INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION: While the term "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)" is used in Operations Other Than War, Los Angeles was not considered a battlefield. The term "IPB" is used in this document to emphasize the important staff process of threat analysis.
Operational IPB prior to deployment and the aggressive gathering of intelligence information during the operation are the keys to success. The importance of IPB increases in a power projection army. The deployment of units into potentially hostile urban environments and their subsequent employment against ambiguous threats make IPB planning critical. The primary difference between IPB for conventional war and for Operations Other Than War is focus - the degree of detail - and the enormous demand for demographic analysis required to support the commander's decision process. An accurate IPB provides focus.
Once formed, JTF-LA aggressively used its intelligence assets to increase and disseminate their intelligence information on the potential threat (40,000 to 50,000 permanent gang members, not including other criminal elements). Describing a threat in Operations Other Than War offers its own set of challenges in recognizing unique differences in types of threat, strategy, modus operandi and tactics.
Initially, the threat in Los Angeles appeared formidable, especially in light of stories of their brutal employment of "sophisticated" assault rifles and rumors of gangs cooperating and planning together. In time, intelligence analysts were able to determine the actual threat that was affected by curfews, stepped-up police patrols, and the deployment of military forces on the street. Hostile actions on military forces were limited to verbal threats, gestures, aggressive driving and, occasionally, brandishment of a weapon or firing it into the air.
TOPIC: Intelligence Analysts.
DISCUSSION: A full complement of intelligence analysts was required to support the ACP. During Operation GARDEN PLOT, there was a pressing need for all of the intelligence analysts available in the ACP. Law enforcement agencies normally have adequate data collection capabilities, but lack (or seldom perform) quality intelligence analysis. As a result, during Operation GARDEN PLOT, significant amounts of data needed to be passed from the JTF J2 element to Fort Ord, CA. Additionally, intelligence analysts are required to integrate, operate, and maintain deployed intelligence data and communications systems. Intelligence analysts are needed to conduct pattern analysis to power the target nomination process.
Local law enforcement agencies have access to human intelligence (HUMINT), often unavailable to the military. The intelligence staff of the law enforcement agencies have unparalleled expertise in civil disturbances and gang behavior, while military analysts are in the best position to apply this experience to civil-military operations.
LESSON(S): Deploy the ACP's full complement of intelligence analysts to support civil disturbance operations. Assign intelligence analysts to department-level liaison teams to assist in analysis and dissemination of intelligence information.
TOPIC: Area Experts.
DISCUSSION: Many soldiers are from urban areas and possess considerable "area expertise" that can be used to develop intelligence on the area of operations. Soldiers and marines were identified who were local residents of Los Angeles. Many possessed considerable knowledge of the communities and gangs in the area of operations. Others had reserve police affiliations, which proved invaluable for liaison with local police departments.
Military units inherently possess many "area experts" for major urban areas. Units identified these soldiers and gleaned from them intelligence data on the area of operations. They also liaisoned with local agencies. Many soldiers from urban areas speak Spanish or other languages spoken in local ethnic enclaves within cities. This knowledge can also prove valuable in the conduct of domestic urban operations. Civilian area experts were invaluable to the operation. The Los Angeles Sheriff's Gang Enforcement Unit provided the most comprehensive and thorough intelligence data on the gang threat. Civilian agencies often provided extensive data in many different areas required by a JTF.
LESSON(S): Screen units' records to identify soldiers from potential "hot-spot" urban areas and who possess foreign language skills.
TOPIC: Counterintelligence (CI) Capability.
DISCUSSION: Civil disturbance missions require an especially robust CI capability. Because of this, it is essential that the division be augmented with strategic CI personnel during civil disturbance operations. AR 381-10 places constraints on a division's CI capabilities. Paragraph A3, AR 381-10, identifies the exceptions pertaining to civil disturbances. The peculiarities of a civil disturbance mission require augmentation by tactical CI personnel to serve in a liaison role.
LESSON(S): Request tactical and strategic CI augmentation from corps and the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) when planning for civil disturbance operations.
