Surveillance
Techniques/Target Acquisition
The enemy at the NTC employ a series of techniques which assist them in surveillance and subsequent target acquisition.
Enemy Techniques:
1. FIRST READ: minutes before crossing the LD, disseminate the most up-to-date information on enemy dispositions to every element conducting the attack.
2. Junior leaders must have graphics:
- assists in the maneuver
- keeps them situationally aware
- reinforces commander's intent
- forces them to focus on areas where the enemy is likely or expected to be
3. Very rarely will a BLUFOR tank commander have known enemy positions on his map, even when scouts have died to get that information to him.
4. Identify reverse slopes, base of slopes and other likely weapon positions, and then assign responsibility for these locations (as Target Reference Points, TRP) to specific maneuver elements; during movement these areas must be watched carefully.
EXAMPLE: Co/TM commanders assign TRPs while on the move. Once platoon leaders identify a TRP, they assign sectors to scan. Once a crew identifies indicators, such as spoil, an antenna, a reflection, or an exhaust plume, the gunner stays locked on it. He can no longer scan. The tank commander tells the platoon leader he's no longer scanning. Either the platoon leader, or the Co/TM commander readjusts the sectors of surveillance to cover the area left unobserved by the crew locked onto a possible target. The crew locked on must be prepared to kill immediately if the enemy is exposed. IF the locked-on vehicle must move, the crew must positively hand off the target to a new overwatch element.
Tank and Bradley crews must be proficient in switchology, i.e., switching from low to high power, and from day to night while searching for enemy indicators. Each mode has advantages and disadvantages. Crews must be proficient in switching between each to make maximum use of the advantages of each.
PROBLEM: target fixation, or failure to maintain all-around security once in contact. When engaged by the enemy, all guns tend to swing in the direction of the enemy fire.
RESULT: enemy tanks, or ATGMs hidden or offset, are then able to kill BLUFOR vehicles without ever being detected.
Technique: maintain vigilant security in all directions, especially during contact. Anticipate additional enemy contact from directions other than the initial enemy direct fires.
Combined Arms Support of Maneuver
Using Artillery, Mortars and Close Air SupportPROBLEMS:
1. Artillery schemes of fire are not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.
2. Too many Fire Support Officers shoot the plan, but not the enemy.
3. Adjusting fire is not a priority training event, even for forward observers within the artillery community; a first-round - fire-for-effect execution mentality has evolved. Virtually every fire mission is a GLIDD-delivered, 10-digit grid from the observer directly to the battery operation center, to the guns.
4. When brigades plan only deep operations and leave the close and rear planning to the task forces, the transition from deep to close will never occur as desired by the brigade FSO.
RESULTS:
1. Too many tankers and infantrymen are unable to get directly into the fire support system and call for and adjust fire, including obscuration smoke. Gun battery commanders respond only to brigade and/or task force FSOs.
2. Too many units attempt to use artillery to "kill" the enemy before the maneuver elements close within the Red Zone. However, the inordinate number of artillery rounds needed to kill combat vehicles, or even to nuetralize them, makes such requirements totally unrealistic given the relatively limited number of available rounds. This leaves too few rounds available for suppression during the actual assault/breach. (Further compounding the problem is the recent reduction of batteries from 24 to 18 guns per battery.)
Techniques:
1. Implement a flexible enough system of fire support that allows tankers and infantryman to call for and adjust indirect fire. They are still trained to do so by officer and NCO educational systems. Such branch/MOS training, however, must be augmented by hands-on application at Home Station. Then, this training must be applied during FTXs and CTC rotations, as further preparation for actual combat missions.
2. To control indirect fires from battalion/task force level:
- establish a series of minimum safe lines (MSLs).
- as companies move forward, commanders request MSLs be placed in effect, based on their GPS grid. RESULT: artillery is never shut off, but continues to roll forward over enemy positions.
- when company/team commanders place MSLs in effect, they also help synchronize fires with maneuver. RESULT: supporting indirect fires actually support the ground maneuver, as it takes place, rather than simply supporting the initial plan.
3. To transition more smoothly from the deep to the close battle: have brigade plan the fire support battle throughout the zone or sector as one continuous fight.
4. Close Air Support (CAS) is more appropriate to plan for killing the enemy than field artillery or mortars.
5. Field artillery must be fired continuously for extended periods of time to achieve the desired effects, i.e., Suppression. Therefore, calculate the time required to suppress and the number of rounds necessary.
