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APPENDIX C

RAMP TRAINING SCENARIOS (cont)

CASE STUDY 7

PROTECTING SELF AND FELLOW SOLDIERS
APPROPRIATE USE OF DEADLY FORCE

SITUATION: A soldier sits on the passenger side in the rear of a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). He and the driver are in the second vehicle of a two-vehicle convoy in the center of a city. As the vehicles move through the city, they pass many civilian men, women, and children. U.S. forces are deployed in a flat, hot, dry, famine-stricken country as part of a multinational coalition force. The mission of the coalition is to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. Armed bands have been frustrating these efforts for months and have even fired upon U.S. soldiers several times over the past few days. Civilians frequently taunt coalition soldiers and attempt to steal items from passing vehicles. The immediate mission of the convoy is to shuttle a military staff officer to a point outside the city. The soldier is armed with an M-16A2 rifle with a magazine in the well, a round chambered, and selector switch on safe. The commander has ordered that the standing RAMP rules of force are in effect, but has provided one piece of supplemental guidance. Recent situation reports state that a coalition was the target of a grenade thrown by someone dressed in local garb. Also, adults have been seen handing grenades to children and persuading them to use them against coalition forces. Accordingly, the commander has supplemented the "A" of RAMP with the guidance that Somalis bearing grenade-sized items and ignoring warnings to stay away should be considered to have hostile intentions.

EVENT: As the convoy makes its way through a market street, a crowd of townspeople surrounds the two vehicles. Nevertheless, all of the townspeople are staying several feet away from the vehicle because of stern looks, verbal warnings, and vigilance of the soldier and his well-armed comrades. The convoy stops because a large cargo truck up ahead has stopped in the road. Suddenly, a boy, carrying what appears to be a small box in one hand, ignores the warnings, and runs up behind the vehicle. He places his hand inside the rear cargo area of the HMMWV as the soldier continues to warn him to stay away.

CONSIDERATIONS: The key rules here are to ANTICIPATE ATTACK and to PROTECT HUMAN LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE. The RAMP rules, as supplemented by the commander, permit the soldier to fire his weapon before receiving fire if he can identify clear indicators of hostile intent. Here, the soldier can conclude that the boy's intentions are hostile and can ANTICIPATE ATTACK. The SALUTE factors support this conclusion. Note the boy's activity (he has ignored verbal warnings, has run up to the vehicle, and placed his arm in the rear of the vehicle), the location (the boy is within the kill radius of a grenade from the soldier and his comrades, but out of arm's reach), the time factor (only split seconds before the boy could pull the pin of a grenade and drop it), and equipment (hand grenade-sized box). A finding of hostile intent is further supported by the recent situation reports concerning hand grenades and the commander's RAMP supplement. Because the lives of everyone in the vehicle are in danger, the soldier can PROTECT HUMAN LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE. Each of the other two RAMP rules supports a decision to fire the rifle. Soldiers can RETURN FIRE with aimed fire, and respond to hostile acts with necessary force. They must MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of the threat, if time and circumstances permit. Under these circumstances, an aimed shot at the boy is the correct measure of force, given that lesser V-E-W-P-R-I-K measures have not turned the boy back or are impracticable.

SUGGESTED RESPONSE: To fire an aimed shot at the boy.

HISTORICAL NOTE: This problem is patterned after an incident in Somalia on 4 February 1993. The Marine Corps sergeant who shot and killed a Somalia boy carrying a box did so only after the boy had ignored warnings and had placed his hand inside the stopped HMMWV. Despite the sergeant's courageous actions in collecting the fallen boy from the hostile crowd and his swiftness in getting him to the nearest hospital, the boy died. All of the witnesses supported the sergeant's account of the incident, though the small box was not recovered. The incident was tragic, but after an investigation, the sergeant was deemed to have acted appropriately in firing on the boy.

REFERENCES: United States v. Johnson, No. 458 27 1616 (I Marine Expeditionary Force, 16 March 1993) (Report of Article 32(b) Investigating Officer).

CASE STUDY 8

MEASURING FORCE AND PROTECTING PROPERTY
USING FORCE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION

SITUATION: It is nighttime, and a soldier guards a portion of the perimeter of a company-sized base camp. Behind him, about 50 soldiers are sleeping and small amounts of fuel, supplies, weapons, and equipment are stored, and several vehicles are parked. U.S. forces are deployed in flat, hot, dry, famine-stricken country as part of a multinational coalition force. The mission of the coalition is to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. Armed bands have been frustrating these efforts for months and have even fired upon U.S. soldiers several times over the past few days. Local townspeople test the perimeter nightly in attempts to steal food or equipment. The soldier's mission is to prevent intrusions into the basecamp and safeguard his fellow soldiers and unit property. The soldier is armed with an M-16A2 rifle. He has a magazine of ammunition in the well, but no round is chambered, and the selector switch is on safe. The commander has ordered that the standing RAMP rules of force are in effect with one piece of supplemental guidance. He has supplemented the "P" "PROTECT" rule with the guidance that soldiers may use the entire scale of force, including, if necessary, aimed shots to kill, to protect the following property: any CEOIs and Vinson security or keying hardware.

EVENT: About 30 meters to the soldier's left, an unarmed local boy scurries beneath the concertina wire into the cantonment area and runs to a parked vehicle. There he quickly grabs a magazine of M-16A2 ammunition left in a footwell by a negligent soldier and runs back to the wire.

