SECTION III
NAMED AREAS OF INTEREST
NAI Trends at the Joint Readiness Training Center
by CPT David H. Carstens, Senior MI Company Observer/Controller, JRTC
A disturbing trend involving NAIs continues to recur in units training at the JRTC. Based on observations throughout multiple rotations, battalion S2s are simply nominating too many NAIs in their respective reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans. The result is a poor overall R&S effort at the battalion level with a lack of collection prioritization on key targets. The operation in which "NAI abuse" is usually most apparent is during the movement to contact phase applying the search and attack technique.
The search and attack technique is a decentralized movement to contact requiring multiple, coordinated patrols (squad-sized and platoon-sized) to locate the enemy. It is most often used in a low-intensity operation against an enemy operating in dispersed elements (FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion). Due to the rifle-strength of company and lower units tasked to execute search and attack and the decentralized nature of the enemy and area of operations, it is often necessary to intensely manage NAI taskings and prioritization. The goal is not to overwhelm the tasked unit(s).
One of the major problems facing S2 NAI development particularly when employing the search and attack technique, is the misperception that the battalion S2/S3 develop the rifle company R&S scheme of maneuver through collection taskings. FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, outlines the company commander's responsibilities during R&S execution: "(after receiving the mission) He obtains enemy information from the S2, conducts troop-leading procedures and coordinates and develops a plan." Outlining the company commander's tasks in the search and attack, FM 7-10 goes on to state, "Checkpoints and NAIs are assigned (by the company commander) to focus the subordinate on specific locations." Only in doing so can the commander on the ground make the best use of the available intelligence to maximize his combat power, develop his own area of operations, and find the enemy.
This does not mean that NAIs are never assigned to companies. When they are, they must relate directly to a key decision or HPT. At the company level, the commander -- not the S2 or S3 -- must be allowed to develop his own area of operations. According to FM 7-10, this includes determining:
- What are the information requirements?
- What are his security requirements (to include taskings from higher HQ)?
- What are the priorities for these requirements?
- What assets are available to meet these requirements?
- How much time is available to collect the information?
- What is most critical?
- To whom will R&S tasks be assigned?
To understand this disconnect, one must first consider the definition and overall planning intent of NAIs as outlined in FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: "(NAI) The geographical area where information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected. NAIs are usually selected to capture indications of threat courses of action (COAs), but also may be related to conditions of the battlefield."
The development of NAIs and their relationship to the tactical decisionmaking process, is outlined in FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counter-Reconnaissance. In addition to reinforcing that NAIs confirm or deny enemy activity at a specific place and time on the battlefield, FM 34-2-1 goes on to establish the linkage between NAIs and commanders' decisions. The refinement of NAIs goes through the following phases:
INITIAL NAI DEVELOPMENT. Develop initial NAIs based on the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Identify those NAIs which specifically relate to the PIR and compare to the enemy situational template (SITEMP): the S2s analysis as to how the enemy will execute its doctrinal tactics given the effects of weather and terrain.
NAI TIME SYNCHRONIZATION. Develop time phase lines (TPLs) which depict doctrinal rates of enemy advance/infiltration as compared to the effects of weather and terrain. Combine NAIs to form the event template: when and where you would expect to see enemy critical events occur. This is the most important IPB product during mission analysis, for it is the basis for operational synchronization against the known threat. Another necessity for wargaming is the event analysis matrix. This tool "supports the event template by providing details on the type of activity expected in each NAI, the times the NAI is expected to be active, and its relationship to other events on the battlefield (FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield)."
NAI REFINEMENT. The above mentioned products are brought to the wargame and used to facilitate the development of the decision support template (DST). This process is driven by the commander, XO, and S3, who along with the rest of the staff, develop friendly COAs which consider what the enemy is doing during certain key times on the battlefield.
The focus for DST development is to identify those critical decisions which the commander may need to make during the battle. Such events, as outlined in FM 101-5, Command and Staff Decision Processes, may influence (but are not limited to) such critical decisions as: location and commitment of the reserve, location of the commander and his HQ, and launching of a counterattack. During movement-to-contact operations, critical decisions may relate to: shifting of the main effort, repositioning of the Q-36 fire-finder radar, and reprioritizing high-payoff targets (HPTs).
At the brigade and battalion levels, NAIs which relate to enemy COAs must directly reflect these types of key decisions which are brought out during the wargaming/DST development phase.
Additionally, the wargaming process highlights the development of HPTs. HPTs are those targets whose loss to the enemy will contribute to the success of the friendly COA (FM 34-130). Once the HPTs are developed by the staff, the decision is made as to where these targets can best be interdicted. These NAIs are labeled as target areas of interest (TAIs) or may even be identified as objectives for certain operations.
This process highlights the linkage between PIR, NAI, and HPT: they all must be synchronized to ensure that the commander makes key decisions at the right time and place on the battlefield. NAIs must, therefore, be linked to a decision and/or priority target. This is further reinforced in FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, which states, "The commander and his subordinates rely on IPB, a sound R&S plan (NAIs), and accurate reports to quickly understand enemy intentions."
