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Risk Management Procedures--Operations


1. Mission Planning and Execution (Risk Management). During planning and execution of the mission, commander and staff use risk management procedures to identify and control mission, enemy, terrain/weather, troop and time (METT-T) hazards. The chart at Enclosure 15 shows how risk management can be integrated into the decisionmaking process. Both of these processes require sequential steps that are executed based on time available. When time is limited, the steps are streamlined with increased reliance on the experience and expertise of the commander and staff. The table at Enclosure 16 shows how risk management can be integrated into a related mission training plan task.

a. Risk assessment. The S3 (Safety) gathers METT-T information from the staff and completes a risk assessment for each course of action (COA). Risk assessment matrices tailored for the unit's METL may be used for this purpose. The risk level of each COA should be entered on the decision matrix as the Force Protection (Safety and Fratricide Avoidance) criterion.

b. Risk management. Commander selects the COA and decides to accept the level of risk or elevate the decision to the next command level. Decision is based on the level of risk-acceptance authority delegated by higher command and significant hazards that cannot be controlled at his command level. (NOTE: Each organization is responsible for establishing the level of command with the authority to accept each level of risk.) For the selected COA, each staff officer applies risk management procedures for his BOS function to identify the hazards most likely to result in loss of combat power and implements one or more controls for each. Care is taken to avoid unnecessary safety restrictions. The Executive Officer (XO) reviews control options developed by the staff that have cross-function implications. He ensures synchronization of the total risk control effort.

Control options addressing high risk hazards and/or those having a potentially significant impact on the COA are recommended by the XO to the commander for his decision.

Approved controls are developed by the staff and integrated into appropriate paragraphs of the operation order and overlays. Commander and staff then monitor and enforce controls until mission completion. New or increased risk in METT-T hazards are risk managed as they occur during the mission. The table at Enclosure 17 shows how risk management can be integrated into an OPORD.

2. Mission Assessment (After-Action Review). After mission completion, commander and staff assess the unit's risk management effectiveness and force protection (safety/fratricide) performance. Improvements are identified, and actions to implement are initiated.

a. For his BOS function, each staff officer assesses the effectiveness of each risk management step, the reasons (force protection factors) for incidents experienced during the mission and whether or not the commander's guidance was met. Based on this assessment, each staff officer identifies (and initiates action to implement) improvements needed.

b. The S3 (Safety) collects from the staff information about force protection shortcomings and needed improvements. He identifies those considered significant/having cross-function application and reports them to the XO. The XO reviews these shortcomings and needed improvements, takes action to implement those he deems necessary and elevates to the commander only those having significant mission impact/high accident risk.

c. The commander uses information from the AAR and recommendations from the XO/staff to determine if the unit's risk management and safety performance meet hisguidance, the effectiveness of hazard controls implemented, and necessary changes to guidance and controls (including SOP) for future missions.



Risk Management Procedures--Training
Risk Management Responsibilities



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