Military

1. Require firing batteries to set up their alternate positions using hasty survey methods.

2. Require battalion survey section to set up hands-on stations where battery leaders can practice different hasty survey methods.

ISSUE: Manual FDC Operations.

OBSERVATION: Fire direction centers (FDCs) operating under manual fire direction procedures are not following standards outlined in TC 6-40, FM 6-40 and unit standing operating procedures (SOPs).

DISCUSSION: FDCs use firing charts, a Tabular Firing Table (TFT) and a Graphical Firing Table (GFT) to verify Battery Computer System (BCS) data:

PROBLEMS: 1) Failure to follow the manual FDC procedures listed in TC 6-40 and ST 6-40. 2) Many Fire Direction Officers (FDOs) do not understand how to derive a GFT setting from BCS data.
RESULT: Long delays in firing when manual data does not check with BCS.

PROBLEMS: 1) Firing charts and target overlays on the FDC map do not reflect target locations. 2) Some FDOs set up the chart incorrectly. 3) Failure to update manual data for new meteorological data.
RESULT: Unsafe secondary check system that is often out of tolerance for range, quadrant and deflection.

PROBLEM: FDC crews often ignore the Backup Computer System (BUCS).
RESULT: Leaves the FDC with no secondary check if the BCS fails.

PROBLEM: Chart and BCS operators in the alternate FDC (when used) often do not prepare to assume primary battery FDC tasks when the FDC is destroyed.
RESULT: Mission execution delays.

PROBLEMS: 1) Platoon FDCs do not enter both platoons' data in BCS, BUCS, or chart. 2) Platoon FDCs fail to establish early communication with the other platoon's guns.
RESULT: FDCs become reactive instead of proactive, which delays mission execution.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Require FDC personnel to become thoroughly familiar with both manual and automated fire direction methods outlined in FM 6-40, ST 6-40-2 (BCS), and the BUCS Job Aids manual.

2. Do not allow FDCs without valid secondary checks to shoot.

1. Routinely train at Home Station on each secondary method.

2. Put all three systems (BCS, BUCS, manual) promptly in use after occupation.

ISSUE: FA Technical Rehearsal.

OBSERVATION: FA battalion technical rehearsals lack the details and standards required to ensure responsive fire support in battle.

DISCUSSION: The goal of a technical rehearsal is to verify that crews can complete all tasks at the lowest level (platoon and section) before the start of the brigade's fire support rehearsal. The technical rehearsal allows the FA battalion to correctly represent its capabilities during the fire support rehearsal. This also prevents the FA battalion from "signing up" for more missions than they can accomplish.

PROBLEM: FA battalion technical rehearsals lack defined objectives and the required level of detail to meet the goal stated above.
RESULT: Units consistently fail to accomplish one or more of their critical fire support tasks (CFSTs) during the execution phase of battles.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Fire order standards.

2. Firing unit assignments by mission type (i.e., which firing units will provide FASCAM, smoke, or copperhead.

3. Target list verification.

4. Method to ensure each element has computed a technical solution for its specified mission.

1. Site to crest.
2. Ammunition availability.
3. Location of alternate aiming points.

ISSUE: Critical FA Tasks (CFATs).

OBSERVATION: FA Battalion staffs consistently identify battalion-level Critical Fire Support Tasks (CFSTs) and wargame each task and requirements (down to fire unit selection) in great detail. The breakdown occurs between translating FA battalion-level CFST into firing battery-level CFAT.

DISCUSSION: FA battalion staffs develop the supporting requirements, decision points and triggers from a battalion-level execution perspective, as represented by a synchronization matrix for use by the TOC during the battle. Yet, battery commanders leave the orders brief knowing little more than the sequencing of movement and the primary/alternate shooters for each critical mission. The excellent FA battalion-level staff planning must be sustained, while producing detailed products for battery-level execution.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The maneuver commander determines how to accomplish the mission using the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs), including fire support. He describes the purpose of fires in his concept of fires paragraph.

2. The FSCOORD and the battalion staff translate these requirements into CFSTs, using the TASK-METHOD-PURPOSE-END STATE methodology.

