SECTION IV
MSB: OPPORTUNITY TRAINING AT THE NTCby CPT Christopher Farley, O/C, NTC
Most of the circumstances involving the Korean War debacle of Task Force Smith don't apply to today's Main Support Battalion (MSB). Today's MSBs don't have problems with out-of-date weapons and communications equipment. Instead, they often have the best equipment in the world. But there is one problem that plagued Task Force Smith in the days of the Korean War that is still a growing concern for today's commanders:
available
training time
Task Force Smith was unable to conduct much training in Japan due to constrained resources and emphasis on Quality of Life issues. This lack of training time had a direct impact on their combat readiness.
Modern MSBs have a similar problem. The whole battalion rarely, if ever, deploys to the field except when the entire division deploys, because of
- The size of the MSB.
- The diverse mission it performs at Home Station.
- The PERSTEMPO of Stability and Support Operations (SASO) around the world.
The highest level of collective training conducted by the MSB is generally company level and most often focuses on mission support skills. This reduces the MSB's emphasis on conducting synchronized base defense operations, which could be vital to its survival in future conflicts against a determined enemy.
This Home Station mentality usually carries forward to the National Training Center (NTC), where most MSBs fail to capitalize on training opportunities by adopting an "admin" attitude. Although only about 25 percent of the MSB typically deploys for a rotation, the MSB could still use the opportunity to train the deployed soldiers and the staff in base defense operations and leadership skills.
The OPFOR threat at NTC is primarily focused on the combat arms battle. NTC's intent is not to provide an OPFOR threat to Division Support Area (DSA) dustbowl operations. This allows mission support in the DSA to occur unhindered by a viable threat. As a result, what most often occurs at the NTC is similar to a Forward Support Battalion (FSB) slice element's occupation of 6th Brigade Camp north of Doha, Kuwait. Units typically conduct mission support from an admin environment, training common CSS skills as they support the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). There is minimal leader emphasis toward conducting security operations training.
This training void should not be acceptable in Kuwait, nor in the dustbowl DSA at NTC!
There is enough time during the NTC rotation to train the deployed soldiers on essential combat readiness tasks, such as:
- Construction of fighting positions
- Operation of crew-served weapons
- Establishment of LP/OPs
- Patrol procedures
- Leadership skills - troop-leading procedures
- OPORDs
- Confirmation and back briefs
- Rehearsals
- Convoy operations
Ample opportunity is available to train these tasks to standard in a non-threatening environment void of the usual training distractions found at Home Station. Mission support would not be affected. Training opportunity is a state of mind that should be inculcated and planned by the MSB Commander and S3.
There are MSBs who successfully used this concept during a recent rotation. They established a base defense operation, constructed fighting positions, practiced LP/OP procedures, exercised their quick reaction forces (QRF), and trained on convoy procedures, together with some "reaction to ambush" battle drills. The MSBs deployed with training in mind, maintained their focus throughout the rotation, and redeployed as a unit better able to defend itself. The training conducted by the MSBs in no way hindered its ability to support the maneuver brigade's operations in the box. The MSBs worked training into the actual scenario through constant liaison with the maneuver brigade, and also the JTF and Division Headquarters.
Units often continue to call themselves "C-1" or "C-2" for training combat readiness on their Unit Status Report (USR), even though they have all "P" ratings for their METL -- an indicator that a C-1 or C-2 rating may be more of a "HOOAH" factor (can-do mission support) than a true reflection of how long it will take to train the unit's essential battle tasks to a "T" level. In this age of the downsized and sometimes "hollow" Army (FSB FAD III units have arrived at the NTC with 65 percent of authorized strength), units such as the MSBs must be prepared to defend themselves during future conflicts that may have an actual rear area threat.
Taking maximum advantage of all training opportunities will result in the ability to avoid unnecessary casualties in a fight against a determined enemy. That's the "endstate" to shoot for!
Table
of Contents
Section
III: Named Areas of Interest
Section
V: React to Armor While Dismounted Battle Drill
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