Section II. DEFINING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: ROE TRAINING

SECTION II

DEFINING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

"In peace operations . . . ROE are directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under whichU.S. forces initiate and/or continue engagement with belligerent forces," and ". . . ROE define when and how force may be used . . . ROE are also the primary means by which commanders convey legal, political, diplomatic, and military guidance to the military force." 1

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF STANDING ROE (SROE)

The official ROE for U.S. forces is a set of rules contained in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces (1 Oct 94) [hereinafter referred to as CJCS SROE]. The CJCS SROE document is classified -- but it does include an unclassified portion, Enclosure A, which provides implementation guidance for U.S. commanders. SROE are the fundamental ROE for peace operations and remain in effect until rescinded.2SROE apply to all military operations and contingencies short of declared war or prolonged conflict except operations in which U.S. forces provide assistance to federal and local authorities in domestic civil disturbance operations. Domestic civil disturbance operations are governed by the DOD Civil Disturbance Plan, "Garden Plot."3In combined or coalition operations, common ROE may be developed among the participating forces; however, if such ROE cannot be formulated, U.S. forces will follow the rules established by the SROE.4

WARTIME ROE VERSUS PEACETIME ROE

"Wartime ROE permit United States forces to fire on all identified enemy targets, regardless of whether those targets represent actual, immediate threats. By contrast, during peacetime, peacetime ROE [SROE] permit engagement in individual, unit, or national self-defense --- the sole legal ground for international use of force during peacetime."5

The primary difference between war and peace operations is that in war, diplomatic efforts have failed, and a military solution is sought through the application of decisive combat power. In peace operations, the use of force is restrained while a diplomatic solution is sought through negotiation or mediation. Accordingly, ROE are more restrictive in peace operations, making them more politically sensitive as well. In today's world, peace operations are normally conducted by a coalition of forces operating under the purview of the UN charter and customary international law. Hence, certain restraints may be mandated by the UN. Using overwhelming force could compromise diplomatic efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. Even a single, relatively small engagement could jeopardize the legitimacy of the peacekeeping force and upset negotiations or mediations. The lesson for commanders is that, in any confrontation, ROE decisions made by soldiers can have strategic, political implications on current and future operations. Therefore, it is vital that leaders and soldiers hold a common understanding of when, how, and to what degree force is to be used.

FUNCTIONAL RULES 6

Commanders may also establish specific, functional types of rules, which further define their intent on how the force will accomplish its mission within the ROE established for the operation. These functional rules are not Army doctrine; however, they are representative of the rules and restrictions which commanders have established in past contingencies.

Type I -- Hostility Criteria.

Purpose: These criteria "provide those making decisions on whether to fire with a set of objective factors to assist in determining whether a potential assailant exhibits hostile intent and thus clarify whether shots can be fired before receiving fire."7

Example: "Hostile intent of opposing forces can be determined by unit leaders or individual soldiers if their leaders are not present. Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force against United States Forces or other persons in those areas under the control of United States Forces. Factors you may consider include: (a) weapons: are they present? what types?; (b) size of opposing force; (c) if weapons are present, the manner in which they are being displayed; that is, are they being armed? are the weapons part of a firing position?; (d) how did the opposing force respond to United States Forces?; (e) how does the opposing force act toward unarmed civilians?; (f) other aggressive actions."8

Risks: "Restraint may suffer if soldiers regard [hostility criteria] as a checklist which enables automatic decision to fire."9

Type II -- Scale of Force/Challenging Procedure.

Purpose: This functional rule specifies "a graduated escalation of force that ground troops must use in ambiguous situations before resorting to deadly force. It [i]nclude[s] such measures as giving a verbal warning, using a riot stick, perhaps firing a warning shot, or firing a shot intended to wound. [It] [m]ay place limits on the pursuit of an attacker."10

Example: "Patrols may use deadly force if fired upon or if they encounter opposing forces which evidence hostile intent. Nondeadly force should be used if the security of United States Forces is not compromised by doing so. A graduated show of force includes: (a) an order to disband or disperse; (b) show of force/threat of force by United States Forces that is greater than the force threatened by the opposing force; (c) warning shots aimed to prevent harm to either innocent civilians or the opposing force; (d) other means of nondeadly force; (e) if this show of force does not cause the opposing force to abandon its hostile intent, consider if deadly force is appropriate."11

Risks: "Initiative may suffer if soldiers feel the need to progress sequentially through the measures on the scale."12

Type III -- Protection of Property and Foreign Nationals.

Purpose: This functional rule "[d]etail[s] what and whom may be defended with force aside from the lives of United States soldiers and citizens. [It] [i]nclude[s] measures to be taken to prevent crimes in progress or the fleeing of criminals."13

Examples: "You may use force in self defense in response to attacks or threats of imminent attack against U.S. or host nation forces, citizens, property, or commercial assets;" and, "Patrols are authorized to protect relief supplies, United States Forces, and other persons in those areas under the control of the United States Forces."14

Risks: "Restraint may suffer if soldiers view [protection of property and foreign nationals] as license to resort directly to deadly force in protection of the threatened object or person."15

Type IV -- Weapons Control Status/Alert Conditions.

Purpose: This functional rule "[a]nnounce[s], for air defense assets, a posture for resolving doubts over whether to engage. For units observing alert conditions, it provides a series of measures designed to adjust unit readiness for attack to the level of perceived threat. The measures may include some or all of the other functional rules."16

Example: "The Task Force Commander will order into effect Rules of Engagement based upon the following three levels of threat to exercise personnel: (1) ROE GREEN . . . when no credible threat of attack against United States or host country personnel or facilities exists. . . . (2) ROE AMBER, upon a determination that a credible threat to United States forces with the country of [host nation] exists . . . (3) ROE RED, [u]pon actual attack of United States [or as otherwise deemed appropriate by the commander]. . . ."17

Risks: "Confusion may result if system is implemented without training on soldier-level rules and their relationship to these statutes."18

Type V -- Arming Orders.

Purpose: This rule "[d]ictate[s] which soldiers in the force are armed and which have live ammunition. [It is essential to] [s]pecify which precise orders given by whom will permit the loading and charging of firearms."19

Example: "The [following] table . . . appeared in Headquarters, Joint Task Force Los Angeles, Operations Plan for Civil Disturbance Operation, para. C (2 May 1992) (scabbard status omitted)."20

Risks: "If arming order requires an empty chamber, soldier may be unable to defend himself."21

Arming	Rifle	Bayonet	Ammunition	Control

1 SlingScabbardIn Pouch/EmptyOIC/NCOIC2 PortScabbardIn Pouch/EmptyOIC/NCOIC3 SlingFixedIn Pouch/EmptyOIC/NCOIC4 PortFixedIn Pouch/EmptyOIC/NCOIC5 PortFixedIn Weapon/EmptyOIC/NCOIC6 PortFixedIn Wpn/Locked & LoadedOIC

Table 1. Arming Orders and Control Matrix 22

Section I: The Dilemma: Crossing the Rubicon

Section II: Defining the Rules of Engagement, Part 2

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SECTION II

DEFINING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT