OVERVIEW
The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) sent teams of subject matter experts (SMEs) to collect observations and lessons on disaster assistance operations. The teams spent 13 days in Florida, 7 in Louisiana and 9 in Hawaii. The teams made over 275 observations, interviewed over 200 leaders and soldiers, and collected all documents pertaining to operational plans and disaster assistance and recovery execution.
A highlight of the hurricane disaster response efforts was the proactive posture taken by commands for immediate response. The "next day" assessment by a number of federal professionals offered local authorities a wide range of alternatives and capabilities to meet their needs. This action allowed the commands to rapidly transition to relief operations.
The doctrinal basis for disaster assistance operations by a Joint Task Force (JTF) can be improved. Joint Publication 500.2, Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures, must be expanded to include the role of the JTF in disaster assistance operations and address the unique civil-military nature of disaster assistance.
Experience with Hurricanes Iniki, Andrew, and Hugo, and a historical perspective suggest that a formalized joint military-civil doctrine approach will greatly enhance the military's ability to execute disaster assistance operations. Developing doctrine should include manning levels for the various agencies, appropriate administrative staffing and equipment, and suggested task organization structures for the JTF (engineer, logistics, security, communications, medical and liaison). The doctrine should also include references to policy publications and technical manuals related to the specific types of disaster. Army and joint interoperability with civil, state, and federal agencies needs refinement so the Army can be a knowledgeable participant in disaster assistance. Specific guidance is needed in deployment operations, assessment teams, task organization, and required materiel and staff manning levels.
Commanders' involvement and liaison officers (LOs) were key to successful interagency coordination and operations. Military and federal liaison agencies may be needed at the local level of the civilian government. Federal, state, and local agencies were not familiar with each others' capabilities and limitations.
Current campaign planning procedures are transferable to disaster assistance operations, but the criteria for mission success and completion must be defined, articulated, and disseminated whenever possible. The lack of an agreed-upon "end state" can result in entrenchment and lead to overdependence on military forces by local government. Both citizens and soldiers must know when emergency military operations will cease and local civil authorities assume complete control of the assistance operations. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) must publish an order directing execution of the Federal Response Plan (FRP). This would in turn provide a starting point for FEMA, in coordination with the Department of Defense (DOD) Director of Military Support (DOMS), to announce an overall mission statement, provide parameters of success, and specify "end state" required.
Knowledge
of the capabilities and organizational structure of federal agencies involved
in disaster assistance must be improved. To enhance capabilities, military
units should consider interoperability training with other federal, state,
and local agencies.
Table
of Contents
Foreword
Interoperability
NEWSLETTER
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