INDIRECT
FIRES AND THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM
(TASK
FORCE FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING METHODOLOGY)(cont)
STEP 3: WARGAME - DEVELOP THE SCHEME OF FIRES: The sequenced critical fire support tasks specified by the commander are a key component of the wargame. Proper wargaming will enhance synchronization with maneuver. The only thing unique in this methodology is again related to abbreviated planning, specifically the commander's involvement. When time is limited, as it is for abbreviated planning, the commander should participate in wargaming with his staff. During the wargame, the commander and fire support officer may need to make minor adjustments to the concept of fires. What the wargame should accomplish is flushing out the method of achieving the desired effects - the scheme of fires. This scheme of fires must be "nested" in the brigade scheme of fires, focused on a few key targets/critical fire support tasks, and link observers to firing tasks, firing units and an established schedule of fires. The wargame will refine the target locations, means of delivery, target triggers, observer locations, movement and positioning for the mortars, CFZs, NFAs and Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs). The two key products that are developed by the fire support officer during the wargame should be the target overlay and fire support execution matrix. The target overlay is often incorporated with the maneuver overlay. The scheme of fires must be forwarded to brigade to ensure they incorporate the task force fires into the brigade concept. The fire support plan must also be disseminated to the task force.
STEP 4: REHEARSALS: Rehearsal of the fire support plan is the next critical event. The bottom line to all this planning is ensuring that it is clearly understood by those that must execute it (subordinate co/tms, observers, etc.) and those that must support with fires (brigade, firing units, mortars). The most important task force rehearsal is the combined arms maneuver rehearsal. This rehearsal must integrate fully the fire support plan. Task force personnel should also participate in the brigade fire support "technical" rehearsal to ensure the task force targets are incorporated and synchronized in the brigade scheme of fires. Time permitting, the task force should also conduct a fire support rehearsal.
STEP 5: REFINEMENT: A plan is just that - - a plan. As new information is gained about the enemy, the fire support plan must be updated. The staff must ensure that changes are coordinated and disseminated. It is also a proven technique to establish a "target cut-off time." This is a time after which any change to the fire support plan must be approved by the commander responsible for the target. If a refined target location is determined after the target cut-off time, shoot a grid mission. The task and desired effects, purpose and endstate should not change.
Before concluding this paper, there are a few issues worthy of discussion that impact on task force fire support planning and execution.
HIGH VALUE TARGETS/HIGH PAYOFF TARGETS: (High Value Target (HVT) - a target whose loss to the enemy can be expected to contribute to substantial degradation of an important battlefield function; High Payoff Target (HPT) - a target that, if successfully attacked, will contribute to the success of our plan.) At the task force level, there seems to be very little utility in identifying HVTs or HPTs. Normally, they are designated by the brigade commander and incorporated into his concept and scheme of fires. The issue with HVTs and HPTs is their synchronization with the "sequenced" critical fire support tasks. Often times at the exact point in the battle when the commander wants a critical fire support task fired to support his scheme of maneuver, someone calls a HVT/HPT, and because so designated, the guns shift off the target to fire somewhere else. If the commander is going to designate and fire at HPTs and HVTs, they have to be carefully synchronized with critical fire support tasks and it must be clearly understood by all observers that the target may only be an HVT/HPT during a specified time or phase in the battle. For example, AT-5s may be a HPT, but when the 1st Echelon Battalion is in your face, the payoff is less than if the AT-5s are identified and destroyed earlier. HPTs are only high in payoff relative to the time they are identified during the fight. HVTs/HPTs must not undermine the sequenced critical fire support tasks.
PRIORITY OF FIRES: (The organization and employment of fire support means according to the importance of the supported units mission.) Worthy of discussion is its relationship with the commander's sequenced fire support tasks. If indirect fires are properly synchronized with maneuver and the commander has sequenced those critical fire support tasks to support maneuver, then it seems priority should go to firing those targets regardless of who has priority of fires. One could argue if the commander has developed a scheme of fires properly, then the right observer will have priority when the commander wants to fire the critical task. The key has to be every observer and leader understanding the concept of fires - the sequenced critical fire support tasks - and sticking to that concept. It is especially important for the various artillery FDC and fire control officers to understand this and not deviate from what the commander wants. However, priority of fires remains a valid concept that should allow anyone to receive fires as long as no critical fire support task is being fired.
OBSERVER PLANNING: The issue at the task force level is who owns and positions the FISTs, the task force or company/team commander. The company/team commander needs them to assist in his fire support planning and to trigger targets assigned to him from the task force scheme of fires. The task force commander wants to position them to ensure they are in the proper positions to call the targets he wants. Observations at the National Training Center would offer this - the amount of certainty or uncertainty will dictate the level of control of the FISTs. In a movement to contact, the task force is more likely to leave control of the FIST with the company/team because the situation is unclear. In the defense, where the targets are fully synchronized with the task force scheme, the task force is more likely to dictate where the observers are positioned. In a deliberate attack, the task force may take the observer away from the breach force company/team to provide redundancy at the point of penetration but leave the FISTs with the rest of the teams.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: Simply stated, CAS is another means of indirect fire support available to the brigade and task force. The commander, first understanding the capabilities and limitations of close air support, must synchronize it with the fire plan to support the scheme of maneuver. The capabilities and limitations (windows for use/targets/observers) have some unique challenges that must be considered, but the commander must plan his CAS together with maneuver the same way as his other indirect fires. It is conceivable at the task force level that CAS may be allocated or a CAS target assigned from brigade as part of the scheme of fires. More likely however, CAS will be "handed-off" to the task force when brigade has no viable target. If this happens, the task force must have a plan that synchronizes it with maneuver and their concept and scheme of fires. The task force must also consider the ETAC in the observer plan.
This paper is not designed to solve all the challenges of getting timely and accurate indirect fires at the task force level. Hopefully, it has addressed some of the issues that are encountered at the National Training Center and highlighted the emerging observations from brigade operations. The step-by-step approach to fire support planning is one way to approach the challenge of getting the effects of combined arms operations. Whatever method used, the key is synchronization with maneuver, commander involvement in planning and refinement and ensuring that the plan is well rehearsed and understood by every observer, leader and firing unit.
Table
of Contents
Indirect
Fires and the Combined Arms Team, Part 2
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