Military

PROBLEM 2-2: The maintenance of accurate battle rosters is a continual problem. Units do not consistently use the automated strength accounting system with any degree of effectiveness.

PROBLEM 2-3: Units have difficulty developing timely forecasts of logistical requirements, including the reporting of casualties, damaged/destroyed equipment (Area Damage Control) and daily LOGSTAT reports.

PROBLEM 2-4: (Repeat of Problem 2-1) Units are not conducting Class V estimates to determine their required supply rate (RSR), then comparing it to their controlled supply rate (CSR) and schedule of fires to plan resupply operations based on priorities and resupply triggers.

1. Battalion leaders and CSS planners are not conducting accurate inventories of Class V on hand, tracking munitions available for draw, and managing ammo haulers by bumper number.

2. The battalion FDO is not being consulted on the schedule of fires or expected expenditures.

3. CSS planners are not associating specific support requirements for the battalion's critical fire support tasks (CFSTs).

PROBLEM 2-5: In many task forces, the logistical requirements of the 10 HMMWV-equipped scout platoon has necessitated that the scout platoon sergeant be responsible for the planning and execution of scout CSS.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 2-6: (Repeat of Problem 2-5) Too often the CSS for the scout platoon is an afterthought by the task force battle staff. Scout platoon leaders are often forced to try and coordinate with internal and external elements for support, without command emphasis from the task force.

PROBLEM 2-7: (Repeat of Problems 2-1 and 2-4) Task force level leaders and CSS planners are experiencing problems with Class V estimates.

1. Accurate Class V on-hand inventories are not being conducted.

2. Failure to track ammunition available to draw.

3. Poor management of ammunition haulers.

4. Planners fail to consult the battalion FDO about the scheme of fires for artillery and the expected consumption based on the mission.

5. CSS planners are not associating specific support requirements with battalion critical fire support tasks (CFST).

6. Too many units are not being considered for resupply until it is too late to rearm in time to prevent mission failure.

7. When resupply is required, CSS and operations personnel do not have accurate information about:

• Where ammunition is located.

• Which trucks are loaded with what ammunition.

• How long resupply will actually take once the appropriate trucks are finally dispatched.

PROBLEM 2-8: Rotational units do not consistently develop timely forecasts of logistical requirements. Many units have difficulty reporting casualties, damaged/destroyed equipment (Area Damage Control), and submitting daily LOGSTAT reports.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 2-9: The recovery plan for not-mission-capable (NMC) vehicles (specifically during task force missions) lack essential detail. Units do not plan collection points and when they do, the collection points do not support the task force mission.

PROBLEM 2-10: An S1 casualty estimate is not consistently made during the planning process.

PROBLEM 2-11: (Repeat of Problem 2-8) Most units experienced difficulty executing the timely development and reporting of future logistics requirements, to include reporting of casualties, damaged or destroyed equipment, and daily LOGSTAT reports.

PROBLEM 2-12:

1. The brigade Main CP CSS planner too often prepares CSS plans based upon guidance received from the TOC without input from the FSB SPO or even the brigade S4.

2. The CSS staffs generally need to use METT-T more frequently in developing its plans to support a task force.

3. The CSS staff still needs to work on integrating the CSS plan with the maneuver plan.

4. CSS key leaders need to be more involved in the planning process:

• To ensure their plan is doctrinally sound.

• To ensure key leaders fully understand the plan, to include tasks and purpose of the task force.

5. The S-4 and the combat trains command post (CTCP) must anticipate the task force's needs during battle in order to push supplies to the companies.

6. Task force S1 and S4 are not integrated into the planning process.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 2-13: S1s and S4s need to improve on forecasting Class III and V usage and resupply requirements during missions. General Support aviation battalion (GSAB) S1s and S4s seem to be lulled into a sense of complacency because most missions (at the NTC) involve two or three aircraft and they know the battalion has a large storage capacity. The S1 and S4 generally do not realize that the units supporting them need daily requirement forecasts from them so they in turn are prepared to provide supplies when they are needed.

PROBLEM 2-14: FA battalions do not determine and track ammunition requirements properly.

1. Battalions experience extreme difficulties in identifying ammunition requirements and tracking expenditures.

2. The staff does not consider ammunition requirements, based on critical field artillery tasks (CFATs), during the mission analysis and wargaming processes.

3. The staff does not direct resupply triggers to adequately support the mission.

4. Staffs do not have systems in place to track ammunition consumption at the section, platoon, battery, or battalion levels, making it extremely difficult to project ammunition requirements.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 2-15:

1. Maintenance estimates are not generally conducted or are not conducted to standard.

2. Maintenance estimates are not fully integrated into the logistics estimate.

3. Task force commanders generally do not ask for nor do they receive a briefing on the maintenance status of the task force.

PROBLEM 2-16:

1. Units do not plan for and forecast Class IV barrier material based on anticipated requirements.

2. Units fail to include required Class IV in load plans and movement calculations.

3. Leaders do not supervise and inspect protective obstacles.

Techniques

1. This paragraph addresses logistics forecasting and synchronization of CSS planning.

1. Use every possible Home Station training opportunity to exercise logistical forecasting and reporting procedures. CSS planners must train to coordinate among themselves in planning. They must know how to do predictive analysis or forecast requirements of the supported the task force.

2. Practice the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP), including CSS planners, during training at Home Station. CSS Planners learn and train on TDMP for their own training, to include METT-T factors.

3. Supported unit staffs must make a concerted effort to integrate CSS planners into TDMP. Have S1 and S4 assistants or NCOs take over administrative duties at Home Station while they attend this training.

4. Battalion logisticians must gather and analyze information and prepare a logistics estimate. Participation in the wargaming process allows CSS personnel to anticipate mission requirements and establish "triggers" for resupply.