EXAMPLE: once the lead Co/TM is about to enter the Red Zone, artillery must suppress the enemy to allow the SBF force to get into position relatively intact, and thus capable of accomplishing its mission. Then, the artillery must suppress/obscure the objective, allowing the assault/breach force to maneuver to an advantageous position to kill the remaining enemy. Therefore, the artillery must be lifted and shifted off the objective as the ground assault force moves within 800 meters of the objective.
6. All these events must be planned for, wargamed and rehearsed prior to execution.
Tempo
and Combat Patience
Successful deliberate attacks most likely occur when you have:
- a reasonably accurate read on the enemy disposition
- effective artillery suppression and smoke obscuration
- a three-to-one force ratio in direct fire suppression
PROBLEM: commanders must know instinctively and intuitively when to go fast, in blitzkreig fashion, to exploit success; when to slow down and allow conditions for success to develop and build.
Controlled, deliberate movement may not take as long as many commanders are led to believe. Invariably it takes longer to lose the lead Co/TM, then have to pause . . . reconfigure the task force to do the same job . . . occupy a SBF . . . then to do the mission right by controlling the tempo in the beginning.
"There are times on the battlefield for controlled movement, and there are times for rapid controlled movement . . . but always controlled."
-- BG Wallace, Commander, Fort Irwin
EXAMPLE: controlled, deliberate movement is similar to what a running back, who possesses blazing speed, does as he effectively follows his more slow-footed blockers - until that split second when the field opens and the runner bursts into the clear.
Technique: know when to use a tactical pause, i.e., the time needed to move an artillery battery to a new firing position, conduct a refuel on the move, adjust obscuration smoke, or to allow commanders to develop the situation. Knowing when to employ a tactical pause, and how long to pause is a function of training and experience, initially gained at Home Station.
Use
of Infantry
Dismounted infantry offers an attacking unit a maneuver asset that is underutilized.
PROBLEMS:
1. Too often infantry squads are not integrated into the Battalion/TF scheme of maneuver.
2. In too many instances where squads are integrated into the plan, mechanized infantry fail to dismount in time to be a combat multiplier.
3. When infantry soldiers do dismount, they are not given a clear task and purpose.
4. Too often the infantry are not used in conjunction with the M1A1 tank and/or the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.
RESULT: The infantry become Red Zone casualties as their vehicle is destroyed.
Techniques: for employing mechanized infantry:
1. Use infiltrating infantry to clear passes and defiles, or other restrictive terrain to increase the brigade and task force movement optempo.
2. Use infantry to attack along an assailable flank, thus forcing the enemy to apply combat power against diverse elements and in different directions.
3. Use infantry squads to augment the scouts in their reconnaissance efforts, and in the effort to get eyes on the objective early.
4. Infantry, infiltrating along restrictive terrain, can unhinge a flank MRP and pre-breach an obstacle.
5. Use infantrymen to conduct a supporting attack or to conduct feints to deceive and confuse the enemy.
6. Use infantrymen, as appropriate, to assist in the maneuver to an advantageous position by guiding tanks and Bradleys to positions where they can effectively fire on the enemy.
Effective
Use of Terrain
To be effective in the Red Zone, tankers and infantrymen must be masters at reading and manipulating the terrain.
"The quickest way to get to heaven is to advance across open ground swept by effective enemy antitank fire . . . tanks will insist . . . on crossing skylines or emerging from cover without looking, in spite of the fact that it is well known the enemy antitank weapons are generally on reverse slopes or in positions to fire at right angles to the axis of advance . . . . The only cover behind which a tank has any security is that afforded by earth defilade."
-- George S. Patton, Letter of Instruction Number 3, 1944
PROBLEMS:
1. BLUFOR elements habitually pull forward from overwatch positions, thus exposing themselves to the awaiting direct fire of the enemy.
2. Too often units mask or overextend the protective range of the overwatching element.
3. Too many units do not have adequate flank security; too many units think they've achieved security if their gun tubes are oriented at 9 o'clock to 3 o'clock. The diagram below compares observed BLUFOR techniques with those of the more successful enemy.
Diagram No. 4
Techniques:
1. Before any forward movement from either a hide position or a firing position, the crew must back up and use terrain to mask its movement.
2. Overwatch elements must also use terrain as cover; EXAMPLE: use the reverse slope of an intervisibility line, or the side of a wadi.
3. When crossing large, open areas - suppress, obscure, then move as fast as you can, and know before you bound, exactly where you're bounding to.
