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Military

SECTION II

"WHAT WENT RIGHT AT MAGLAJ?"


In contrast to what happened at Lukavica, consider a separate event that occurred several weeks later near the village of Maglaj.

An Inter-Entity Boundary Line crossing by the Muslims from Maglaj to the village of Rijecca in the Doboj municipality was coordinated through the mayors of Maglaj and Doboj. The purpose of the crossing was to visit a cemetery. The visit was agreed to by the chief of police who guaranteed the safety of the Muslims. Given this information, the TFE staff developed a course of action to ensure the coordinated effort of the Task Force to minimize the possibility of a confrontation between the Serbs and Muslims. Checkpoints were established by elements of a TFE Brigade along the route to ensure that weapons were not brought into the zone of separation. Helicopters and a quick reaction force were postured to respond, if necessary. The IPTF, the Bosniac police, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees escorted the Muslim group of approximately 50 personnel to the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. A TFE unit and the IPTF monitored the movement and both provided situation reports to the TFE command post. At the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, the Muslim group was handed over to the Serb police who escorted them into the cemetery. The IPTF and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees continued to move with the group. A group of 10-15 Serbs was at the graveyard (however, the initial report was 50 Serbs; the number was later confirmed to be 10-15 personnel by observers from a Task Force Eagle helicopter).

Four of the Serbs became hostile, because journalists, who accompanied the group, were taking pictures. Allegedly, an agreement had been made that filming of the event would not be allowed. However, the IPTF, United Nations high Commissioner for Refugees, and the journalists were unaware of the agreement, if indeed one had been made. Fighting broke out and one Serb left and came back with a pistol. He fired two shots in the air. The Serb police subdued the individual, and the gun was confiscated.

The shooting incident was reported by the IPTF to the TFE tactical operations center. The TFE Brigade Quick Reaction Force (QRF), along with the military police, was alerted and moved to a position two kilometers North of the site. A Tactical Psychological Operation Team was also notified and moved to link up with the quick reaction force. After a short weather delay, an OH58C helicopter, with observer, flew to the site. The TFE QRF and a combat camera crew was put on a 30-minute alert. The Muslim visit resumed; however, the same Serb who fired the shots started throwing rocks and tension, again, increased. The Muslims then decided to suspend the visit and the Serb police escorted the group back to the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. The Serb police chief informed a member of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that charges would be brought against the hostile men.

"What went right at Maglaj?"

TTP:
  • Good prior staff coordination, ensuring civil police, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and IPTF involvement, resulted in the situation being resolved by the civil authorities, rather than Task Force soldiers. Having said that, TFE, through effective staff coordination, was able to accomplish its charter of: ". . . on request, which include the following: observing and preventing interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and persons."

  • Accurate and timely reporting by the TFE Brigade allowed the battle captain to track the situation and provide updates to the commander of TFE and the Chief of Staff. Although the IPTF initially reported 50 Serbs at the site, the employment of observation helicopters, as a redundant means to confirm reports, was instrumental in the successful battletracking.

  • The accurate battletracking also facilitated the rapid buildup of combat power, if TFE forces were required to respond to the situation. The staff exercised patience and restraint in applying the combat power. It was correctly determined that employment of the TFE and the quick reaction force to the site was not necessary.



Section I: The Operational Environment
Section III: Brigade and Battalion Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures



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