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Vignette: OPERATION DESERT STORM:
ACTIONS IN A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

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At 0500 on 27 Feb 1991, a balanced mechanized task force in box formation moved to contact on the right flank of a brigade wedge formation moving east. Although very dark, there was no obscuration of the battlefield and all companies maintained accurate position in the brigade wedge by GPS headings along east-west gridlines. The brigade had long since outrun the operational graphics and maintained control primarily by formation. Subsequent investigation confirmed all unit positions were in accordance with the plan. Contact through the night had been heavy, but became sporadic as dawn approached.

The right flank company in the center task force trailed the lead tank company in the southern task force, maintaining a distance of 2-3 kilometers. In the confusion caused by enemy-dismounted contact within the brigade, this company acquired friendly vehicles in the southern task force's lead tank company. Amidst reports that enemy vehicles were engaging them (this may have been RAG fire impacting vehicles in the southern TF sector), gunners engaged the friendly vehicles to their south. All the vehicles involved in the exchange were moving.

Brigade Formation Moving East

In one engagement, the near tank company commander's tank was hit in the turret by an M1A1 sabot round. The tank shut down immediately, and the commander ordered evacuation. Himself wounded, he began trying to extract the mortally wounded gunner from the top of the turret, when a second round impacted the tank hull. Thrown to the ground, the commander now noticed flame erupting from the driver's hatch and turret hatched. By this time the lightly wounded loader and driver were off the tank, and with in seconds a third round impacted the tank hull. This precluded further approach of the tank. As an immediate result of this one engagement, the gunner was killed and the company commander with remaining crew was out of the fight. The tank itself burned for one hour and 45 minutes before exploding ammunition completely destroyed it. in simultaneous engagements, four other tanks in the task force were hit for a total of two vehicles destroyed, one KIA, and seven WIA.

This fratricide incident significantly impaired the combat power and effectiveness of both units involved. Despite redundant and adequate maneuver control measures, direct fire control an discipline lapsed. Although instructions allowed no engagements beyond 2000 meters, it appears some shots violated this guidance. Contributing factors were visibility (50m with night vision goggles), turret orientation, thermal identification, fatigue and RAG explosions mistaken for main gun signatures. Keep this incident in mind when reviewing the reduction measures in Chapter 3.

Table of Contents
Chapter 2: Fratricide - Cause and Effect
Chapter 3: Fratricide Reduction Measures and Lessons Learned