5. Train S1 in making casualty estimates, both deliberate and combat. Rehearse S1 in integrating the casualty estimate into task force planning.

2. This paragraph addresses Class V estimates.

1. Leaders and staff must understand where all of the ammo is located, when and where it is expected to be pushed, and which quick adjustments, based on a changing tactical situation, are feasible.

2. Develop a worksheet that prompts answers to key questions in estimating expenditures for future operations. Use this worksheet, or checklist, to ensure key ammo information is requested, pushed, and tracked accurately.

3. Convert ammo estimates to triggers for resupply. These triggers should also be included on a mission execution matrix. Publish ammunition numbers in the FASP which reflect the ammo required, by battery, to accomplish their respective critical fire support tasks (CFSTs). Also specify the ammo to be carried by the ammo platoon and/or repositioning requirements.

4. Following coordination with the BAO, publish which standard load plans, by bumper number, the ammo platoon will use.

3. This paragraph addresses FA battalion Class V estimates and tracking.

1. Staffs must carefully consider ammunition capabilities and requirements during mission analysis and wargaming and throughout the planning process.

   1. Critical field artillery tasks (CFATs) are the key to determining requirements.

      • Compute ammunition quantities for expected task requirements.

      • Wargame the "what if" (i.e., what if we shoot 60 minutes of smoke as opposed to 30 minutes).

      • Derive ammunition requirements for that task.

      • Do this for each expected task.

   2. After determining how much and what type of munitions are required, you can push the required munitions to the batteries.

   3. The battery commander uses the CFATs to develop well-thought-out turret and FAASV loads based on quantity and type of munitions expected to be fired.

2. The staff must determine resupply triggers to allow an uninterrupted flow of ammunition for the duration of the mission.

   1. Consider download and travel times as a part of the resupply trigger.

   2. Establish triggers by number of rounds fired versus a percentage (i.e., 15 DPICM rounds versus 50% DPICM expended) to ensure that the trigger is clearly understood across the battalion down to platoon level.

3. The FA battalion must have a standard system to track ammunition.

   1. Howitzer sections must rapidly update their platoon operations centers (POCs) with ammunition expended and received.

   2. Batteries must develop a detailed Class V tracking chart and identify a person to be in charge of managing the platoon's or battery's ammunition.

   3. The POC and gunline continually cross-check information to ensure it is accurate.

   4. There should be a means to track how many battalion 1 round volleys of ammunition by type of munitions have been fired.

   5. The batteries must update the staff routinely on ammunition fired. This process is time intensive but necessary to successful ammunition management.

4. This paragraph addresses Class III estimates.

1. Battalion executive officers (XOs) must ensure the S1 and S4 forecast all requirements, regardless how seemingly minute.

2. Training at Home Station should always emphasize future operations as well as current so that the impact of supply forecasting can be realized.

3. Participate in COA development and wargaming to gain the necessary information to forecast future requirements.

5. This paragraph addresses scout platoon logistical planning.

1. The task force commander, XO, and S3 must become more directly involved in the CS/CSS planning process to support scout platoon operations. Incorporate commander's guidance into WARNOs. Put greater detail into FRAGOs and OPORDs to ensure scout platoon support requirements are understood and coordinated well in advance.

2. The task force XO (or S3, depending on staff organization/responsibilities) should synchronize the support for the scouts, so the scouts are free to deploy on their mission as early as possible. The scouts must be able to move with the confidence that all necessary support is in place and available when the scouts need it.

3. Technique options:

   1. Give the scouts a dedicated vehicle (cargo HMMWV, 2 1/2T or 5T truck with a driver and TC out of the support platoon) that brings the scout LOGPAC forward from the field trains to a scout AA. During scout missions, this vehicle and crew can be staged in the combat trains until needed by the scouts.

   2. Make the HHC XO or first sergeant bring the LOGPAC from the LRP to the scout AA. NOTE: Both options above require a dedicated ambulance to support scout CASEVAC.

   3. Satellite off the closest company/team; however, this technique strains the CSS resources of the designated company.

   4. The task force may decide to "trade" a scout HMMWV for a cargo HMMWV. This gives the scouts a vehicle that can carry Class I/III/V, and evacuate casualties.

6. This paragraph addresses recovery operations planning.

1. The Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) must have an understanding of the task force mission in order to develop a recovery plan and must plan for collection points that will support the task force during the entire mission.

2. The BMO must integrate his recovery plan with S4 CSS plan.

3. The recovery plan must be briefed during the CSS rehearsal to ensure that the company teams have a thorough understanding.

7. This paragraph addresses maintenance estimates.

1. In Home Station training, include:

   1. The preparation of a maintenance estimate IAW FM 43-5.

   2. The integration of the maintenance estimate into the logistics estimate by the task force CSS planners IAW FM 71-2, Chapter 7.

2. Task force logistical planners must make a concerted effort to include the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) in the planning process, specifically COA development and analysis.

8. This paragraph addresses Class IV barrier material estimates.

1. Routine barrier material planning should be based on requirements established in the unit TACSOP.

   1. The TACSOP requirement should be developed from the type, size, and number of obstacles each unit is expected to routinely erect.

   2. Adjustments to the routine TACSOP Class IV requirements be made according to METT-T and the commanders assessment.

2. FM 5-102, Appendix D, stipulates about one 2-1/2 ton truckload of material for 300 meters of triple stand concertina.

3. Limited transportation assets and manpower for construction of obstacles may dictate that barriers be used to canalize enemy forces rather than provide perimeter security.

4. Leaders must define the standard for emplacement of obstacles, communicate the standard (TACSOP), and enforce the standard.

TA.7 Combat Service Support, Part II

TA.7, Part IV