TOPIC: ARE WE GETTING ANY BETTER?
There is a common perception that, because units seem to make the same mistakes year after year at the Combat Training Centers, the Army has not improved despite high quality soldiers, vast technological improvements in equipment and an extensive school system. If true, it will be impossible to reap the benefits of Force XXI.
DISCUSSION. "The statement that we keep making the same mistakes over and over again, there is some validity to that if you don't look below the surface.... If you try to make a very terse comment bulletized about what the mistake was it may sound very similar, but I will tell you that we are trying to do things now that we wouldn't even have thought about attempting to do five, six, eight or ten years ago.... If you look at the years in which the Training Centers have been in existence and compare the mistakes that units are making now with the ones that units were making in 1985, you would see a dramatic improvement.... We have gotten past in many cases, past first-order mistakes and into the more complicated issues of our business."
"I just caution anyone who tries to draw empirical data and conclusions from comparing one...rotation to another. We haven't had two in a row... that have had the same identical conditions on the battlefield.... And, I think the goal posts are getting moved on the unit. l think the field is getting bigger. The O/Cs are getting better at the critical eye and their ability to dissect across the BOS. It's a more sophisticated battlefield."
"One of the endearing qualities of the CTCs is if you don't make the same mistake today that you made yesterday you are probably going to make a different one. That's the whole nature of learning out here."
"I just caution people, some will come to our AARs and just gasp when they see the number of casualties. Break, break, this is training...we want engagements. MILES isn't perfect but it's the best we have...we are not there at l00 percent. Like I said with the..., I saw the casualties they suffered on an operation at [a CTC].... I [also] watched them in how they used their weapons in the streets of Kismayo and other places. They were pretty awesome to be quite honest at squad and platoon levels in particular."
"Because training time is so precious, we're seeing the units just come here on the run and they are not getting even to come to the same amount of time to prepare as they did in the past. I'd rather have them use the time to prepare for this training experience, the Super Bowl, at the CTC."
"We always throw the uncertain nature of our battlefield in...we always have a few things up our sleeves. That's just the way it is. We want to take them all the way to the edge. We see improvement in several areas as units share information."
"A lot of things that are not giving them [rotational units] the opportunity to prepare up where we would like them to. It's a more sophisticated battlefield. You combine that with OPTEMPO that has them going in a zillion different directions without adequate training time to prepare for the rotation. You end up with the training rotation being a concentrated green cycle/gold cycle training period."
"But I think we need to remember that it's not a level playing field at any of our CTCs. You have blue forces who at the most are coming through on a rotation once a year, and you have an OPFOR that's fighting 300 battles or more a year. We are, in fact, probably training against a tougher enemy than you may find on any battlefield."
"We have an obligation, I think, at all the CTCs to keep ratchetting up the standard or perhaps the conditions, so that it isn't easy to win."
"If you think about it, there is nobody in the world who would give us anything like the kind of fight that the world class OPFOR would give us."
"Part of the reason why you are seeing the same mistakes is this is a whole new crew from the last time this unit came through. Captains have 12-18 months as company commanders, but they are not getting any time then on the tail end on battalion and brigade staffs as battle staff captains. So, what happens is you end up with a guy straight out of school going into the battle staff. Generally, you have immature staffs. One brigade commander, who has come through twice in the last year and a half. When he came back the second time, it was only his sergeant major in the brigade headquarters who had come through a year and a half before."
"Until we get finished with downsizing and we take care of all the competing priorities and we are able to settle back into where you can get captains to stay on board for three years and majors to stay for three years, your NCOs aren't being pulled out after two and a half years, you can't stabilize the force."
"I think some of the reasons why our blue forces made the same mistakes over and over again is they are dealing with a heck of lot more than just maintaining that battle focus. The operational tempo is fast and furious....I think another factor that contributes to it is unit personnel turbulence."
"Very clearly, our Army personnel system is the greatest enemy of readiness. The tremendously rapid turnover and failure to allow people to concentrate."
