SECTION
II
THE
LESSONS LEARNED SYSTEM
AND
HOW IT FUNCTIONS
The system employed by CALL is simple. It consists of four basic components: COLLECT, PROCESS, ANALYZE, and DISSEMINATE. Exercising each of these components in a systematic process results in lessons about the smart way of doing business, i.e., what works, and what doesn't.
What has utility for you is not just someone spelling out what's wrong, but who did the mission right, and how did they do it? What can you learn from what they did so that your unit will not make the same mistakes as other units?
The real bottom line for the success of CALL and the entire lessons learned system is whether CALL can help soldiers and units perform their mission right the first time, regardless of the mission.
How then are lessons learned?
At this point it really is important to understand the distinction between a "lesson" and a "lesson learned."
Educators will tell you that you don't have a lesson learned until you have changed behavior. Thus, for CALL, the first step is to observe the Army's warfighting to determine what behavior needs to be changed.
Ideally the observation of "warfighting" form which we will learn lessons will occur at one of the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), where mistakes don't result in casualties.
Changes to behavior can be getting us either to stop doing something we've been doing, doing something different than we've done before, or doing something new that we haven't done before.
When the Army conducts any mission, its composite activities constitute behavior. That behavior, however, can be broken down into missions, into tasks and subtasks, both individual and collective - just like our training doctrine spells out.
The concept of changing the Army's behavior sounds formidable. However, viewed in the context of attacking the smaller, relevant parts, behavioral changes can be made to happen.
Let's look at a behavior - rehearsal - that is now routinely conducted, while only a few years ago such behavior was virtually nonexistent. This is a clear example of how CALL helped get the lesson out to the field with the resulting desired changed behavior.
Seasoned trainers and warfighters knew intuitively that if an individual or a unit rehearses an activity, then the likelihood of success of that activity greatly increases. At the NTC, in fact, the observers/controllers (OCs) would tell anyone who would listen that "It's not practice that makes perfect, but perfect practice makes perfect." The OCs knew that for a rehearsal to really be meaningful, the rehearsal had to be conducted to a high standard.
CALL, however, went beyond the intuitive to COLLECT specific observations about rehearsals to find out just how often units rehearsed, what standard the rehearsals met, and the effect of rehearsals on subsequent mission execution. By capturing data on this issue, CALL could determine if the Army had a problem with rehearsals, and, if so, what could be done to solve it.
Without repeating data listed in CALL Newsletter 91-1, Rehearsals, Apr 91, suffice it to say CALL showed that the Army, as evidenced at the NTC for one year, did a very poor job of rehearsing for combat operations. However, the same study also showed that units that conducted good rehearsals were much more successful when they executed missions that units that did not rehearse at all, or did poor rehearsals.
We obtained this data by direct observation of unit performance at the NTC captured by OCs for CALL and recorded on a carefully developed form. After each rotation, the OCs returned the forms to CALL, where the raw data was PROCESSED into a computer database for retrieval by subject matter experts (SMEs) for ANALYSIS.
CALL analysts, however, are not "Ivory Tower" number crunchers. While recognizing and utilizing survey results for statistical analysis, CALL routinely sends analysts to the CTCs for their own direct observation, and to ferret out of the OCs the best mission-execution techniques from the personnel who witness the Army's full performance spectrum. In the case of rehearsals, the OCs proved a rich source of observations about specific techniques that worked well at brigade, battalion and company or team levels.
CALL collected enough observations about the Army's behavior to prove that significant rehearsal deficiencies existed. CALL also collected observations about successful rehearsal techniques that could be passed on to the rest of the Army. So the system of COLLECT, PROCESS, ANALYZE distilled useful information that now needed to be DISSEMINATED.
In addition to CALL's own newsletter, CALL worked directly with SMEs from various TRADOC schools and centers to help fill an identified doctrinal deficiency. Nowhere did any rehearsal doctrine exist. However, the writing of FM71-123, Tactics and techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces, Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company Team, filled the doctrinal void by including successful rehearsal techniques and procedures from company through brigade level.
The dissemination of these lessons, however, is only part of the battle. The lessons must influence the Army's behavior (how it conducts a mission or task) for the entire process to be complete.
The success of getting the lessons to the field showed up when the Army executed Operation JUST CAUSE. The extent of rehearsals conducted and the contribution of those rehearsals to mission success are a matter of proud record for that operation. The Army further demonstrated its changed behavior regarding rehearsals during Operation DESERT STORM, where combat operation rehearsals became a way of life, again demonstrably contributing to the ultimate success of the operation.
Table
of Contents
Section
I - The Background of CALL
Section
III - Quick Lesson Turnaround: How the System Works for You!
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
