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Discussion:

Situation: A mechanized infantry battalion task force was conducting a defense against a motorized rifle regiment. The brigade OPORD and graphics contained a plan to execute a FASCAM minefield, on order, under brigade control, in the battalion's sectors. The battalion had to structure the defense around the planned minefield.

Problem: The battalion did not control the installation of the minefield. The brigade would execute the minefield based on the flow of the battle as determined from the combat reporting. Only the intent to install the obstacle and the approximate location was detailed in the OPORD.

Identify the Hazard: The battalion task force engineer identified the minefield as a potential fratricide hazard during the mission analysis phase of the tactical decisionmaking process. He knew elements of the task force would be moving around the obstacle during the battle because it would cover a major route through the battalion sector. The obstacle would pose as much a hazard to friendly elements as it would to the enemy if the location was not throughly disseminated.

Assess the Hazard: The task force engineer informed the battalion commander he assessed the hazard as extremely high. It was on a major route through the sector and would be emplaced by the brigade during the heat of battle with little or no warning. Friendly units moving from battle position to battle position could easily become trapped in the minefield and become casualties.

Identify Control Options and Make Decisions: The battalion commander knew he did not have the authority to alter the brigade OPLAN. The brigade would maintain control of the emplacement of the obstacle. He would have to control the hazard through the battalion OPORD, backbriefs, and rehearsals.

The task force engineer placed the FASCAM minefield on the battalion obstacle overlay. He highlighted the need for everyone in the task force to know the intended location of the minefield from the very start of the defense during his portion of the OPORD brief. The battalion commander reinforced him by emphasizing to the subordinate commanders the need for each to ensure soldiers understood where the obstacle would be emplaced.

The commander insisted that all elements plan, mark, and rehearse movements through the sector in a manner that would ensure the minefield would always be bypassed before it was actually emplaced.

Implement Controls: The information concerning the FASCAM minefield was disseminated to the lowest levels of the task force. The medics discovered that they were the element of the battalion most affected by the obstacle. They planned their casualty evacuation routes in and out of the battle positions to the collection points in such a manner that would avoid the minefield. They marked and rehearsed their routes in limited visibility and during daylight. All of their graphics clearly identified the intended minefield.

Supervise: The attack began, and brigade determined that the enemy main effort was from an unexpected direction. The location of the FASCAM minefield was changed. The obstacle was executed, and the battalion was informed almost simultaneously. The battalion was unable to disseminate the change to the lowest levels rapidly enough to prevent elements from driving through the new location.

Two medical vehicles completed the pickup of casualties at a battle position and were returning fully loaded to the collection point along their previously marked and rehearsed route. This route took them directly through the new location of the FASCAM minefield. The unsuspecting medics entered the minefield and all onboard the vehicles were killed.

The brigade had determined the risk from the enemy required rapid change to the obstacle plan. The commander did not consider the possible impact on friendly units moving through the sector. No one on the brigade staff conducted an assessment of the potential hazard for the commander. The only control implemented by the brigade staff was a radio message that the minefield was being executed immediately and, incidentally, at a new location.

The minefield did not slow or detour the enemy in their attack. They bypassed the minefield and continued their attack deep into the task force sector. The only casualties inflicted by the mines were the medics and the wounded being evacuated.

Lesson(s): Changes in a plan must undergo a risk management analysis. This is especially true when a hazard is high risk.

Risk Management Responsibilities