TOPIC: TRAINING TO STANDARD
DISCUSSION. "Because you come so infrequently, you don't want to be stuck and never get out of the starting gate. So to that extent, yes, maybe we do become time oriented. I think there is a difference though. It is one thing not to perform to standard, think you have and continue on to another event. It's quite another thing to clearly know that you haven't performed to standard, and then move on to another event."
"If [the unit leadership] doesn't have the recognition of failure, then there is nothing to be gained by redoing the mission; as far as they are concerned, they still had an opportunity to do well on that mission. There is a very fine line between when to stop and redo and when you continue to let it go to its bloody conclusion even though you can prophesy early in the fight how it is going to turn out."
"It is not the classic training in the sense that you train to standard, you do it with multiple AARs until you get the standard and you retrain as necessary. Because they are such expensive events, we just don't do that. I agree that's exactly what we do (train to time, not to standard). I would say it's not all bad because it gives you what the Army baseline is, and it gives you unbiased information about where you stand and what's regarded as the Army standard."
"Training to standard -- it gets back to one of our other responsibilities. We want units to come here and understand what the standard is with realistic conditions. Some units (fortunately not very many) don't know what really good training is supposed to look like."
"I wish there was a way though, where once a unit got to the 60- or 70-percent level, we could stop the training, and say, What have you done here? You've got casualties beyond your means to repair.' We shouldn't sit there and hang on forever until you get down to the 20-percent mark. l think that is inherently wrong."
"I just caution people, some will come to our AARs and just gasp when they see the number of casualties. Break, Break. This is training. I'm not into the political side of the world where we withdraw because we suffered 20 casualties on this engagement. No, this is a training center. We want engagements!"
"This is a hardening experience.... By the time (the unit left the CTC), basically having been NOGO on two out of four missions, that unit came back battle hardened, confident, and they jelled as a team.... It had been an assessment not only of the unit, but also of the individuals. They didn't redo any missions. Because of the AAR, they knew where they had not met the Army standard, and they improved as they went along."
"I have often heard people say,... we just have to train harder. I don't think that's the issue. I think we are out there training hard; we are beating ourselves to death training hard. l think the issue is how we train.... We don't truly do the fault isolation needed to determine what it is that's keeping us from being a Trained "T" standard."
"So, to the extent that you can transfer learning from one mission to another mission that is repeated 3 or 4 or 5 days later, then perhaps that criticism isn't valid.... There is a time and resource aspect to this scenario that you have to be sensitive to when you start considering redoing missions. The division senior leadership... has to make a judgement as to whether redoing a mission just completed is more valuable to the training of the organization than the mission they have yet to accomplish."
"We are becoming increasingly more zero-defect oriented .... That has to be a concern that our senior leadership must address. A zero-defects mentality is dangerous. It stifles the creativity and initiative of our Army -- our strong suit!"
CURRENT ASSESSMENT. Most units now do not arrive at the CTC ready for "graduate level" warfare training. A myriad of prior mission and home-station challenges complicate their sustainment training. The MTP standards imposed by the CTCs for each mission are difficult for units to meet. However, the CTC training philosophy considers this changed environment of our units.
From a quick glance, CTC missions appear to be executed within a time-driven scenario. This is deceptive; CTCs train to standard, but in a broader sense. First, the collective and/or supporting tasks not executed to standard within one mission are purposefully emphasized in follow-on missions. The critical role of the OC and CTC instrumentation system is to help "isolate the fault" in a mission, capture cause and effect, facilitate unit self-discovery of corrective action, and reassess performance in a follow-on mission. The iterative process throughout the rotation allows units to improve even through they do not repeat the same collective task in a specific mission. This type of "fault isolation" can be executed at home station for many small units; it is increasingly difficult at home station for company-team and higher.
Second, CTC AARs focus on "what right looks like." Trained OCs, skilled in the art of AAR presentation and doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, facilitate this self-assessment process. The AAR discipline clearly establishes the task and performance standard, and isolates weaknesses for units to guide their home-station training program.
Third, CTC engagements often result in excessive casualties beyond the unit's capability to replace, but units continue to execute the mission. Many perceive this as counterproductive. However, second and third order effects of these losses encourage initiative, creativity, and leadership opportunities for subordinates down to soldier-level. The CTC battlefield becomes the worst of all possible conditions. These tough conditions hone all soldiers across the entire force in the "fog and friction" of the modern battlefield.
Fourth, mission repeats during a CTC rotation are sometimes necessary to achieve a specific training objective. This is a resource intensive decision -- a unit mission scheduled later in the rotation may be deleted, and the pace of the exercise may be accelerated. The division senior leadership, in consultation with the CTC commander, makes this decision.
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS. Commander and battle staff proficiency and small unit drills are at the foundation of unit readiness. These functions must be learned at home station and honed "in the box." Proficiency "gates" must be established and met prior to unit participation in costly CTC rotations. Simulations can provide a large portion of this capability -- objective assessments to established standards and easily replicated conditions to support iterative training. This applies to the crew, squad, platoon, company and battalion, as well as battle staffs. The CTC Leader Training Program (used by both FORSCOM and USAREUR) should be the tool that clarifies the tasks, establishes the conditions, and assists senior division leaders assessing the performance standards.
Units must arrive at the CTCs ready for a "graduate-level" training experience. This demands comprehensive home-station training at least through company/team and battalion/brigade battle staff level. Otherwise, the full potential of the CTC experience will not be realized. This places a premium on units maintaining the "band of training excellence" that embeds SOPs and drills in their everyday operations.
Home-station resource constraints limit unit development of a comprehensive training environment replicating that available at the CTC. However, technology is available for units to participate in a CTC rotation as part of their home-tation training program through a STOW-type (Stimulated Theater Of War) environment. This could significantly increase the initial skill level of commanders and their battle staffs. If the STOW-type environment is expanded to include SlMNET-type capabilities for multiple units, small units (down to platoons and crews) and their leaders will likewise profit relatively inexpensively from the demands of CTC mission conditions.
CTCs must remain fully resourced -- especially in personnel. The OPS GP, OC Teams, and OPFOR require 100-percent+ manning to ensure resiliency with the expanding CTC mssion creep. A large portion of leader and small unit training occurs through O/C mentoring and teaching. Standards are prescribed; effective tactics, techniques and procedures are discussed; possible solutions are gamed. Training is based against a known standard. The train to time versus train to standard myth is minimized with an O/C force that provides consistent assessment feedback across the evaluated unit.
by LTC G. CHESLEY HARRIS, IN
Main
Table of Contents
Topic:
Are We Getting Any Better?
Topic:
Leader Development
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