted patrolling operations. Careful planning, SITEMPs, and detailed map reconnaissances help in the selection of routes, infiltration lanes, and dismount points.

• The brigade should take measures to help in the penetration.

  • Units can fire artillery to keep the enemy's head down and create noise to mask the sound of friendly penetrating forces.

  • Smoke may be employed to cover movement.

• If numerous dismounted patrols operate in the same area, control measures must be employed to prevent fratricide and to prevent the activities of one patrol to give away the locations of the others. Essentially, these reconnaissance patrols should be approached as described in the Ranger Handbook -- the proven techniques in that superb manual are the keys to success in stealthy, dismounted, reconnaissances.

When it is not possible or practical to penetrate enemy security forces using stealth, armies have often employed the reconnaissances in force to find enemy positions, force him to reveal his major weapons systems, or depart from "hide positions."

• In-force patrols are robust combat patrols that intend to fight the enemy.

• Observing the enemy's response to force patrols is an excellent way to gain information about him.

• After the enemy reveals himself, COLTs or other observers positioned during the conduct of the patrol can reduce enemy strongpoints with artillery fire -- especially Copperhead shots.

• Take advantage of the action to infiltrate stealthy reconnaissance elements to positions of advantage.

• A task statement to a subordinate unit could read:

  "At 181900 Mar, conduct a reconnaissance in force {or combat patrol} with a tank heavy team along Axis Blue to determine the strength and disposition of enemy defenses vicinity OBJ Red. Abort the mission after the loss of two combat vehicles. The Co Tm must return behind PL Gold NLT 182400 Mar."

• Make required combat support and combat service support arrangements.

• Train units to be able to carry out this task, and work out techniques and procedures. Any commander assigning such a mission would need to take care to ensure that the commander executing it understands what his requirements are. This is a mission with which our current Army is not familiar.

The Wave Technique

Most training units at the NTC send all of their designated reconnaissance units out near-simultaneously. This limits flexibility, hinders the ability of units to change focus during operations, and makes it difficult to replace lost assets. Units should consider deploying their reconnaissance assets in waves. (See Figure 7.)

Example: A unit with 48 hours to prepare for an operation sends out half their assets the first night and the other half the second.

Advantages:

• The first wave can be sent out quickly to help develop a general picture of the enemy (although some focus is certainly possible).

• The second wave can be sent to areas that the first failed to reach, or areas that became more important later during planning.

• The second wave can focus on areas that were initially uncovered, by mistake or design, but are now realized as important.

• The second wave can replace casualties from the first.

• Rotating scouts, FISTs, and other assets provide resupply and recovery, and planning time to units. Such rotation also suggests that scouts are not the only units that carry out reconnaissance -- infantry or even tank platoons can be tasked as well.

Tracking Reconnaissance

Brigades and task forces must develop well-defined SOPs for monitoring and adjusting their reconnaissance efforts. Inculcated SOPs are critical, for the myriad of tasks involved with preparing the main force for combat tends to distract staffs from tracking reconnaissance progress.

Specific techniques:

• Designate a COR

• Designate routine times to demand the submission of

  • Reconnaissance plans and SITREPs from supporting units
  • Posting of PIR and IR in the TOC

• Require that locations for all reconnaissance elements be posted and updated on the brigade and TF situation maps (it surprises many how rarely brigades track TF OP locations)

• Designate standard times for the submission of rear area patrol plans.

• Establish routine meetings (or "IPRs") for the review of reconnaissance progress.

  • Hold them several times daily.

  • The XO would preside over most, but the commander should routinely attend at least one at a standard time each day.

  • The brigade (or TF) delineates exactly what information gets exchanged.

  • End with scheduled decisions that review PIR and designate new recon objectives, NAIs, or focuses for collection systems.

• Practice these standing procedures in garrison, for they do not come easy.

Sustaining Reconnaissance

Providing combat service support to reconnaissance elements is and will always be a challenge. Reconnaissance missions are by design risky business, and evacuating their casualties and providing them with supplies may at times be impossible. Planners of reconnaissance must, therefore, look for times when support is possible, and plan and execute accordingly.

• During offensive operations, the brigade or TF should designate rally points before inserting scouts. Medical support and resupply would then go to the designated points during the course of operations to evacuate wounded and provide water, and wounded soldiers would know where to go and wait for help. A unit SOP may state that the TF security force will maintain an element prepared to move forward on short notice to retrieve casualties. Locations, signals, and triggers all need to be pre-arranged.

• Resupply is also difficult, but there are techniques:

  • Pre-designate resupply drops, where aircraft deliver food, fuel, water at designated times. Reconnaissance elements would go to the designated sight after the drop is made.

  • The ranger concept of a patrol base, away from the enemy, but accessible to reconnaissance elements is another technique.

• Sustainment supplies that reconnaissance elements take with them are vital. Reconnaissance elements must be given sufficient time to plan and prepare. Pre-combat checks/inspections are often more important for reconnaissance troopers than anyone else.

This article identifies problems that our forces currently experience while conducting reconnaissance operations, and offers some practical measures to assist units in improving these operations. The critique of the current force in no way intends to reflect upon the quality of effort or the professionalism of the forces that deploy to the NTC. Indeed, the great outfits that train at NTC are from the world's best Army and are led by terrific soldiers. But our great Army is not perfect, and its ability to plan, prepare, and execute reconnaissance operations needs emphasis for improvement. The uncompromising professionalism that has made us the world's premier land-fighting force impels us to fix what is broken. It is in this spirit that we offer these suggestions.

None of the recommended techniques offered here are easy. Strong commitment must be made by leaders to devote the necessary time and energy to Home-Station training, practice, and development of thorough SOPs. And if our reconnaissance efforts are to be successful, we must:

• Decide at the command level what our focus is.

• Adequately convey this focus and the coordinating details necessary for execution in an order.

• Coordinate the efforts of all information-gathering agencies.

• Promulgate that order in enough time for subordinate elements to plan and prepare.

• Plan to obtain the needed information in time for leaders to make decisions early enough to permit their decisions to be put into effect.

• Amend the plan IAW the developing situation, and execute those changes.

• Provide adequate combat support and combat service support to reconnaissance elements.

Success in reconnaissance and surveillance depends on accomplishment of these imperative tasks. To a large measure, success in the main fight depends on the success of our reconnaissance. So if we do not fix reconnaissance, our chances for victory on future battlefields are diminished.

Foreword

Home-Station Training (HST)