EXAMPLE: The FA battalion staff develops CFST No. 1:

Next, the staff must wargame the battalion-level task to produce a more specific battery-level task, using the same methodology, but in far greater detail. Thus, Battalion CFST No. 1 translates into Battery-level task CFAT No. 1: A battery (primary)/C battery (alternate) FASCAM:

The FA battalion staff had also developed CFST No. 2:

Again, as part of the wargaming process, the FA battalion staff wargames this task to produce the battery-level task, CFAT No. 2: B (Primary)/C (Alternate) CPHD:

ISSUE: FA Ammunition Management and the Use of the Palletized Loading System (PLS).

OBSERVATION: The problems discussed below describe the results of failures to maximize the capabilites of the PLS and the impact on FA ammunition management at all levels.

DISCUSSION:

PROBLEMS: 1) Ammunition platoon operating procedures are generally not clearly defined. 2) Units generally fail to account for PLS capabilites in Ammunition Platoon SOPs. 3) A general lack of cohesive platoon training concepts exists.
RESULTS: 1) Too many ammunition handlers untrained on safe handling procedures. 2) Frequent failures to recognize ammunition compatibility.

PROBLEM: FA battalion S3s, S4s, and Battalion Ammunition Officers (BAOs) are not establishing ammunition resupply procedures that address the wartime requirements of Unit Basis Load (UBL), Required Supply Rate (RSR), and Controlled Supply Rate (CSR).
RESULT: Ammunition mismanagement.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Develop several different load plans for inclusion in TSOP.

2. Combat configure (complete rounds) flat rack load plans, based on battalion go to war UBL.

3. Put examples of both "double loop" and "single loop" ammunition resupply techniques in TACSOP.

4. Establish a procedure for S3 to get accurate ammunition counts from the batteries.

5. Establish a procedure to get accurate counts from the BAO and the S4 of on-hand quantities in the ammunition platoon and the ammunition transfer point (ATP).

6. Routinely compare on-hand quantities with CFST requirements to develop specific guidance for the BAO. Only when the BAO receives specific numbers, by type and lot, can the BAO implement an efficient distribution plan.

7. Ensure the orders process produces accurate CFST requirements.

8. Paragraph 4, OPORD: Include delivery instructions by type, lot and time to the batteries, as well as positioning of ammunition in the combat and field trains.

1. Combat configuration: load trucks by type, i.e., all DPICM, with other trucks loaded with a mix of munitions to support CFSTs.

2. Use the "double loop" technique as the primary for ammunition resupply, but substitute the "Flat Rack Transfer Point" (FRTP) for the "Ammunition Truck Transfer Point." MTOE authorization is 18 PLS for the artillery battalion, 3 for the firing battery and 9 for the battalion ammunition section.

3. Have the BAO work in the combat trains with the battery ammunition sections. The BAO constantly coordinates with the S4 and the S3 about ammunition while planning the battalion resupply system.

4. Establish habitual relationships between the ammunition sections and the firing batteries for SOP familiarity.

5. Give the ammunition sections the responsibility for navigating to the battery they support, delivering ammunition flat racks and then back-hauling residue.

6. Have the ammunition platoon sergeant with the battalion ammunition sections work out of either the field trains OR the ATP. He, and the section chiefs who work for him can:
   1. Draw ammunition from the ATP.
   2. Combat-configure flat racks based on BAO guidance.
   3. Deliver flat racks to the combat trains/FLTP.
   4. Back-haul empty flat racks and residue in peace time.
   5. Supervise and assist ATP personnel load flat racks to ensure ammunition lot management.

7. Use the "single loop" technique of ammunition resupply for emergency resupply or a push of ammunition for immediate consumption. This Rearm, Refuel, Resupply Survey Point (R3P/R3SP) should be described in detail in the TACSOP to facilitate speed, traffic flow and security.

8. Create a program to periodically safety certify personnel using hands-on and written evaluation.

9. Have ammunition platoons practice combat configuring loads during Home-Station field training exercises.

10. Use the daily back haul of residue as a means to train leaders and soldiers in how to track PLS and exercise the ammunition resupply system.

MANEUVER BRIGADE AND BATTALION/TASK FORCE: These recent observations by BDE/TF Fire Support O/Cs occur routinely enough to be called a trend within rotational maneuver elements.

ISSUE: Brigade Fire Support Planning Process.

OBSERVATION: The brigade planning process does not generally follow the guidelines outlined in FM 71-123, Chapter 1, which results in various staff elements developing their plans in relative isolation.

DISCUSSION:

PROBLEMS: Brigade targeting teams: 1) Fail to develop a meaningful high payoff target (HPT) list. 2) Fail to produce a wargame derived scheme of fires. 3) Develop a target list that supports the scheme of maneuver.
RESULT: A lack of synchronization between the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs).

