Military

PROBLEM 3-2: Forward support battalions (FSBs) have difficulty tracking the flow of high priority requisitioned parts. Manual transportation manifests are either not used or not accurate when used.

PROBLEM 3-3: Units have difficulty maintaining an accurate picture of the materiel readiness of equipment and status of open repair parts requisitions.

1. The tracking of DA Form 2404 flow remains a problem.

2. The tracking of high priority requisitions via transportation manifests by the main support battalions (MSB) remains inconsistent.

3. The success rate of Class IX electronic data transfer (BLAST) declined 40% in the last quarter.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 3-4: Task force level unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) operations need to be improved. Doctrinal repair evacuation criteria are not followed nor are METT-T factors used to produce mission-specific criteria.

PROBLEM 3-5: Task force DA Form 2406 reporting lacks accuracy.

1. Units habitually delay reporting combat vehicles which are not fully mission capable.

2. Units delete vehicles from report in anticipation of arrival of repair parts which will restore vehicle to FMC status.

3. Circle X delegation below task force level clouds accuracy of report.

PROBLEM 3-6: (Repeat of Problem 3-1) Rotational units frequently have an inaccurate picture of equipment materiel readiness and status of open repair parts requisitions. They do not transition well from garrison to the field environment and requirements in using ULLS, SAMS ½ and SARSS. Accomplishment and tracking of DA Form 2404 flow requires more emphasis.

PROBLEM 3-7: (Repeat of Problem 3-2) Main support battalion (MSB) tracking of high-priority requisitions via transportation manifests remains inconsistent. MSBs use manual transportation manifests inconsistently to maintain visibility of in-transit high-priority parts. They do not get manifests to forward support battalion's support operations prior to each shipment's arrival in the brigade support area (BSA).

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 3-8: In field maintenance operations, units, leaders, and individuals fail to properly complete and submit DA Form 2404 and DA Form 5988. Many unit technical SOPs do not address the basics of DA Forms 2404 and 5988 completion to include format, submittal, and collection process/method, maintenance section form flow and actions, and return of form/parts to equipment operator.

PROBLEM 3-9: (Repeat of Problems 3-1 and 3-6) Units have difficulty maintaining an accurate picture of the materiel readiness of equipment and status of open repair parts requisitions upon arrival into Theater. CSS units have difficulty transitioning their Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS) (i.e., ULLS, SAMS ½ and SARSS) from garrison to a field environment because of a lack of manual tracking system while the STAMIS are off-line.

PROBLEM 3-10: (Repeat of Problems 3-2 and 3-7) Manual transportation manifests were used inconsistently by main support battalions (MSBs) to maintain visibility of in-transit high-priority parts. Transportation manifests do not get to forward support battalion (FSB) support operations prior to each shipment's arrival in the brigade support area (BSA).

NOTE: The use of Class IX electronic data transfer (using the "BLAST" software program) has improved to a 68.3% success rate; an increase in effectiveness of 17.3%. The increase can be attributed to improved Home Station training and better coordination between the FSB and their signal support.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 3-11:

1. Task forces have difficulty controlling the flow of vehicles in and out of unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs).

2. Task forces often have fully mission-capable vehicles remaining in the UMCP for long periods of time.

3. Once vehicles are released from the UMCP, task forces often have problems successfully linking up the vehicles with their units prior to execution.

PROBLEM 3-12: Generally, operator maintenance procedures are substandard.

1. DA Forms 2404:

• Lack signatures
• Have incomplete administrative data
• Are often illegible
• Are not forwarded IAW standard procedure

2. Identified faults have no recorded corrective action.

3. Units do not use appropriate diagnostic procedures/equipment.

4. Parts often not routed or delivered until end of campaign.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 3-13: (Repeat of Problem 3-11) Task forces have difficulty controlling the flow of vehicles in and out of unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs).

1. Task forces often have fully mission-capable vehicles remaining in the UMCP for long periods of time.

2. Once vehicles are released from the UMCP, task forces often have problems successfully linking up the vehicles with their units prior to execution.

PROBLEM 3-14:

1. The average unit at NTC accomplishes PMCS in 48-72 hours. The desired turn-around time on PMCS of combat systems is 24 hours. This goal is accomplished by less than 10% of the units that arrive at the NTC.

2. Crews do not have a system of turning in combat systems for PMCS.

3. 1SGs and platoon SGTs are not involved in the planning of LOGPAC synchronization.