How many NAIs should be tasked out at the battalion level? Consider first the number of command decisions identified during wargaming and add the templated HPTs (prioritized and relative to PIR) identified during the wargaming process. Further refinement of NAIs can best be accomplished by understanding the capabilities of available assets as well as the operational considerations during search and attack. The battalion's few dedicated, organic information-gathering assets include the scout platoon and infantry patrols. Other assets which are often task-organized down to battalion level are from the brigade's direct support MI company. These include ground surveillance radar (GSR), remotely monitored battlefield sensor (REMBASS) teams, interrogators of prisoners of war (IPW), and counter-intelligence (CI) teams.
The scouts form the basis of the commander's R&S effort at battalion level. They can reconnoiter to determine enemy dispositions and/or occupy observation posts (OPs) from which they can observe the battlefield and relay information to the commander. According to FM 7-20, "Scouts should concentrate on the most important information requirements -- they should not be overtasked." According to FM 34-2-1 and FM 17-98, The Scout Platoon, the scout platoon at full strength can:
- Reconnoiter only a single route during route reconnaissance.
- Reconnoiter a zone 3 to 5 kilometers wide (for dismounted airborne or light infantry organic scouts, consider zones 500-1000 meters for most missions).
- Operate six OPs for limited periods (under 12 hours), or three OPs for extended periods (over 12 hours).
In recent post rotational surveys conducted at JRTC, the scout platoon leadership overwhelmingly agreed that three NAIs for a particular R&S mission was a reasonable expectation.
Given the R&S focus outlined in FM 7-20 and previously mentioned scout platoon limitations, the scouts should focus on those NAIs which directly relate to key decisions for the battalion commander. Task-organized ground surveillance or human intelligence (HUMINT) assets may give additional coverage, provided they are adequately worked into the battalion's intelligence reporting (communications) plan and specifically tasked in the R&S plan. The ground surveillance and/or HUMINT team leader in support of a battalion mission must be brought into the R&S planning process to confirm or deny the ability to cover a particular NAI.
The answer to how many NAIs are acceptable to task out to battalions from brigade is slightly more subjective. Consider first the FM 7-20 definition for movement-to-contact operations: "An offensive operation conducted to gain or re-establish contact with the enemy. Its purpose is also to develop the tactical situation." FM 7-20 goes on to state that, "The battalion tries to establish contact on ground of its own choosing and to develop the situation." In keeping with the definition and purpose, the battalion through internal R&S planning development -- not the brigade staff -- should develop and refine the AO during the moment-to-contact phase.
NAIs from brigade should be directed only at those key areas which drive the brigade commander into a significant decision. The R&S process is managed at brigade, but should be refined from bottom to top. Proposed are the following steps to avoid over-tasking units and ensure bottom-up refinement of the collection process:
STEP 1: The brigade S2 disseminates a collection plan (resulting from the wargame) along with the brigade commander's PIR, brigade situation and event templates, as well as the HPT list. NAIs are limited, focusing only on key decisions and HPTs which may significantly affect the enemy's course of action if destroyed.
STEP 2: The battalion staff takes the collection priorities from brigade and conducts intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for their identified AO. The S2 reviews and refines situational and event templates. R&S taskings are developed to cover specified brigade NAIs as well as those key decision points/HPTs identified by the battalion commander. Copies are disseminated to brigade as well as the rifle companies and battalion scouts.
STEP 3: Rifle company commanders go through the identical IPB process to develop the situation and issue R&S taskings within their assigned AOs. Their plans are disseminated to battalion as well as the platoons and sections tasked to execute.
STEP 4: The battalion S2 and S3 review the company scheme of maneuver and R&S taskings to ensure that the commander's intent is being met, PIR are being answered, and HPTs are targeted in priority. The S2 reviews for collection gaps and coordinates with the S3 to adjust R&S taskings if necessary. The brigade S2 executes the same process for R&S plans sent up by battalions.
STEP 5: R&S plans are tracked and progress reported from company to battalion and battalion to brigade. The collection process is constantly refined at daily target synchronization meetings held at battalion and brigade.
The refinement process for NAIs is key to the development of the event template which, in turn, drives the commander's DST and overall operational synchronization. NAIs must be tied to decisions or key HPTs identified during the targeting process and not used as a means of directing forces on the ground. Prioritization is the relationship of decision points and HPTs to the PIR. Only in doing so can the limited R&S assets available at the battalion level be properly focused at the right time and place on the battlefield. Additionally, companies and battalions must be allowed the flexibility to develop their own AOs, particularly during movement to contact operations. The task of planning, prioritizing, and executing R&S within the rifle company and battalion AOs, must rest in the hands of the respective commander.
Table
of Contents
Section
II: TOW MILES ROE
Section
IV: MSB: Opportunity Training at the NTC
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