PROBLEM: The R & S plan does not focus on generating traceable information for engagement by lethal and nonlethal means.
RESULT: No plan to link observers with shooters to synchronize fires with maneuver.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. During home-station training, follow the tactical decisionmaking process specified in FM 71-123, Chapter 1.

2. Train targeting team members to adhere to the DECIDE, DETECT, DELIVER methodology outlined in FM 6-20-10.

ISSUE: Role of Task Force FSOs during the Fire Support Planning Process.

OBSERVATION: TF FSOs are not integral players during the staff planning process.

DISCUSSION:

PROBLEMS: 1) TF FSOs are not providing subject matter expertise within the maneuver staff. 2) Mission analysis often fails to identify specified and implied tasks. 3) Staffs are not considering assets available. 4) Staffs are not considering higher headquarters' scheme of fires. 5) Staffs do not mention critical fire support tasks. 6) Staffs do not inform the maneuver commander of all the assets at his disposal. 7) Wargaming and synchronizing procedures do not incorporate action-reaction-counterreaction methodology, which would focus the FSOs' need to influence the battle.
RESULTS: 1) Planning guidance is generally weak and does not incorporate all indirect fire systems. 2) Units are not briefing higher headquarters' targeting and scheme of fires. 3) OPORD briefs are not clear and concise in describing how the scheme of fires will support the scheme of maneuver.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Have FSOs train their FSNCOs on how to conduct mission analysis in their absence. After learning how to list the specified and then derive the implied tasks from the higher headquarters OPORD, also have the FSNCOs extract all fire support considerations for each type of mission. List them on a butcher board or record them in some way. (The FM 6 series have bulletized checklists; FM 71-123 breaks fire support considerations down by offensive and defensive missions). The FSNCOs' ability to do this analysis when the FSO is gone will dramatically cut lost time, help focus the process and ensure complete task coverage.

2. The task force timeline must include these critical tasks:
   1. Emplacement of triggers.
   2. Target refinement to support confirmed versus planned obstacles.
   3. Radar zones submitted to higher headquarters.

ISSUE: CAS Integration in the Brigade Fire Support Scheme.

OBSERVATION: Too many brigade schemes of fire support do not reflect Close Air Support (CAS).

DISCUSSION: Several problems hinder brigade efforts to employ CAS: 1) Multiple target grids generated from a variety of sources. 2) Ineffective airspace management. 3) Lack of Suppression, Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), both lethal and nonlethal. 4) Lack of qualified controllers at the right place at the right time.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Wargame ACAs, SEAD, and the placement of USAF Enlisted Terminal Attack Controllers, in addition to CAS employment against specific targets. Then ensure the scheme of fire support incorporates these events.

2. Involve the ALO in the planning process as part of the targeting team.

3. Use CAS Target Box Cards (CTB cards) to assist in rapidly employing CAS.

Note: In this example, the staff developed this card for engagement of the northern MRB in EA Red. If the northern MRB (our High Priority Target, HPT) showed up in EA Green instead, a CTB card would be developed for that enemy COA also.

4. The staff may have to develop 8-10 CTB cards to address the contingencies for any given mission. Early development of the CTB cards will prevent the staff from trying to do the same process during mission execution.

5. Issue copies of the CTB cards to all fire support elements and the artillery battalion staff.

6. Position ETACs forward to exercise final control of the CAS. Routinely let the brigade ALO in the TOC or a task force ALO traveling with the task force FSO exercise final control. The person with final control must have eyes on the target.

7. In using ETACs forward for final control, train them to work directly with brigade COLTS. ETACs are fully trained to execute final control, and with further training, they can quickly be integrated with the COLTS. An additional benefit to this relationship is the ETACs' ability to send intelligence data on long-range VHF radios if FM communication with the COLTs fail.

ISSUE: Fire Support Effects.

OBSERVATION: Units rarely correctly address the desired effects of fire support. Methods used by brigades to determine effects seldom translate into Critical Fire Support Tasks (CFSTs) that would help ensure successful mission execution for the brigade.

DISCUSSION:

PROBLEM: Brigade commanders give fire support guidance that is too specific, i.e., "Destroy one MRB of the regimental main body deep."
RESULT: This overly specific guidance on fire support effects before any courses of action are developed drives the staff to develop different courses of action, but with each course required to achieve the same fire support effects (deep) for each COA.