4. Wherever possible, keep bounds short. Try not to exceed one third of the direct fire range of the overwatching element. (See Diagram No. 5 below.)
 | A.
Moving element is masking the overwatch element. Tanks can't fire because range
is out to 3000m. Can't suppress with TOW fire because of slow time of flight.
Overwatch can suppress with indirect fire. B. Overwatch can't cover with direct or indirect fire because of enemy use of defilade. C. Moving element can cover both if it maintains all-around security. LESSONS:
|
5. Every element must be responsible for its overall security.
6. Flank security: consider moving flank security elements out to the maximum weapon range away from the main body. EXAMPLE: if your unit could be fired upon by enemy direct fire weapons effectively from 2,500 meters, then move flank security out to 2,500 meters. This helps protect the main body. This technique is obviously terrain dependent.
7. Routinely dismount from these extended security ranges and scan the next area with binoculars.
Developing
the Situation
Once you make contact with the enemy, the battle never quite unfolds exactly like the rehearsals, the templates, or the schemes of maneuver brief say they will.
Therefore, what can be done to create the greatest likelihood of success once you are in contact and required to develop the situation?
Techniques: developing the situation is a reconnaissance action, the objective of which is to find out enough about the enemy to defeat him while maintaining your own freedom of action, and hiding your strengths and limitations.
1. Ideally, the assault force will have a thorough knowledge of the enemy's disposition before committing to action. But, combat demands the assault force must be prepared for considerably less than the best circumstances. In many situations, the reconnaissance elements will be relaying their reports to the assault force commander once the sun is up and the attack is underway. An effective advance guard company can also assist with accurate reports. If the assault force commander cannot physically conduct a leader's reconnaissance, he may only get a visual reconnaissance through binoculars from a support by fire position. In all cases, the assault force must develop the requisite intelligence of the objective, even if a momentary, local tactical pause is required. Time spent on reconnaissance is never time wasted.
2. Although difficult to replicate with MILES, one time-tested TTP worth discussing is reconnaissance by fire: defined as "placing direct and/or indirect fire on positions the enemy is suspected of occupying." FM 17-97.
RESULT: causes the enemy to disclose his position by either moving or by returning fire. (NOTE: The effectiveness of this technique is directly proportional to the enemy's level of training and discipline.) Use reconnaissance by fire when:
- time is critical
- natural or man-made obstacles that
- could be overwatched by an enemy force are encountered
- a suspected enemy position fits the situational template
- bunker complexes that may or may not be occupied are encountered
- enemy locations are known
To develop the situation:
- maneuver platoons laterally to try and find enemy flanks
- avoid decisive engagement
- do not try to close with the enemy
- maintain freedom of maneuver
Indicators of enemy intentions: examples of how to read the battlefield:
-
can you move to the enemy's flank without receiving fire from other positions?
If so, you may have encountered a CSOP or the flank of an MRP in a security
zone. If not,
- you've probably found a larger element.
- how much indirect fire is the enemy calling? Heavy fires indicate larger defending units and strong defenses; accurate fires indicate a forward observer has you visually. are enemy vehicles moving into hasty frontal firing positions? Can you see dust and diesel plumes? These all indicate a moving enemy force. Obstacles and prepared positions don't.
- what is the distance between enemy vehicles and weapon systems? Dispersion of 100 to 200 meters with tanks behind infantry indicate a prepared defense which is at least company size. Vehicles spread out by themselves 300 to 400 meters apart usually reveal an MRP that is spread thin.
- mines and wire are always overwatched by direct fire weapons - spot them before they spot you.
This kind of information is critical to develop not only the battalion/TF fight, but also the brigade fight.
Battle
Command
When the shooting starts, the maneuver phase of the battle is underway. Reports are expected. These reports are critical to developing a read of the battlefield, and in keeping the commander informed.
Procedure: Cycle of Reporting, informing the commander about the following:
-
what
is to my front?
- what is the enemy doing?
- what are we doing?
- what are we going to do?
A cycle of reporting should be an integral part of the unit TACSOP (see diagram below).
Commanders can't be everywhere, and they can't see everything. Timely reports can facilitate teamwork and synchronization. EXAMPLE: Use whatever element is in the best position to see the battlefield to guide other elements to a position of advantage. The guiding element can drop down on the command net to give instructions to get the other element to the right spot.
