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Engineer planners must be proactive, knowledgeable and integrated members of the Task Force (TF)/Brigade Combat Team (BCT) staff during the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process. A unit's success or failure in the attack may very well depend upon it!

When engineer planners fail to assist the S2 in the IPB process, a critical tool in planning the attack is lost. Combined with the S2's enemy situation template (SITEMP), a detailed analysis of the enemy's engineer capabilities, time available, past practices, and doctrine provides the TF or BCT commanders with a valuable tool to develop courses of action (COA), R& plans, and task organizations. The engineer commander uses the analysis to determine the resources required for each COA, make recommendations based on the resources he has available, and tailor his forces to support the maneuver commander's intent. Without a doubt, it is the lynch-pin of successful engineer integration in the attack!

Benefits of Engineer Integration During IPB

The TF/BCT benefits by:

Knowing . . .

• where and what type of obstacles to look for during the reconnaissance phase
• which COAs will require multiple breaches and which may only require one
• where assets may be required for situational obstacle planning, resourcing and execution

Which Allows . . .

• the S2 to confirm or deny the situational template and change it to fit the collected information
• the TF/BCT staff to understand the pros and cons of each COA and reduce overall risk
• the TF/BCT to plan and support a successful R& effort
• the TF/BCT to plan support, assault, and breach force positions for each known or anticipated obstacle
• the TF/BCT to adequately task-organize assets for the attack

And Provides . . .

• the information required to determine the type of breaching operations needed to reach the objective
• the FSO and S3 the information needed to pre-plan indirect fires to support breaching operations
• the type of obstacles and terrain needed to conduct realistic rehearsals
• the information required to identify potential areas and requirements for situational obstacles

The Engineers benefit by:

Knowing . . .

• the number of breaches expected
• the type of obstacles expected
• the breaching resources required
• the required types of obstacles needed to support rehearsals
• locations for potential situational obstacles

Which Enables Them . . .

• to develop a tailored engineer task organization
• to identify and request additional resource requirements
• to develop plans to "flex" engineer assets on the battlefield
• to provide detailed advice to company/team/TF/BCT commanders
• to plan for and resource situational obstacles

And Focuses . . .

• the Sapper RECON Teams at specific NAIs and specific information requirements
• the Sapper platoons on specific reduction drills for the expected obstacles

The Company/Team/TF/BCT Commanders benefit by:

Knowing . . .

• detailed information on the number, locations, and types of obstacles they may encounter along
• their route
• the number of breaches they are expected to execute
• the resources and costs anticipated with breaching obstacles along their route
• potential locations of situational obstacles

Which Allows . . .

• detailed planning of support, assault, and breach force positions for each obstacle
• the FOs to plan indirect fires to support the breaching and smoke operations
• the development of realistic rehearsals based on known and expected types of obstacles

One of the most dangerous tasks an engineer squad can face is dismounting and breaching a minefield under fire. Conducting the breach with a MICLIC towed by a squad M113 not only exposes the squad to fires in a lightly armored vehicle but also presents the possibility of losing two breaching assets at the enemy minefield. The loss of two breaching assets can also occur if the AVLM is used.

Commanders and engineers must consider the risk of losing sappers and other breach assets when planning for breaching operations. During the IPB process, consider the types of fires expected at each obstacle belt, and recommend specific breach assets to be used. This will enable maneuver commanders to task-organize their force and maximize the overall effectiveness of the operation. The risk assessment table shown below can be used to determine the risk.

* Two breach assets could be lost.
** One breach and one proofing asset could be lost.

The last five columns of the table show risks of losing tracked assets capable of pulling or moving the MICLIC that are organic to the engineer company. The engineer squad carrier towing a MICLIC exposes the most personnel to the threat. The ACE exposes the least. For both the ACE and the CEV, the loss of both a proofing and/or survivability asset in addition to the MICLIC may outweigh the benefit of minimal exposure of personnel.

In their haste to establish the main engagement areas for the task force, engineer and maneuver units at CMTC routinely fail to mark, record, and report that mines are being put on the ground. This situation is worsened when FASCAM minefields are executed during the "fight." Combined with a habitual failure to provide detailed graphics and information of planned and emplaced minefield locations through all levels of the task force and brigade combat team, it becomes a recipe for disaster.

The risk of a friendly vehicle driving into one of our own minefields is a concern for every commander. The risk can be reduced if it is evaluated and control measures are implemented at all levels. Engineers have the inherent responsibility to inform the maneuver commander that minefields in and around the MBA may be left unmarked in the interest of establishing the defense by the defend NLT time. In addition, because these minefields will remain in place after the battle is over, the risk of minefield fratricide may increase.

Engineers can conduct the minefield fratricide analysis for the commander using a Minefield Risk Assessment Matrix (see Table 1). With this information the maneuver commander can designate the control measures required for each individual obstacle or obstacle group.

* Assumes graphics and radio broadcasts occur.

A separate risk analysis should be conducted for FASCAM minefields (see Table 2). Artillery-delivered ADAM/RAAMS and ground-emplaced FASCAM systems, such as Volcano and MOPMS, provide a great deal of responsiveness to the commander. However, this flexibility can dramatically increase the risk of fratricide.

* Assumes graphics distributed and radio broadcasts occur.

The controls the commander chooses to utilize may require additional engineer effort that could reduce the number of obstacles actually emplaced. Simple controls, such as graphics and radio broadcasts, require no additional engineer effort. The radio broadcasts are similar to NBC downwind or standard flash message report. This could be an hourly update of all emplaced mine locations or an individual announcement of each emplaced minefield on the task force and brigade combat team command nets. To be effective, each subordinate unit must pass the information to the lowest levels in the command. Accurate and timely obstacle information dissemination is the most important aspect to preventing mine related fratricide if the minefields cannot be marked.

Table of Contents
Understanding Our Business: Synchronizing Fires and Maneuver
"Black 6, this is Red 6...contact...."