CIVIL
DISTURBANCE DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION: The fact that most things went right, despite the speed at which the situation developed, validated the Department of Defense (DOD) Civil Disturbance Plan (Operation GARDEN PLOT). However, refinements in doctrine must be made to account for the nature of joint civil disturbance operations in "Operations Other Than War."
Emerging doctrine must pay particular attention to unique threats and closer relationships the military must have with civilian law enforcement agencies. It must detail the type of support necessary to deal with today's complex civil disturbance dilemmas, as well as provide guidance for the Army to execute selective mobilization, which could include calling the National Guard into federal service.
TOPIC: The Changing Nature of Civil Disturbance.
DISCUSSION: Army doctrine deals with civil disturbances in the context of "Mass Acts of Civil Disobedience." Doctrine covers a wide spectrum of training responses, to situations that include snipers, bombings and hostage situations, and focuses significant attention on crowd control techniques.
In contrast, soldiers committed to civil disturbance operations in Los Angeles, predominantly conducted point and area security missions. In this respect, the Los Angeles operation is on the periphery of what Army civil disturbance doctrine addresses. National Guard and active Army units conducted no crowd control measures in the doctrinal sense. The large-scale rioting, looting and burning was over before the first National Guard Military Police (MP) units arrived on the scene. They indicated that there was no confrontational involvement with anyone, other than the common criminal element or gang members.
The disturbance in Los Angeles spread rapidly from one section of the city to others, in an apparently simultaneous outbreak of violence. This incident departs from the Watts riots of the 1960s, which were generally confined to one area. Another difference was the nature of the mission. Rather than confronting one group determined to create chaos, JTF-LA encountered a series of armed elements determined to settle scores and protect interests. The elements ranged from store owners to gang members. With this knowledge of the tactical situation, JTF-LA took measures to reduce its vulnerability to automatic weapons. Crowd control formations were deemed unacceptable by the JTF commander based on METT-T.
The impact of this unique operation on Army civil disturbance training and doctrine is uncertain. Given the nature of the criminal element in our nation's large cities, it is reasonable to expect a propensity for greater violence and more focused resistance from organized criminal elements during future civil disturbances. There is little basis for a large-scale change in doctrine because of this one experience. Civilian police forces continue to emphasize crowd control training and credit the use of large, well-organized, tactical units with limiting the spread of violence and quickly controlling civil disturbances in Miami in 1989 and Washington D.C.'s Mount Pleasant area in l99l.
LESSON(S): Ensure that civil disturbance doctrine remains flexible, taking into account changes in the urban environment. Focus on the changing threat. Coordinate regularly with, and develop close working relationships with, local law enforcement agencies.
Overview
Standing
Up JTF-LA
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