2. Rehearse command assumption. Do what if? drills, where the order of command is different than that specified in the OPORD, since casualties usually don't occur in the same sequence. At all times, the officer in charge had better know they're in charge. Therefore, as leader casualties occur, the new chain of command must be announced, and the new commander must take charge immediately.
PROBLEMS:
1. In an attempt to control Co/TM bounding overwatch, many TF commanders graphically identify specific SBF positions, and/or a series of specific SBF positions. RESULT: decreased Co/TM maneuver flexibility, especially when the actual terrain dictates SBF positions different than those originally specified.
2. Too often Bn/TFs fail to give clear task and purpose to the SBF element.
Techniques: for Battle Command of SBF elements: Specify an axis of advance to the SBF element. If a Co/TM, for example, the axis will allow the commander to bound by platoons, using the terrain to his advantage. And to move forward, steadily and deliberately, according to the terrain. The SBF element can then move to occupy the best SBF position dictated by the actual terrain that still allows mission accomplishment.
Conclusion
To effectively win in the Red Zone requires closely coordinated, synchronized combined arms operations. The ability to win is built at Home Station, through rigorous, repetitive training that is conducted to standard.
As training budgets dry up as a result of recent downsizing, computer based "virtual reality" training has been heralded as an effective, cost-efficient training substitute to field maneuver training. As a result, much of today's Home Station training, especially for commanders, is computer based. Icons on a computer screen move and converge until they make contact. The simulation calculates what happens, and the results, as units engage each other in this computer warfare, are statistically evaluated. Commanders take their hands off the computer key pad and "watch" to see who will be victorious. The killing is remote and hands-off.
As commanders bring their units to combat atthe NTC, too often their prior training leaves them unable to articulate specific and detailed plans on how to effectively destroy the enemy. Commanders do address movement and formations . . . they address occupation of SBF positions . . . movement through the breach . . . even how they intend to work an objective.
What
is sorely lacking, however, is the specifics on how to fight and kill the enemy
within the Red Zone, as rounds are flying and soldiers are potentially dying
.
. . as the unexpected, unanticipated occurs and the survivors are those quickest
to adapt to the reality of the moment . . . .
The fog of war is nowhere as prevalent in the relatively pristine environment of computer simulations. The conditions of war on the ground are totally different. Organic communication equipment which are used during simulations are often bypassed due to the proximity of the workstations. The face-to-face interaction that develops between participants is often not feasible or possible in a combat zone. Orders and instructions are often physically passed to subordinates who, in turn, immediately key punch necessary data with near precise results. Because of the unrealistic nature of computer simulations, they do not allow the commander the ability to develop the intuitive feel and rhythms of a modern battlefield, or for where he should position himself to actively influence events. The net result is far too many ground maneuver commanders never develop their abilities to gain what should become an intuitive feel for the pace and rhythms of battle. Without realistic maneuver training, the realities of dust, sweat, blood, and confusion swirling around them as they make the life and death decisions inherent in Battle Command are never realized.
The fix. Certainly part of the answer lies in the effectiveness of Home Station training. T& specifically addressing actions in contact must be developed, fielded and then used, over and over.
George C. Marshall observed the same phenomenon between World War I and World War II. In his 1939 introduction to Infantry in Battle, he wrote:
"There is much evidence to show that officers who have received the best peacetime training available find themselves surprised and confused by the difference in conditions as pictured in map problems and those they encounter in campaign. This is largely because our peacetime training in tactics tends to become increasingly theoretical. In our schools we generally assume that organizations are well-trained and at full strength, that subordinates are competent, that supply functions work, that orders are carried out. In war many or all of these conditions may be absent. The veteran knows this is normal and his mental processes are not paralyzed by it . . . ."
Valuable training encourages leaders, through experience, to develop the mental filters to distinguish between what is crucially important on a battlefield, and what can be safely ignored. It teaches individual soldiers how to survive and deliver lethal violence on the enemy.
NOTE: This article was based on a class and resulting discussion that was delivered by COL James Grazioplene, the Commander of Operations Group at the National Training Center, and LTC Peter Palmer, the OPFOR Commander of 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Also James Crowley of the RAND Corporation contributed valued input. All diagrams were developed by CALL's graphic artist, Cathy Elliott. Stay tuned to future CALL publications for a more detailed Newsletter that will provide T&EOs, as well as home-station training strategies, for actions in contact and closing with the OPFOR, currently being developed by the National Training Center.
Table
of Contents
"Black
6, this is Red 6 . . . contact . . . ", Part 1
The
PLGR: Techniques and Procedures
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