PROBLEM:Other commanders give guidance that is too vague, i.e., "Provide decisive fires against the enemy." This is too general and undefinable.
RESULT: Without definable guidance, staffs produce unspecific, ineffective fire support plans.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Definitions with an EXAMPLE: interdict, with the specified effect, i.e., either Disrupt, or Delay, or Limit, a function or action that the enemy will attempt to accomplish:

   1. Disrupt: Prevent the enemy from carrying out this action in the method he intends. EXAMPLE: "Disrupt the enemy's ability to fix our main effort's main body."

   2. Delay: To cause that function or action to happen later than the enemy desires. EXAMPLE: "Delay the repositioning of the enemy's opposite flank MRC until our reserve commits through the breach."

   3. Limit: Prevent that action or function from happening where the enemy wants it to happen. EXAMPLE: "Limit the advance guard's use of the ridge line to flank the brigade combat team."

   This gives clear guidance to the staff addressing enemy actions the commander finds unacceptable. The staff uses that guidance and formulates courses of action accordingly. Wargaming further refines the courses of action and helps to synchronize the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs). This results in a concept of operation (scheme of maneuver) and a concept of fire support (scheme of fire support) to accomplish the mission.

2. With the commander's guidance and the wargaming products, the targeting team must determine the necessary systems (each with a time, place, and purpose) to use on the enemy formation. The cumulative result of this employment will achieve the commander's intent (Disrupt, Delay, Limit).

3. During wargaming, the targeting team determines which and how many enemy systems must be attacked with maneuver, lethal and nonlethal fires to achieve the desired target effect.

ISSUE: Transition of Fire Support Fight from Deep to Close.

OBSERVATION: The transition of the fire support fight from deep to close to rear either does not take place, or it takes place at an unplanned time and location.

DISCUSSION: This transition is arguably the single most critical fire support event that takes place during a mission.

PROBLEMS: 1) The brigade did not define the transition point or time. 2) Task forces are unprepared to assume transition responsibilities. 3) Both 1 and 2.
RESULT: If a transition occurs, it is seldom smooth and rarely at the time or location intended.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Brigades must plan for deep, close and rear operations. If the brigade only plans deep operations, and leaves the close and rear planning to the task forces, the transition from deep to close will never occur as desired by the Brigade FSO. By brigade planning the fire support fight throughout the zone or sector as one continuous fight, the transition can occur smoothly from deep to close to rear.

2. The brigade Fire Support Element (FSE) develops the fire support plan, and subordinate FSEs refine it.

3. Transitioning from deep to close to rear the brigade is not handing off fires to subordinate headquarters. Brigade is handing off responsibility for execution of the brigade fire support plan to subordinate headquarters.

ISSUE: Fire Support Rehearsals.

OBSERVATION: Fire support rehearsals are not demonstrating adequate understanding of the fire support plan at all levels, and are not confirming supportability of the scheme of maneuver, including the synchronization with the other BOS.

DISCUSSION:

PROBLEMS:1) Brigade fire support rehearsal are being conducted after the brigade combined arms rehearsal. 2) Brigade fire support rehearsals are too often conducted with a very unstructured format. 3) Task Force and Co/Tm FSOs are generally unprepared to rehearse to the level of detail required by the brigade FSO.
RESULTS: 1) Fire support rehearsals come too late to validate maneuver supportability. 2) Unstructured rehearsals cause wasted time as key players do not know their assigned tasks or how they fit in during the conduct of the rehearsal.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Conduct the brigade fire support rehearsal BEFORE brigade combined arms rehearsal to ensure fire support can accomplish what is expected. NOTE: See earlier discussion on Fire Support technical rehearsals.

2. Conduct Task Force and Co/Tm fire support rehearsals BEFORE the brigade fire support rehearsal so that these elements can either confirm validity of the plan, or identify potential problems.

3. Include the brigade fire support rehearsal in the brigade timeline so that key players will be there.

4. Immediately following the issuance of the brigade OPORD, have the TF FSOs and the artillery battalion S3 backbrief the brigade FSO on the fire support plan. This will ensure everyone understands the plan (and the commander's concept of fire support) before subordinate elements go back to develop their own fire support plan and then rehearse.

ISSUE: Staff Supervision of Brigade Fire Support Plan.

OBSERVATION: Brigade staffs do not closely supervise the development of the fire support plans among subordinate elements. Such supervision is necessary to ensure subordinate elements develop fire support plans that will result in the success of the brigade fire support plan.

