INDIRECT
FIRES AND THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM
(TASK
FORCE FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING METHODOLOGY)(cont)
STEP 1: MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEF: To make the right decision about the employment of his indirect fires, the commander must get certain information from his fire support officer. This is normally done during the Mission Analysis Brief. The key information he must receive includes a clear understanding of the brigade scheme of fires as those fires relate to the maneuver plan, a clear understanding of the task force role as an "executor" of their portion of the brigade scheme of fires and a clear picture of indirect fire assets available.
MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEF (FSO INPUT)
- Brigade
Scheme of fires
- Higher cdr's concept of fires
- Allocation of FPFs/priority TGTs
- Current and on order FSCMs
- Specified and implied tasks
- Limitations
- Priority of fires
- FA organization for combat
- Location
- When in position
- Assets available/when
- FIST status
- Mortar status/location
- CAS allocation
- COLT allocation/location
- Current ammunition status
- Number of killing missions available (FA/MTR)
- Smoke (length/duration)
- FASCAM (No. of disrupt, fix, turn, block/release authority)
- Number of Copperhead
STEP 2: SPECIFY THE CONCEPT OF FIRE SUPPORT: (Note: One could argue that this step should be the "Commander's Intent for Fire Support" as part of the commander's planning guidance to his staff. This is probably true above the task force level where you have a planning staff and a FSCOORD and can effectively plan and execute simultaneously. However, at the task force level, you do not have a planning cell and most FSOs do not have the experience of fire support planners at higher levels and are unable to translate commander's intent for fire support into an effective, synchronized concept of fires. Couple this with limited planning time and the result is a requirement for the commander to specify the "concept of fires" as the next step rather than simply providing his intent for fires. Time and training permitting however, "commander's intent for fire support" could be the second step at the task force level.)
At the conclusion of the mission analysis brief to the task force commander, the commander gives his planning guidance to the staff. The commander specifies his maneuver course of action assigning maneuver task and purpose to subordinate units. To ensure synchronization of indirect fires with maneuver, rather than giving only his intent for fires, he must specify his concept of fire support. He does this by clearly articulating his "sequenced" critical fire support tasks.
There is no clear definition of a critical fire support task. However, from a maneuver commander's perspective, it is a fire support task that, if not properly executed, will have a severe impact on the ability to accomplish the maneuver task it supports. It is imperative that the commander personally establish the task and purpose for each target. The FSO can assist the commander in establishing the method and endstate. Critical fire support tasks should be expressed in terms of...
| the TASK ............... | Although FM 6-20-10, The Targeting Process, discusses task and purpose in terms of disrupt, limit and delay; at the maneuver task force level, it is more appropriate for the task force commander to state his tasks in terms of the effects he desires.... Suppress, Destroy, Obscure, Screen. These effects should be related to a specific enemy formation and/or function. |
| the PURPOSE ....... | of the fires as they relate to the scheme of maneuver. This is how the commander synchronizes indirect fires with maneuver. |
| the METHOD ......... | to achieve the desired effects (FA, mortars, CAS). At this point, the commander may have a preference for delivery of indirect fires. He may specify that he wants to use his mortars, he may specify that his desire is to use artillery or CAS or he can leave developing the method to his FSO. However, with the exception of specifying mortars, he must "negotiate" with brigade for artillery or CAS. The method may also be refined during the wargame. |
| the ENDSTATE ..... | as it relates to the enemy or friendly formation/ function. Endstate at the task force level is often the accomplishment of the task. However, a statement of the endstate is still desired and can be developed by the FSO. |
| and SEQUENCED.... | to clearly prioritize the order, the targets should be fired based on the scheme of maneuver. Commanders must ensure that artillery is available when required to support the scheme of maneuver. If the scheme of maneuver requires that more than one critical fire support task be fired at a time, then the commander may have to "apportion" his assets (FA, mortars, CAS) to meet all the needs. This "apportionment" normally occurs at brigade level. |
| COMMANDER'S CRITICAL FIRE SUPPORT TASKS (an example) | |
|---|---|
| TASK No. 1: | Continuously suppress the entire MRC for 12 minutes |
| Purpose: | Allow
both
company/teams to occupy their support by fire positions without taking effective enemy direct fire |
| Method: | FA fires on a group target by one battalion of artillery |
| Endstate: | Both
company/teams in their SBFs without losses to enemy direct fires |
| TASK No. 2: | Screen
the
point of penetration from the two Southern defending enemy platoons |
| Purpose: | Prevent
the
enemy from engaging the breach force with direct fires until the breach is complete (approx. 30 minutes) |
| Method: | Mortar
smoke initially, followed by generated smoke if wind conditions permit |
| Endstate: | Two
Southern MRPs unable to bring effective direct fire on the breach force until the breach is complete |
It may be worth noting here that not all critical fire support tasks have to be firing tasks. For example, the insertion of an observer to have eyes on a target may be so important that the commander specifies it as a critical fire support task. Another example may be the use of CAS or nonlethal EW fires.
Table
of Contents
Indirect
Fires and the Combined Arms Team, Part 1
Indirect
Fires and the Combined Arms Team, Part 3
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