Section II, Part 2. DEFINING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: ROE TRAINING

SECTION II

DEFINING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (cont)

Type VI -- Approval to Use Weapons Systems.

Purpose: This rule "[d]esignates what level commander must approve use of particular weapons systems . . . [It may] prohibit use of a weapon entirely."23

Example: "The following table . . . appeared in Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Operations Order 91-1, Rules of Engagement (5 Mar. 1991) (certain weapons systems omitted)."24

Risks: "Units or soldiers may not be able to defend themselves adequately."25

Approving Commander	RCA	Demo	Mortars		FASCAM
			PA	UA
JCS
CINCPAC
JTF	X
Corps					X
Div			X
Bde				X
Bn		X
Co

Table 2. Approval Matrix for Use of Weapons Systems26

Type VII -- Eyes on Target.

Purpose: This rule "[r]equire[s] that the object of fire be observed by one or more human or electronic means."27

Example: "Surface Weapons. This subparagraph applies to the conduct of fire in both low and mid-intensity combat operations to include the employment of indirect and direct fire surface weapons and naval gunfire. . . . Every effort will be made to observe fires regardless of the target location."28

Risks: "Initiative may suffer if redundant eyes on target are required."29

Type VIII -- Territorial or Geographic Restraints.

Purpose: A commander may "Create geographic zones or areas into which forces may not fire. This may involve a territorial (or perhaps political) boundary, beyond which forces may neither fire nor enter except perhaps in hot pursuit of an attacking force. [This rule may] [i]nclude[s] tactical control measures that coordinate fire and maneuver by means of graphic illustrations on operations map overlays, such as coordinated fire lines, axes of advance, and direction of attack."30

Example: "You are not permitted to enter the land, sea, or airspace of other countries -- besides the host nation."31

Risks: "Units may be unable to defend themselves adequately if entering area is only way to suppress continued attack."32

Type IX -- Restrictions on Manpower.

Purpose: This rule "[p]rescribe[s] numbers and types of soldiers to be committed to a theater of operations . . . [This rule might be specified to] [p]rohibit use of U.S. manpower in politically sensitive personnel assignments which require Allied manning."33

Example: "[The U.S. Army Helicopter], when employed on combat support missions, will be United States marked and manned with a combined United States and [Allied Nation] crew."34

Risks: "Positions may be manned for other than purposes of military effectiveness."35

Type X -- Restrictions on Point Targets and Means of Warfare.

Purpose: This would "[p]rohibit targeting of certain individuals or facilities. [It] [m]ay restate . . . Laws of War for situations [where] a hostile force is identified and prolonged conflict ensues."36

Example: "Hospitals, Churches, Shrines, Schools, Museums, and any other historical or cultural site will not be engaged except in self defense."37

Risks: "Restating the Law of War can clutter the message on mission specific tasks."38

THE PRINCIPLES OF NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

In peace operations, SROE are governed by the principles of necessity and proportionality, the two elements of self-defense. The principle of necessity states that the application of armed force in self-defense requires that a hostile act occur or a force or terrorist unit exhibit hostile intent. The principle of proportionality states that the force used must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time, to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of U.S. forces.39

To fully appreciate these principles, it is essential to understand their underlying components which are critical factors when confrontations occur and SROE are applied in actual situations.

The components of SROE which relate directly to the principles of necessity and proportionality are:

Hostile Act: An attack or other use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit (organization or individual) against the United States, U.S. forces, and in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens, their property, U.S. commercial assets, and other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals and their property. It is also force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel and U.S. government property.40

Hostile Intent: The threat of imminent use of deadly force by a foreign force or terrorist unit (organization or individual) against the United States, U.S. forces, and in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens, their property, U.S. commercial assets, or other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals and their property.41

In either case, the right exists to use proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary means available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy the threat.42

These terms and definitions are useful in instructing soldiers in their further understanding of how to anticipate a hostile act, how to react to the threat before it occurs, and when and how to apply graduated levels of nondeadly force while reserving the use of deadly force if measures of nondeadly force fail to dissuade an antagonist. Deadly force, although not specifically defined in doctrine, is force that is reasonably likely to result in death or serious bodily harm -- to a soldier or an attacker.

THE COMMONLY USED BOILERPLATE OF SELF DEFENSE

In formulating ROE, rules should not constrain the commander's right and responsibility to protect his command against an actual or imminent threat of attack. Hence, virtually every set of ROE has been prefaced by the boilerplate of self defense, such as: THESE RULES DO NOT LIMIT A COMMANDER'S INHERENT AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS AVAILABLE AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE OF THE COMMANDER'S UNIT AND OTHER U.S. FORCES IN THE VICINITY.43However,"Telling soldiers in capital letters that they may "take all necessary measures [means] in self-defense" is not a panacea [for commanders] . . . [T]he self-defense boilerplate begs too many questions to be one of the thoughts a soldier should bring to mind under stress."44It leaves too much to the soldier's interpretation or imagination as to what constitutes "all necessary means."

_______________
NOTES

1FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Jun. 93), p. 35.

2Enclosure A, SECRET, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces (1 Oct 94), p. A-1. [This unclassified enclosure to the CJCS SROE is reproduced at Appendix A of this CALL publication.]

3Ibid., p. A-2.

4Ibid., p. A-1.

5Major Mark S. Martins, "Rules of Engagement for Land Forces; A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering," Miliary Law Review, Volume 143 (Winter 1994), p. 27.

6Ibid., pp. 110-117.

7Ibid., p. 110.

8Ibid., p. 110.

9Ibid., p. 110.

10Ibid., pp. 110-111.

11 Ibid., p. 111.

12Ibid., p. 111.

13 Ibid., p. 111.

14 Ibid., p. 111.

15Ibid., p. 111.

16Ibid., p. 111.

17Ibid., p. 112.

18Ibid., p. 112.

19 Ibid., pp. 112-113.

20Ibid., p. 113.

21Ibid., p. 113.

22Ibid., p. 113.

23Ibid., pp. 113-114.

24 Ibid., pp. 113-114.

25Ibid., p. 114.

26 Ibid., p. 114.

27 Ibid., p. 114.

28 Ibid., p. 115.

29Ibid., p. 115.

30 Ibid., p. 115

31Ibid., p. 115

32 Ibid., p. 115

33Ibid., p. 116

34 Ibid., p. 116

35Ibid., p. 116

36Ibid., p. 116.

37Ibid., p. 116.

38 Ibid., p. 116.

39Enclosure A, CJCS SROE, p. A-5 [See reproduction at Appendix A of this CALL publication].

40Ibid., p. A-5.

41Ibid., p. A-5.

42 Ibid., p. A-5.

43Enclosure A, SECRET, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces (1 Oct 94), p. A-3.

44Major Mark S. Martins, "Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering," Military Law Review, Volume 143 (Winter 1994), p. 80.

Section II: Defining the Rules of Engagement, Part 1

Section III: Command Climate

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