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SECTION III

BRIGADE AND BATTALION TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

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The TFE brigades identified the problems with their involvement in civil disturbances early in the operation. The brigades understood that the civil police and civil authorities were responsible for maintaining law and order, but units also were required to prevent overt violence. This put soldiers in an uncertain predicament: "Do I let the civil police attempt to control the situation and watch civilians get injured or killed or do I perform the job of the police?"

The brigades arrived at the decision to conduct a "pre-emptive strike" - - they would set the conditions for peaceful crossings by coordinating with the key players prior to the event. At the same time, they would posture combat forces to respond quickly if the situation disintegrated into violence. The battalions and squadrons, which executed the operation, developed execution checklists that facilitated the process.

Prior to the Crossing

• Conduct coordination meeting between the following:
  • Organizer of the crossing
  • Local civil leader of the area in which the crossing will take place
  • Local police authorities
  • International Police Task Force (IPTF)
  • CA Team
  • Company/Troop Commander of the sector in which the crossing will take place
  • United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
  • Local military commanders
• Plan Fires
• Request air presence
• Positioning of forces and key leaders
• Medical coverage
• Use of nonlethal ammunition
• RockDrill/Rehearsal

Day of the Crossing

• Conduct reconnaissance of the site
• Intelligence update on the current situation
• Conduct final coordination
• Issue metal detectors to checkpoints
• Array forces to "back up" local authorities
• Secure routes to and from the site
• Establish observation posts for approach of hostile groups
• Local authorities and IPTF cordon off the site

Concepts for the operation were generally developed as per the above checklist, but could vary based on METT-T conditions. The coordination before the event was instrumental to ensure that the civil police, civil authorities, and IPTF clearly understood their responsibilities. Nonetheless, a TFE unit was positioned on the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) where the civilians would cross to ensure that the IPTF and both factional police were present. Ideally, the police from the faction crossing the International Boundary Line would escort them to the crossing point at the boundary. Often, a member of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the media would accompany the civilians who usually rode to the event in buses. Once the civilians arrived at the IEBL crossing point, the police from the faction on the far side would assume responsibility for escorting the civilians to the event site.

Several hours before the event, TFE units would be positioned at key points along the route and in the vicinity of the site. Checkpoints before the crossing were established to conduct searches for weapons, because arms were not allowed in the Zone of Separation except for designated personnel (side arms for civil police). A quick reaction force was also placed on alert. Though the units were positioned to quickly respond to a situation, it was essential that they remained transparent to the civilians. Air assets were employed along with mounted patrols and observation posts were emplaced to identify potentially hostile groups.

BATTALION/SQUADRON CONCEPT SKETCH

In addition, medical assets were surged for crossings. A medic was task-organized with every squad. A medic was also deployed with the Civil Affairs team to observe the people getting on the bus, identifying potential casualties based on a visual assessment (e.g., the elderly who are likely to be heat casualties or have heart problems). In past incidents, wounded civilians were evacuated in privately owned vehicles. Although a hospital was in proximity of the incident, the casualties were evacuated to a facility further away because it was of the same ethnicity of the wounded personnel. Planners had to wargame the location of hospitals and the ethnicity of the facility in case the unit was required to evacuate civilian casualties. The Battalion Surgeon positioned himself, along with a partial Advanced Trauma Lifesaving System (ATLS), approximately 400 meters from the crossing site. This allows the surgeon to rapidly respond to an incident. A medical evacuation helicopter was also put on alert.

TIMELINE FOR THE OPERATION

Often, it was clear that a crossing would ultimately result in violence. In response, courses of action were developed to discourage the event. Ideally, this was accomplished through coordination with the organizer of the event, mayors, the police, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. If this failed, units could make getting to the IEBL difficult to dishearten civilians from continuing movement. This was achieved by establishing a series of temporary checkpoints along the route of march. The purpose of the checkpoints was not only to inspect for weapons, but also to prevent the mass movement of vehicles that could be a threat to peace. The soldiers at the checkpoints could have the civilians dismount vehicles and have them continue their movement on foot - - dismounted movement could not be impeded.

The ideal situation was when the brigade knew of an upcoming event and could conduct the necessary prior coordination. This was not always possible, especially in the beginning when civilians crossed the IEBL seemingly at random. Although the deliberate planning process and prior coordination minimized the potential for unexpected crossings, units had to prepare to execute hasty "counter-civil disturbance" drills.

