SECTION
III
QUICK
LESSON TURNAROUND:
HOW
THE SYSTEM WORKS FOR YOU!
Beside the honing of basic warfighting skills, today's Army must also prepare to execute contingency operations in virtually any part of the globe.
The new world "order" has left a world where order is too often an exception, rather than the rule. When and where volatile, chaotic situations prevail, particularly in areas of the world that directly impact on the strategic political and economic interests of the United States, the Army must be prepared to serve as an agent of national policy.
Most likely, when the national command authority dictates the projection of ground forces as part of an overall military instrument on national policy, the Army can expect to operate in conjunction with the other services (joint operation), as well as with the armies of allied nations (combined operations). Involvement in joint and combined operations expands he scope of the Army's requirements in preparing for combat.
Additionally, operations other than war potentially constitute a significant slice of the Army's effort in the future. The Army's participation in quelling the civil riots in Los Angeles, CA, April, 1992, and providing civilian disaster relief following the devastating hurricanes ANDREW and INIKI in the southeast and Hawaii, respectively, set the stage for subsequent U.S. international involvement.
Operation RESTORE HOPE, a humanitarian assistance mission executed in Somalia, provided another major example of how the Army, as part of a joint or combined effort, helped execute the type of mission that has literally arisen faster than out training base's ability to field the necessary doctrinal publications.
With conditions ripe in numerous places in the world for the infusion of combat soldiers and units executing noncombat roles to alleviate undesirable conditions of suffering, slaughter and starvation, the U.S. Army must stand at the forefront of national efforts to exercise the worldwide responsibilities expected of the United States.
As the Army's training base moves rapidly to adjust doctrine to reflect changing roles and missions, it is incumbent on the field army to vigorously prepare itself for the unexpected. Thus, you must now adjust your mission-essential task list (METL) to include your unit's potential execution of any of a variety of operations other than war, in addition to your traditional combat task list. Now, more than ever, your margin for error, either as a commander or as a soldier or leader, is smaller than ever.
Personnel resources, as well as training dollars, will be increasingly tight. Yet, the number and type of missions will increase. How then can CALL help you and your unit structure yourself for success when you are called upon to execute?
Some recent examples should give you a good perspective on how CALL's efforts in exercising the lessons learned system paid both immediate and long-term dividends for participants in both combat and humanitarian assistance operations.
When Sadaam Hussein's Iraqi army invaded neighboring Kuwait in August, 1990, the then Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vouno asked CALL to produce a newsletter about lessons from desert warfighting and maintenance geared toward the individual soldier to be deployed in that Southwest Asian theater.
CALL personnel tapped into our database and rapidly pulled together lessons to meet the CSA's guidance and published them in Newsletter No. 90-7, Winning in the Desert, August 1990. Ultimately over 400,000 copies of this newsletter made their way in theater for both soldiers and Marines.
Soon afterward, CALL published a second Operation DESERT STORM Newsletter No. 90-8, Winning in the Desert II, September, 1990, geared toward maneuver commanders, which provided tactics, techniques and procedures proven successful in the desert environment. In addition, the newsletter included information on the Iraqi army and ow it operated in both offensive and defensive scenarios.
Both newsletters generated positive comments from soldiers in theater, and more importantly, soldiers provided CALL feedback on how they USED the newsletters to help train themselves and their units.
Finally, CALL produced Newsletter No. 90-11, Getting to the Desert, December 1990, a literal example of quick lesson turnaround. Based upon a collection effort at the initial deployment sights, this newsletter captured lessons about deployment and mobilization clearly relevant to the next units then scheduled for deployment.
Here was a case where CALL disseminated lessons immediately and helped units avoid repeating the mistake made by the first deploying elements.
The rapid translation of observations from the deployment sites into issues, or problems, and then into recommended "lessons" about how to solve the problems proved extremely beneficial in raising the learning curve of the next units that deployed to Southwest Asia.
The experience of CALL exercising the lessons learned system in a fast-forward mode based on operational necessity served as a precursor for the in-theater lesson turnaround that became a hallmark of CALL's efforts in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia.
First, CALL analysts published Newsletter No. 92-6, Operations other than War, Volume I, Humanitarian Assistance, December 1992, outlining lessons from the Army's participation in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT following the cessation of hostilities in Operation DESERT STORM.
Then, CALL formed a Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT) to deploy with the 10th Mountain Division elements sent to Somalia as part of the joint force for humanitarian assistance.
For Army elements within the Somalian area of operations, the CALL team in theater ensured cross-talk took place at ll levels while executing the operation.
As the units waited for the deployment go-ahead, CALL analysts produced a special edition Newsletter No. 93-1, Somalia, January 1993. Providing extracts from the draft version of FM 100-5, Operations, about operations other than war, the newsletter also provided background information about Somalia's political situation and "do's and don'ts" about customs and habits.
CALL got this newsletter into soldiers' hands very early into the deployment process. Some got it prior to deployment, while others received it soon after their debarkation. The newsletter clearly proved worthwhile, as evidenced by numerous requests for even more copies.
The United States Marine Corps elements in Somalia requested and received copies as well, in another example of successfully sharing lessons in the joint arena.
Concurrently the CALL observers utilized the latest satellite technology and communications links to pass the lessons directly back the CALL at Fort Leavenworth, while also sharing observations with elements potentially in the deployment sequence.
Capitalizing on this rapid transmission of observations, CALL analysts completed the Operation RESTORE HOPE after-action report and lessons learned briefings within a matter of days following the redeployment of the CAAT. Working with the subject matter experts who collected in theater, CALL personnel synthesized the observations and issues into a useful format for dissemination to the Army at large.
The after-action report not only contains observations and issues, but also solid recommendations for solving issues. These recommendations, like those in other after-action reports CALL produces, specify actions necessary across the Total Army spectrum to turn issues into solutions.
In this context, the after-action report becomes a document that drives the systemic changes necessary to rapidly fix what needs to be fixed. The implementation of such recommendations serves to institutionalize success, so that subsequent executions of similar missions start out even more likely to succeed.
Therefore, if you find yourself on the firing line to execute a mission, either direct combat or an operation other than war, you can feel confident that a successful framework for your operation exists because of the previous exercise of the Lessons Learned System.
Table
of Contents
Section
II - The Lessons Learned System and How it Functions
Section
IV - When a Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT) Shows Up on Your Doorstep
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