STANDING
UP
JOINT
TASK FORCE LOS ANGELES (JTF-LA)
INTRODUCTION: Despite the uniqueness of civil disturbance operations, the formation of JTF-LA went smoothly with few problems. The 7th Infantry Division's Assault Command Post (ACP), as the JTF headquarters, remained flexible in its command and control structure throughout the operation. The JTF required additional personnel for G3 operations, military police, and communications sections. Liaison officers were added to coordinate with Marine and National Guard forces and civilian law enforcement agencies.
TOPIC: The Proper Force Structure.
DISCUSSION: The civil disturbance in Los Angeles required a light and responsive force. The JTF commander required disciplined and well-led soldiers to control unruly mobs and to restore order. Deploying units dispensed with bringing artillery, air defense and armor weapons systems. They also left behind machine guns, mortars and grenade launchers.
The forces traveled light with good reason. A military force bristling with heavy weaponry and combat equipment will antagonize a citizenry unaccustomed to military involvement in civil affairs. Heavy weapons invite violations in Rules of Engagement (ROE) that could inflame public sentiment.
LESSON(S): Task-organize forces according to the factors of METT-T. Be sensitive to the traditional American disquiet of standing armies and martial law. Leave behind weapons and equipment unsuited to the task of restoring calm to a U.S. city and use personnel associated with those weapons and equipment in a liaison role.
TOPIC: Augmentation of the JTF.
DISCUSSION: The division ACP was significantly augmented to be capable of controlling civil disturbance operations as a JTF headquarters. In particular, the G3 operations, military police, and communications sections all required more personnel. Additionally, liaison officers were included for coordination with Marine and National Guard units and civilian law enforcement agencies.
The ACP is a nondoctrinal headquarters whose structure varies from division to division. With representatives from each Battlefield Operating System (BOS), it serves as the lead command and control element during division deployments. The composition of the ACP is adequate for operations where the division is not a JTF headquarters. When it is, the ACP must be augmented in key functional areas. G3 operations require additional personnel to monitor joint operations. The communications section was not robust enough to operate and maintain its equipment and to ensure interoperability with subordinate elements. A relatively large number of liaison officers were deployed with the ACP to provide timely coordination with other military units and civilian agencies.
LESSON(S): Keep the organization of divisional ACPs flexible, to allow for rapid augmentation should the mission require the establishment of a JTF headquarters.
TOPIC: JTF Resource Management Expert.
DISCUSSION: JTF-LA was not staffed with a resource management expert. With the federalization of the National Guard and the participation of the active Army and Marine Corps units, funding issues became more complex than usual. The JTF had to provide fund cites, develop reimbursement and cost-accounting procedures, and prepare cost and field budget estimates. Lacking a resource manager in the joint headquarters, the JTF commander had to rely on his staff at Fort Ord, CA, to telephonically relay resource management information and guidance. If the JTF had been staffed with a resource manager, the J4 section could have better concentrated on logistical operations without the distraction of resource management issues.
LESSON(S): Recruit the services of a resource manager from any branch of service to handle funding issues during joint operations.
TOPIC: JTF Contracting Officer.
DISCUSSION: The JTF headquarters did not have a contracting officer. With the deployment of Army and Marine Corps forces into the area of operation, and the rapid standup of the JTF headquarters, there was great need for a contracting officer on the staff. Contracting officers are essential in providing the supplies, services, and equipment that cannot be brought from home station. They also serve as subject matter experts in resolving issues, concerns and requests for contracting information. Without this capability, the JTF headquarters cannot sufficiently oversee contracting activities and ensure regulatory compliance. Contracting is a complex field, requiring highly specialized trained officers. General logisticians normally do not have this expertise.
LESSON(S): Establish a staff section in the JTF headquarters that includes a contracting officer, ordering officers, a Class A agent with funds and an administration section. Deploy this element with the advance party and place the personnel under the control of the JTF Chief of Staff.
TOPIC: Liaison Officers (LOs) in the JTF.
DISCUSSION: Active and Reserve Component LO integration was outstanding and greatly improved interoperability. LO teams during the operations were composed of both Active and Reserve Component personnel. This provided continuity as active forces combined with the already deployed reserve forces. Reserve Component officers have expertise in civil disturbance operations and are sensitive to the political concerns of civil authorities. Active Component officers contribute operational expertise and knowledge of joint operations. Civil disturbance operations are clearly a team effort. Although liaison was extensive, initial efforts were hampered by poor placement of the individuals and their inability to handle both operational and intelligence matters simultaneously. Had the teams been sent in pairs, one an operations liaison and the other an intelligence liaison, their effectiveness would have been significantly increased.
LESSON(S): Employ Active and Reserve Component LO teams during all civil disturbance operations. Deploy liaison teams in pairs of two, operations and intelligence at each echelon. Develop a training plan to rehearse civil disturbance operations involving both Active and Reserve Component personnel.
TOPIC: The Lack of Civil Military Operations.
DISCUSSION: JTF-LA did not employ a civil military operations staff section. It was not known when the ACP deployed that it would form into a JTF headquarters. It was determined during the formation that there was little need for a civil military section at the JTF level. Functions normally performed by the G5 were either irrelevant or were already being performed by earlier deployed National Guard forces. The JTF operation did not last long enough for any civil military mission to surface.
The entire JTF-LA effort was a large-scale civil military operation, and tactical staffs accomplished their missions directly with the U.S. civil authorities without a language barrier or other need for a civil military staff at JTF level.
LESSON(S): Consider the G5 role during disaster assistance or civil disturbance operations.
TOPIC: Reporting Procedures in the JTF.
DISCUSSION: Reporting procedures in the JTF took time to develop because of the divergence of report formats used by each of the major commands that made up the JTF. The reporting formats and procedures used by each of the divisional units are determined by the mission and higher headquarter requirements. When the major commands combined to form JTF-LA, new reporting procedures were required as outlined in the DOD Civil Disturbance plan. The JTF staff had difficulty obtaining timely information from subordinate units early in the operation. However, once the new reporting procedures were disseminated in a JTF fragmentary order (FRAGO), there were no further problems.
The ad hoc nature of JTF organizations complicates the task of developing a report's standing operating procedure (SOP). Each participating unit brings its own reporting procedures and formats. A JTF headquarters must determine the information required, the time of submission, and the format to be used for each report. This guidance should be disseminated as quickly as possible upon the establishment of a JTF.
LESSON(S):
One
of the first tasks of the JTF battle staff is to disseminate guidance immediately
on reporting procedures. Guidance can be in the form of a FRAGO, a memorandum,
or guidelines. Reporting procedures are available in the Joint User Handbook.
Increased emphasis on standard message text is essential.
Civil
Disturbance Doctrine
Mobilization
and Demobilization of National Guard Forces
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