. . . A TFE patrol reported that that approximately 300 Muslims had gathered at a bridge near the town of Doboj. Several hundred Serbs, many armed with axes and knives, also gathered with the intentions of preventing the Muslims from entering the town . . . . The number of civilians grew and the commander of a TFE Brigade went to the site to assess the situation. The crowd, particularly the Serbs, became more hostile and TFE soldiers were ordered to fire warning shots. Approximately 100 warning shots were fired in the air. However, they had little effect on the Serb crowd. A TFE battalion reported that they had two platoons on 15-minute alert if assistance was required. Units from another TFE battalion established a checkpoint to control the crowd moving from Doboj; however, they were only able to stop those personnel carrying weapons. Personnel from both crowds intermixed and fighting ensued. Serb police attempted to stop the fighting and calm the crowd, but were beaten up by members of the Serb mob. One Serb attempted to attack a Muslim woman with what appeared to be an ax. A TFE soldier fired a pistol-fired flare (as opposed to a more lethal weapon) that hit the Serb and knocked him down; the Serb got up and ran away. When Muslims attempted to move back toward the bridge, the Serbs started to run after them, resulting in a more chaotic situation. Warning shots were then fired at the ground in front of the Serbs, which proved to be more effective than the shots fired in the air. The TFE soldiers formed a line, but were pushed back somewhat. Helicopters were requested. When the helicopters arrived, the rotor wash was used to separate the crowds. This proved to be effective because small rocks and dust were blown, causing the crowds to turn their backs and stop fighting. Soon afterward, the crowd dispersed. - - From an After-Action Review after a Riot at Doboj A platoon of TFE soldiers arrived and formed a phalanx around the vehicles that would facilitate moving civilians out of the way, if that became necessary. The convoy began to move with the interpreters and police in the front so they could talk to the crowd. The crowd became somewhat hostile again, but the convoy eventually made it to the main road. - - From an After-Action Review after a Riot at Lukavac

In each instance, units were successful in either restraining the crowds or extricating themselves from a dangerous situation. Placing the interpreters and local police in front of the phalanx was very effective. The soldier who fired the flare at the Serb opted for a less lethal means to prevent an act of violence. However, there was the potential for learning some wrong lessons.

• The rotor wash of the helicopter effectively separated the crowds by spraying debris which forced the crowd to turn their backs and disengage. However, use of helicopters in this manner is very dangerous because of their vulnerability to small arms and objects that can be thrown into the rotors. In addition, civilians could receive serious injury from the flying debris.

• It is customary for civilians in Bosnia to fire their weapons in the air during celebrations. This may be the reason warning shots fired in the air by the soldiers had little effect against the crowd. The warning shots fired at the ground were effective, but this is also a very dangerous technique because of the potential for ricochets.

• It is arguable that the civil police increased hostilities, particularly when they were firing warning shots. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the police to maintain law and order.

Some of the most significant lessons came from the actions of the civil affairs and tactical psychological operation teams that played key roles in minimizing the potential for violence during the civil disturbances.

. . . A crowd consisted of approximately 100 personnel, many of them holding sticks and rocks. A TFE officer expressed to the civil affairs personnel that several young men had left and he was concerned that they might return with more lethal weapons. The civil affairs team began working the crowd to determine the leaders and the CA team leader and two TFE officers tried to lessen the tensions. The TFE officers isolated and spoke with the most vocal individuals - - they were brought into a circle of guards and the situation was discussed. This action was instrumental in discovering vital information and allowing the civilians to voice their concerns. Eventually, the civil affairs team leader, an interpreter, a TFE officer and the local police chief got on top of an armored personnel carrier and spoke to the crowd. They explained: It was not their intentions to hurt anyone. However, they were going to remove the man who had been accused of war crimes from the area. They would use force if required, but hoped that would not be necessary. If the man was a war criminal, he would be turned over to the proper authorities. With great detail, the crowd was told how they were going to proceed out of the area to allow the civilians to get out of the route. The crowd was asked to support the mission and obey the laws. - - From an After-Action Review after a Riot at Lukavac

The key TTP from this incident resulted in the Psychological Operation Company developing a checklist for addressing crowds:

• Face-to-Face Communication: If the group is organized and there appears to be a leader of the group, then isolate that individual and conduct the discussion face to face. This is the preferred method. It provides immediate feedback to the issue and problem. This also does not allow outside influences to sidetrack the discussion.

• Use of a Loudspeaker System:
  • Use only when necessary to address a large crowd. Use the smallest means possible and increase as the situation dictates.
  • Direct your broadcast toward the agitators or main portion of the crowd.
  • Identify troublemakers not posing as leaders. Direct attention to them.
  • Anticipate what the crowd or group might do and have a message prepared.
  • Position yourself to be able to address and react to the situation.
  • Do not allow yourself to become surrounded by the crowd: stay alert.
  • Call for assistance when necessary. Assistance should be present although not necessarily conspicuous.
  • Limit the volume so you do not appear overbearing. A higher volume may incite the crowd to higher levels of discussion or action.

• Message Content:
  • Use a simple message in a short sentence.
  • Make the directions clear and understandable.
  • Do not give multiple directions in one message.
  • Maintain composure, do not lose your temper.

• Live Broadcast:
  • Preferred method is to use an interpreter if one is available.
  • Write down what you want said and have it read verbatim.
  • Be extremely careful when you ad-lib, it is not recommended.
  • Use key communicators when possible, i.e., local mayors, police, military leaders.
  • Use proper official for dealing with specific situation. (i.e., Police chief if concerns are public safety)
  • Use male voice in a male dominate society.

• Ultimatums:
  • Be careful when giving ultimatums or threats, do not use them unless the situation makes it necessary.
  • Never give an ultimatum you are not willing or do not have the authority to implement.
  • Give a reasonable time for the crowd to conform to the ultimatum.

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Section II: "What Went Right at Maglaj?"
Section IV: Staff Coordination at Division