TOPIC: Intelligence Sources.
DISCUSSION: Intelligence sources from urban areas can include a wide variety of law enforcement agencies. Obtaining vital information on the Los Angeles area and the potential threat required extensive coordination with civil law enforcement agencies at various levels of government. For example, military forces established an intelligence exchange with suburban police departments, local city command posts, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Command Center, the LAPD Emergency Operation Center, the city command center, the Sheriff's office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) office, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) office. Some military personnel had affiliation with local police departments and were used as contacts to obtain additional intelligence data. Civilian agencies were very cooperative once personal working relationships had been established.
LESSON(S):
TOPIC: Determining Criminal Patterns.
DISCUSSION: Conducting threat pattern analysis is difficult when military forces are deployed for civil disturbance operations. When potential threat activities and patterns can be determined, the resulting intelligence can be predictive. However, during civil disturbances, gangs and other criminal elements may change their normal patterns of activity when military forces are present, making pattern analysis extremely difficult.
LESSON(S): Continue conducting threat pattern analysis during civil disturbance operations; consider the effects that a military presence has on gang members and other criminals.
TOPIC: Intelligence Reports.
DISCUSSION: Intelligence reports came in a variety of formats during the operation. They varied from standard military intelligence summaries and reports to a wide variety of law enforcement reports that contained intelligence, but were not identified as intelligence reports.
Intelligence reporting within the JTF included a daily intelligence summary (modified in format to meet urban civil disturbance requirements) and intelligence spot reports. These reports proved workable and informative. The JTF disseminated them in a timely manner using facsimile machines. The reports included police logs, operations reports, and large amounts of faxed paperwork.
Standard intelligence reports work well and require no corrections. Intelligence personnel, however, must seek out all possible data to examine and gather intelligence information. Civil disturbances are very similar to operations in low intensity conflicts.
LESSON(S):
TOPIC: Photo Support.
DISCUSSION: Very little intelligence photo support was used during the operation. Ground and aerial photographs of the urban area would have enhanced the commander's intelligence picture. If taken well ahead of time, photos of key facilities, intersections, staging areas and potential trouble spots from both air and ground level could have been stored and later disseminated to all levels of command for planning purposes. Helicopters are good platforms for photography and reconnaissance missions, and can aid commanders and staffs in making accurate damage assessments of the area of unrest.
LESSON(S): Use photo assets readily available to give commanders updated views of areas of operation prior to unit deployment. This will assist them and their staffs in the planning process.
TOPIC: Intelligence Communications.
DISCUSSION: The intelligence information flow during the civil disturbance operation involved different communications channels than normally used by tactical forces. During the operation, units used a variety of government-owned, off-the-shelf purchased, and personally owned equipment to effectively conduct intelligence exchanges with local law enforcement agencies. Cellular phones, police scanners and faxsimile machines were invaluable to the operation.
LESSON(S): Anticipate the need to procure additional communications equipment to support intelligence operations during civil disturbances.
TOPIC: Collection, Use and Retention of Information on U.S. Citizens.
DISCUSSION: At the outset of any major civil disturbance operation in the U.S., there is considerable reluctance to use intelligence personnel for liaison activities with law enforcement agencies and provide force protection information to military commanders. Use of G2 or S2 personnel to obtain force protection information may be permissible. However, given the restrictions of AR 381-10 and DOD Directive 5200.27 on use of military intelligence assets to collect information on U.S. citizens, it may be more appropriate for military police and/or G3/S3 personnel to perform the function.
Any information collected must not be retained any longer than necessary to determine disposition and must be destroyed under provisions of AR 380-13. Improprieties in this area can result in prison terms by those involved. Using intelligence personnel adds additional considerations under AR 310-10 and may place the command and DOD in an unfavorable light should the local media discover this fact.
LESSON(S): The use of intelligence personnel to support civil disturbance operations is highly sensitive and requires early and clear guidance by higher headquarters and DOD. Using LOs, who are not usually associated with intelligence gathering, prevents the question of AR 381-10 requirements from ever surfacing.
Logistics
Communications
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