COMMUNICATIONS
INTRODUCTION: Redundant communications systems are essential for continuous communications during civil disturbance operations in large urban areas. This was realized quickly by units that were unable to maintain continuous communications with higher headquarters and subordinate units. Units of Joint Task Force-Los Angeles (JTF-LA) deployed and used many types of communications equipment with varying degrees of success. Initial problems were quickly solved through training, or by borrowing or procuring needed equipment.
JTF-LA was formed from a divisional headquarters. It experienced some growing pains from using some communications equipment normally used only by echelons above corps. Now that divisions are expected to effectively stand up JTF or ARFOR headquarters, they must quickly overcome the learning curve and provide well-trained operators from within their own staffs. TOPIC: Communications Equipment.
DISCUSSION: During Operation GARDEN PLOT, the JTF deployed and used several types of communications equipment with varying degrees of success. A large number of tactical and handheld radios were used in support of civil disturbance operations. Following the initial crowd control operations, platoon and smaller size units may deploy throughout the operational area to provide security at widely separated locations. Tactical VHF communications in an urban area can be intermittent and unreliable. The use of various handheld systems, such as the Motorola MX300, can cause interoperability problems.
The following communications equipment was used with good results:
LESSON(S): Develop specialized and redundant communications packages to use in urban environments for identified units ready to deploy. Consideration should be given to deploying and using tactical equipment, cellular phones and appropriate independent power sources (portable generators).
TOPIC: Cellular Phones and Facsimile Machines.
DISCUSSION: During the alert phases, coordination with units for logistical support was hindered by a lack of facsimile machines and cellular phone equipment. Most units have only one telephone line. This must support all initial requirements, such as personnel notification, passing verbal warning orders, and coordinating vendor support, convoys, and airlift. Units lack facsimile machines and cannot receive hard-copy convoy movement clearances. FRAGOs and other such documents could not be distributed. Telephone contact was nearly impossible because of single use lines that were performing the tasks described above. There was direct or timely contact with ground movement personnel at military airfields or key logistical staff enroute.
LESSON(S):
TOPIC: Data Transmission to Higher Headquarters.
DISCUSSION: Goldwing became the primary means of data transmission between the J2 element at Los Alamitos and Fort Ord for Operation GARDEN PLOT, even though the system is sensitive and requires significant antenna adjustment. Goldwing was used during the intelligence stage of deployment, until secure facsimile communications were established. A significant amount of well-trained operators is required to establish and maintain Goldwing communications. Once communications were established between Fort Ord and Los Alamitos, the system continued to be effective and was used as a backup and redundant capability.
LESSON(S): Ensure that all division G2 personnel deploying and forming a JTF are well trained in the setup, operation, and maintenance of the Goldwing system.
TOPIC: Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).
DISCUSSION: The JTF did not have a portable WWMCCS computer or enough trained operators. The FORSCOM and I Corps command posts required the JTF to establish a WWMCCS address for receiving electronic messages. Since the division does not have a WWMCCS, the J6 had to coordinate with local units for WWMCCS support. Units cannot always expect this type of support for all deployments and should be ready to provide their own assets.
LESSON(S): Anticipate using WWMCCS during worldwide deployments and train operators to use it.
TOPIC: Telecommunications Center Availability.
DISCUSSION: The lack of a conveniently located telecommunications center complicated efforts to send official messages. The JTF was headquartered at the Armed Forces Reserve Center, Los Alamitos, which does not have a telecommunications center. Consequently, the J1 had to fax official messages to the Long Beach Naval Station where they were retyped for transmission over the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). Another option was to have a courier deliver messages to the Long Beach telecommunications center. Both methods were slow and inefficient.
LESSON(S):
TOPIC: Tactical Satellite Access.
DISCUSSION: Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) access and frequencies changed often during the operation. JTF-LA used TACSAT radios for its command NET. Unfortunately, over a 10-day period, the TACSAT frequency and the satellite itself changed five times, for reasons beyond the control of the JTF commander. Re-establishing communications with every station after changes was difficult. In one case, the JTF was given a satellite that FORSCOM headquarters could not access. The Ground Mobile Force Satellite Command is responsible for assigning TACSAT frequencies.
LESSON(S): Ensure high-level command NETs have consistent satellite access and frequencies.
Intelligence
Transportation
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