CONSIDERATIONS: The key rule here is to MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of the threat. Under the standing RAMP rules, a soldier must use only the amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission. The force used must fit the scale of the threat in magnitude, intensity, and duration. If possible, soldiers apply a graduated escalation of force when facing civilians who are unarmed, but who also are confrontational and unfriendly. Here, the boy is unarmed and is running away. He poses no immediate threat to the safety of the soldier or his American comrades, and although he is stealing U.S. property, it is not one of the types of property the commander has designated to be protected with deadly force. Unless the soldier can get close enough to the boy to stop him by grabbing hold of him, use of force is not appropriate. Nor do the other RAMP rules support the use of force. Soldiers may RETURN FIRE with fire, but the boy has fired no shots. Soldiers may ANTICIPATE ATTACK and fire first if they see clear indicators of hostile intent, but here, none of the SALUTE factors indicate hostile intent. Soldiers must PROTECT LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE, but no lives are endangered by this fleeing boy.

SUGGESTED RESPONSE: To chase the boy, but to refrain from firing the rifle. Report the incident to the chain of command as soon as possible.

HISTORICAL NOTE: This problem is patterned after numerous incidents that occurred in Somalia in 1993, when local civilians entered U.S. base camps and stole various items. Although aggressive in safeguarding their supplies and equipment, soldiers time and again showed appropriate restraint in situations such as this one.

REFERENCES: SMCT 181-906-1506; Colonel Gilbert S. Harper, Operations Other Than War: Leading Soldiers in Operation Restore Hope, Military Rev., Sep 93, at 78.

CASE STUDY 9

ANTICIPATING ATTACK
USING FORCE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION

SITUATION: A company-sized convoy of light infantry, mounted on High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWVs), moves along a city street. U.S. forces are deployed in a flat, hot, dry, famine-stricken country as part of a multinational coalition force. The mission of the coalition is to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. Armed bands have been frustrating these efforts for months, and about one hour ago, U.S. Special Operations Forces conducted a raid to seize two lieutenants of the most powerful local bandit. During the raid, two UH-60 helicopters were shot down by bandits armed with RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades. About 90 U.S. soldiers are pinned-down at the first crash site by hundreds of bandits armed with AK-47 assault rifles and RPG-7s. At least two Americans are dead, and more than twenty are injured. Casualties among the bandits are much higher. The mission of the company is to reach the pinned-down soldiers at the crash site, reinforce them, and help evacuate all forces and wounded to a secure area. When the company left its position at a nearby airfield ten minutes ago, the standing RAMP rules were in effect, but five minutes ago several vehicles in the convoy were ambushed by organized bands firing AK-47s. U.S. forces returned fire and continued. The commander has just supplemented RAMP rules with the order to ANTICIPATE ATTACK along the route by firing at armed local persons who appear near the road.

EVENT: As his vehicle rounds a bend, a soldier in a HMMWV near the back of the convoy notices three men with
rifles peering at the front of the convoy from behind a wall and talking among themselves. The men begin to raise the weapons to their shoulders.

CONSIDERATIONS: The key rule here is to ANTICIPATE ATTACK on the convoy. Under the RAMP rules, as supplemented by the commander, soldiers can fire their weapons before receiving fire, if they see clear indicators of hostile intent. Here the soldier can conclude that the intentions of the three men are hostile because of their size (small but organized, similar to ambushing bands), activity (they are hiding behind a wall and raising their weapons), the location (near the road being traveled by the convoy), the time factor (only minutes after other vehicles in the quick reaction force have been ambushed with rifle fire), and equipment (AK-47). Each of the other RAMP rules supports the soldier's decision to fire at the men. Soldiers can RETURN FIRE with fire, and respond to hostile acts with necessary force. Although it is not clear that these particular men fired on the convoy earlier, what the soldier observes is consistent with a continued attack on the U.S. convoy. Soldiers must MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of threat, if time and circumstances permit. Under these circumstances, aimed shots at the men are the correct measure of force to protect lives and accomplish the mission. Given the lack of time available, the soldier should not attempt lesser measures along the graduated scale of force -- verbal warning, etc. Finally, the soldier can fire his rifle, the only lethal weapon available, because soldiers can PROTECT LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE.

SUGGESTED RESPONSE: To fire at the men, and alert the remainder of the convoy.

HISTORICAL NOTE: This problem is roughly patterned after an incident that occurred in Somalia on 3 October 1993. Although conducting a humanitarian assistance mission, U.S. forces found themselves in a fierce firefight with Somali bandits. The company was part of a Quick Reaction Force ordered to reinforce Special Operations soldiers who were pinned down in a different part of Mogadishu. Shortly after leaving Mogadishu International Airport in the late afternoon, the company was ambushed. Soldiers and Somalis fired thousands of rounds of ammunition and fired hundreds of grenades before the Americans were forced to backtrack and seek an alternative route to the crash site.

REFERENCES: SMCT 181-906-1506; Rick Atkinson, Night of a Thousand Casualties: Battle Triggered the United States Decision to Withdraw From Somalia, Wash. Post, 31 Jan 94, at A1.

Appendix C, Part 2
Appendix D: ROECONs: A "Straw Man" Appendix to the Division Tactical SOP



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