4. The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) and XO establish a plan during RSOI only when coached, and NCOs execute on constantly changing guidance from the task force XO.

5. The PMCS system is not tested in garrison or during field training exercises (FTXs) prior to deployment and are therefore setting the conditions for failure.

6. DA Forms 2404 are often submitted with signatures/administrative data missing and/or identified faults having no corrective action taken.

7. Due to a shortage of experienced mechanics, units are not using the diagnostic equipment (breakout boxes/STE-ICE) available to them to determine all vehicle faults. Consequently, installing parts does not always correct the deficiency, and vehicles remain in a "C" status for extended periods of time.

PROBLEM 3-15: Units typically do not use maintenance doctrine repair timelines to evacuate equipment out of the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP).

1. Organizational maintenance drags combat systems around the battlefield until repaired.

2. In over 12 rotations, only 1 M119 Howitzer (British light gun) has been evacuated to the Bravo Company in the brigade support area (BSA).

3. The maintenance support teams (MSTs) repair as far forward as possible but do not consider time a factor when repairing equipment.

PROBLEM 3-16: Units too often do not use simplified test equipment (STE) or break-out boxes (BOB) in their troubleshooting (TS) procedures.

1. Units usually swing-test fault diagnosis.

2. Units typically split the BOB into two parts -- half forward, half back. Having the equipment in separate locations does not facilitate the use of the equipment.

Techniques

1. Units must not lose accuracy of the materiel readiness of equipment and status of open repair parts requisitions while transitioning from garrison to field environment.

• Unit leadership should require the use of automated CSS systems in both Home Station garrison and field use. Future CSS automated management software must be more user friendly and provide real-time information management products.

• Units should request or keep track of historical usage of supplies in the theater to which they are deploying. It is possible to develop a "factor" to use automated forecasting tools, e.g., OPLOG planner, at battalion or brigade S4 sections.

• Units should develop a manual system (DA Form 2404 daily turn-ins and daily maintenance meetings) to track readiness before STAMIS are fully operational after arrival into Theater.

2. The brigade combat team (BCT) must have sufficient time to put into motion actions to accept and install high priority deadlining parts prior to line of departure (LD).

• CSS units should develop tracking systems for high priority parts. This system should be used on a daily basis at Home Station.

• The automated BLAST system must continue to be trained and utilized at Home Station in order to build familiarity with MSE interface by all components of the system: signal company, brigade signal officer, and battalion commo/SARRS operator.

3. DA Forms 2404 and 5988 must be properly completed and submitted.

• Many Home Station daily motor pool operations can be applied to field maintenance operations. Those that are not may be refocused to equate administrative operations to tactical/field requirements to eliminate a dual-system of operations.

• Technical SOPs can be updated/revised/written to include maintenance operations.

• Unit LOGPACs are often the collection point for DA Forms 2404 and 5988 and delivery of non-deadlining parts to platoon sergeants.

• Maintenance contact teams can accompany the LOGPAC supplies with the platoon sergeant and work on vehicle faults during LOGPAC operations or at a consolidated site.

4. DA Form 2406 reporting must be accurate. Report vehicles as not mission capable (NMC) until all deadlining faults are repaired. Maintain tight control and continuous reporting on circle X vehicles. Units should better train maintenance reporting procedures and operator/unit level troubleshooting procedures.

5. To prevent the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) from becoming a collection point for disabled vehicles, the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) should conduct a maintenance estimate to determine which vehicles could be better repaired in the more stable confines of the brigade support area (BSA). This would preclude the 4-6 hour time to displace from UMCPs.

6. The UMCP should be given enough Class IV material to create a "fence" with one exit/entrance. UMCP leaders should designate a "gate guard" to control traffic in and out of the UMCP. The task force leadership should take an active interest in controlling the link-up of repaired vehicles with their units. Too often, the only parties involved in the linkup are the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) and the individual vehicle commanders.

7. Place the break-out boxes (BOB) either forward in the UMCP or field trains to facilitate its use.

8. Break the cycle of weekly PMCS while at Home Station. Test the PMCS system in garrison and during FTXs before deployment. The task force leadership must place greater emphasis on the training and conduct of operator PMCS and troubleshooting IAW the appropriate -10/-20 manual. Follow doctrinal timelines in order to test the long-term campaign tempo.

TA.7 Combat Service Support, Part III

TA.7, Part V