DISCUSSION:

PROBLEMS: 1) Subordinate elements are not required by TACSOP to submit reports to brigade FSEs necessary to monitor subordinate element planning and preparation. 2) Few brigade FSEs are proactive enough to get the information from subordinate elements. For example, the only reports routinely required to be sent to the brigade FSE are task force target lists and artillery firing unit locations. Therefore, the brigade FSE does not routinely receive TF fire support annexes, execution matrices, or observer plans. 3) During the preparation phase, the brigade FSE does not routinely monitor the progress of subordinate preparations, i.e., emplacement of triggers, establishment of OPs, reconstitution of observers, maintenance of fire support assets, sub-assignment of target execution responsibilities, rehearsals, target refinement, etc. 4) No standard "required report" from subordinates about fire support assets exists.
RESULT: Without this close staff supervision from brigade, the brigade FSE has no assurance that subordinate elements are developing a fire support plan that will meet the brigade commanders requirements, or that the assets necessary to accomplish the mission are available.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Develop a required fire support asset status report from subordinates, with associated reporting times. This must be a "push" system from lower to higher since this information cannot be easily obtained through TACFIRE.

2. Require subordinate elements to submit to the brigade FSE the execution details of all assigned fire support events, i.e., exact trigger description and grid; time the trigger was emplaced; observer location; batteries that will fire the target; volume of fire; munitions; etc.

1. Use either the fire support execution matrix or the scheme of fire support worksheet as the basic tool for staff supervision. Look at the fire support events assigned to each subordinate. Subordinates should submit detailed execution plans for each event. Therefore, a blank box means the subordinate has not submitted its plan. The brigade FSE then asks the subordinate element for a status of planning/preparation.

2. As subordinate execution plans are received, the brigade FSE can immediately check to plan to see if it will accomplish the assigned mission. If so, fine. If not, then adjustments can be made with the subordinate.

3. Have subordinate elements backbrief the brigade fire support plan immediately following the issuance of the brigade OPORD.

4. Require periodic radio/MSRT backbriefs from subordinates when their plans are complete, but before they are published.

AVIATION FIRE SUPPORT: These recent observations by Aviation OCs occur routinely enough to be called a trend among rotational aviation elements.

ISSUE: Proficiency of Aviation Observers.

OBSERVATION: Aviation observers are not proficient at engaging moving targets with indirect fires.

DISCUSSION:

PROBLEMS: 1) Aviation units do not train to compute trigger points to engage a moving target at the designated intercept point. 2) Aviation observers do not understand realistic fire mission processing times. 3) Aviation observers do not understand how to use fire mission processing time, time of flight and target speed to determine the distance between the trigger point and the intercept point.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Train aviation observers to engage moving targets during observed fire training.

2. Observed fire training on engaging moving targets should include:
   1. Use of physical triggers.
   2. Fire mission processing times.
   3. Trigger distance computation.

ISSUE: Positioning of Artillery Batteries under Air Corridors.

OBSERVATION: Artillery movement plans frequently position artillery batteries where fires would pass through air routes.

DISCUSSION:

PROBLEMS: 1) Field artillery position areas (PAs) and air routes are not deconflicted. 2) Artillery rounds pass through air routes near friendly aircraft. 3) Aircraft in air corridors fly over batteries that are firing.
RESULT: These problems greatly increase the risk of fratricide, both ground to air and air to ground.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Artillery battalion S3s must plan PAs around established air routes to ensure fires will not violate air routes.

2. If PAs must be placed where fires will violate air routes, an Airspace Coordination Area (ACA) must be established.

3. Fire support officers at all levels must verify that artillery PAs and air routes are deconflicted during planning and rehearsals.

ISSUE: Aviation Clearance of Fires.

OBSERVATION: Aviation units have difficulty clearing fires into the ground maneuver zone.

DISCUSSION: Typical aviation element missions include: 1) Attack reserve forces. 2) Stop enemy penetrations. 3) Conduct screens forward of ground maneuver units. 4) Conduct screens to the flanks of ground maneuver units. These missions often require the aviation unit to request fires into the ground maneuver zone or sector. Problems in clearing fires greatly increase the likelihood of fratricide.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Ground maneuver and aviation units must develop and disseminate a plan to clear fires.

2. The plan to clear fires must be rehearsed.

3. The plan must incorporate redundant and alternate means of communication.