"We are not developing the intuitive expertise that we need. What we are going to do is come into a very complex environment here in 10-15 years with folks who don't have the grounding, the basic technical grounding, to do that. It's probably the repetitive assignments that build that intuition...guys are going to die because they didn't have...the most knowledgeable leadership that they could have had."
CURRENT ASSESSMENT. At first glance, the same mistakes are being made as they were several years ago. However, as stated by the CTC leaders, the level of sophistication of the problem has changed. Tactics, techniques, and procedures, not even thought of a few years ago, are now regularly used, such as the execution matrix. Equipment improvements, like the M1A2, SINCGARS, MLRS, and Apache, create new parameters, which, in turn, cause new lessons even though the categories of lessons are the same. The level of expectation is greater, the environment and OPFOR tougher.
But in recent years, there has been a dramatic decline in the level of proficiency a unit brings to the CTCs to plan, synchronize, and execute on the battlefield. This causes relearning lessons while "in the box." Years ago, units froze personnel moves and conducted extensive training exercises months before deployment to a CTC. This is no longer the trend in most units. The major reasons for this unpreparedness are:
- a personnel system that does not allow leaders enough time to build the technical and tactical knowledge base or the maturity and intuition needed for battle command.
- an ever-increasing OPTEMPO that saps training time and resources from units.
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS. "Immature staffs," will soon produce underdeveloped commanders. The captains and majors who did not have ample time to serve in the critical positions will someday be senior leaders. Their lack of experience, even if they had a CTC rotation, will soon be apparent. Force XXI commanders must be well grounded in tactics to take full advantage of Information Age organization and technical advances. This trend of accelerated personnel turbulence, with little time to learn battle command, will likely continue until the Army stabilizes the force and the operational pace decreases. There are several areas that the Army must change to ensure leaders will have the experience to meet future challenges:
- CTCs must continue to increase the difficulty of rotations. Elevating standards and the expertise of the OPFOR ensures the Army will never become complacent toward its warfighting ability.
- Challenging scenarios should continue to change to meet evolving threats. We can't get caught fighting the last war. This includes how live fire exercises are conducted.
- Strengthen the links between the CTCs, TRADOC schools, and doctrine writers. The Information Age gives the Army the tools to rapidly spread tactics, techniques and procedures as well as lessons learned, straight from the CTC battlefield, through the branch schools, directly into doctrine.
- Increase use of STOW and other simulators prior to a rotation to bring units to the CTCs at a higher state of training.
- Change
personnel policies to give adequate time for future leaders to develop warfighting
skills.
- Allow more officers to go from their advanced course to a nominative assignment. This gives them three more years for self study, learning leadership and developing maturity prior to returning to a troop unit for their command. Hold ROTC and recruiting battalion commanders, Reserve Component advisors and others in the chain of command of junior officers responsible for specific warfighting and staff skills needed to perform when they return to a troop unit.
- Lengthen advanced courses to allow teaching the skills now provided in CAS3. Eliminate CAS3. Although an excellent course, CAS3 provides those skills too late in an officer's career, pulls him out of an important job for three months, and disrupts the unit.
- By returning an officer back to troops after his nominative assignment and not requiring him to attend CAS3, the officer should have a more stabilized tour, allowing him more time to learn warfighting skills and more CTC experience. He would then go to CGSC and return to a troop unit, giving him a chance to use his recent experience in important field grade positions.
- Current assignment policies must change. Captains need at least 18 months of command and extended time in staff positions. Majors should serve a minimum of 30-36 months in battalion and/or brigade S3 and XO positions.
- Finally, the CTCs must be kept as the centerpiece of combat training. Although costly in terms of personnel and funding, the benefits keep our Army in a league of its own in warfighting skills, doctrine development, and battle command preparation.
Main
Table of Contents
Section
II : Table of Contents
Topic:
Training to Standard
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