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Chapter 3

FRATRICIDE REDUCTION MEASURES
AND LESSONS LEARNED

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This chapter provides tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) broken out by the subject areas of doctrine,, training, organization, material, leader and soldier development (DTOMLS). Like any component of field or tactical SOPs, units must tailor and practice these skills constantly during collective training opportunities. This will hone leader abilities at all levels to accurately predict and compensate for possible fratricide risk. Ultimately the only effective techniques will be those soldiers understand, innovate and refine themselves, practice frequently, and integrate into unit SOPs.

TRADOC has developed a Fratricide Action Plan and the Combined Arms Command Training (CAC-T) at Fort Leavenworth is the overall proponent. this action plan coordinates and directs service school's efforts to resolve recognized shortfalls in DTOMLS products relating to prevention of fratricide on the battlefield. The proponents will review and update this action plan every six months until changes in doctrine, TTP and course POIs are accomplished. Many initiatives mentioned in this chapter stem from this action plan.

SECTION 1: DOCTRINE AND TTP

DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS CONTROL MEASURES

Control measures tied to terrain features and battlefield events are as crucial to fratricide prevention as they are to synchronization. Physically mark TRPs, use ground-burning illumination, WP, beacons, colored smoke, strobes (w/IR filters), and identifiable Engagement Areas (EAs) to orient maneuver and fire (remember these techniques can be compromised over time). Another technique is to use weapons control status similar to ADA for direct fires. Weapons HOLD, TIGHT, or FREE would indicate the necessity of an external verification of the fire command or call for fire. A variant is status RED - Do Not Shoot or status GREEN - Shoot at Will. Depending on the level issuing the fire command, the next higher or adjacent echelon could be the verifying source. Use detailed Rules of Engagement (ROE) to establish engagement criteria for various conditions soldiers might face. For instance, tanks only engage dismounts when receiving effective ATGM or rocket fire and do not engage beyond 2000m. Other ROE might deal with when to load weapons and what the requirements are to clear direct fires by weapons type.

Rules of Engagement: Directives issued competent military authority that specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. --FM 101-5-1

"The motto for direct fires in our brigade was - THINK, VERIFY, ENGAGE." --Operation Desert Storm Bde S3

Use control measures that provide spacial separation between adjacent units. An example is to improvise a variation of a Free Fire Area (FFA) instead of the more common Restricted Fire Line (RFL) for converging forces in am enemy target of opportunity. In the example, the FFA becomes an engagement area for both elements, while reducing the chances of enemy or adjacent forces becoming intermingled. Priority and control of supporting fires would be situational, depending on existing boundaries, the main effort and best vantage point. Instituting a 1-km buffer zone along boundaries of adjacent major commands and Allied forces was successful Operation DESERT STORM technique coordinated through liaison officers. verification before engaging became a requirement in this zone. However, this technique would likely be infeasible in the defense or in restricted terrain.

Free Fire Area instead of just RFL or Boundary

MOUT CONSIDERATIONS

Urban terrain provides high potential for fratricide because of the likelihood of close quarters (high weapons density), recognition problems, and unfamiliar secondary effects of weapons. GLINT tape effectiveness was severely reduced in build-up areas during Operation JUST CAUSE due to ambient light. However, there were examples of effective use at ranges under 100m. Soldiers also employed several ineffective and dangerous techniques to breach various fences, walls, and barred doors with grenades, rifle fire, and even anti-tank weapons. Schedule opportunities to practice live-fire demolition and breaching techniques in realistic situations with actual munitions. Fire support also presented problems. Direct fire support, even from just a block away, is very difficult to control. In another Operation Just CAUSE example, mechanized forces providing fire support were told by brigade a light force had cleared a tall hotel building only to the second floor. In actual fact, it had cleared to the tenth floor and was fighting in a counter-sniper engagement. Seeing this fire and apparently some weapons protruding, the mechanized forces began to suppress. This drew return fire from the friendly light force for some seconds before coming under control. All units must have routine techniques for conspicuously marking cleared rooms, floors, and buildings as they progress through an urban area. These procedures must be automatic, practiced, and discernable at night so that soldiers understand them even with limited preparation time. also, during MOUT operations, develop a numbering system for all buildings and landmarks to simplify coordination of maneuver and supporting fires.

CLEARANCE OF INDIRECT FIRES

A recent white paper on this subject from the U.S. Army Field Artillery School states: "The Fire Support Element (FSE) at the maneuver headquarters initiating the request for fires is responsible for obtaining internal clearance (clearance from subordinate units) and, as necessary, clearance from adjacent units in whose areas the targets lie." The white paper further details the lack of TTP available to the FSCOORD and maneuver commander. Although doctrinally acceptable within unit boundaries, passive control (silence is consent) greatly increases the potential for fratricide, due to the assumption of optimal communications and battle tracking. CTC experience shows that there is no substitute for clearing fires through positive control and "eyes-on-target" observation at the lowest possible level.

During Operation DESERT STORM, the standard procedure was absolute positive control of all fires, with the result of only one friendly fire incident. However, due to the range s involved, direct observation was unlikely and responsiveness of fires suffered significantly in Southwest Asia. Fort Sill observes " To be effective, procedures for achieving positive control must become a routine part of the planning, coordination, and rehearsal process for every tactical operation or mission." Many units have trouble integrating fore support effectively in rehearsals to assign control responsibilities, and this appeared recently as an unfavorable fire support trend at the JRTC. To achieve positive control, without sacrificing responsiveness, units should incorporate these lessons in training:

• Establish and practice routine positive controls (permissive controls to those who can see; restrictive measures protect those who are exposed).
• Establish simplified procedures for external (adjacent and higher) clearance of fires.
• Incorporate fire support members in liaison teams for detailed flank coordination at each level (even across higher boundaries, e.g., brigade HQ across a corps boundary).
• Establish procedures for manning rear CP FSEs and positive control in rear areas.
• Anticipate special controls needed for mixed voice-digital environments.

RECONNAISSANCE PRIORITIES

Properly executed reconnaissance can greatly reduce fratricide risk. Normally, priority intelligence requirements (PIR) relate to confining the enemy on the objective. In reducing the fratricide risk, consider PIR relating to the feasibility of the routes, navigation and maneuver plan. Identifying hazards and confirming fire control measures will help the commander continue to update his tactical estimate and reduce operational risk. Units during Operation DESERT STORM sometimes moved reconnaissance patrols to the flanks upon contact to reduce both the vulnerability of the reconnaissance patrol and the main body. Allocating some reconnaissance capability to a flank vantage point for observation and reporting can enhance synchronization and command and control.

REHEARSALS

Data from NTC rotations demonstrates that failure to plan, prepare and rehearse has a negative impact upon execution of the fire plan. A leader's preparation and supervision before battle is a critical element in reducing fratricide. Rehearsals at all levels are key to understanding the concept of operation, verifying specific responsibilities, timing, and backupprocedures to help synchronize unit operations. For additional reading, see CALL Newsletter 91-1, Rehearsals, Apr 91.

NTC TF Direct Fire Rehearsal Trends

48.5% of units attempted rehearsals

54.5% of these were rated "effective"

12.2% established engagement priorities

3.4% executed established priorities

12.7% moved wpns based on rehearsals

79.7% underused rehearsal opportunities

Benefits of a good rehearsal:

• Well-understood fire control measures are established.
• Maneuver element locations and actions are well known.
• Information down to every soldier.
• Feedback to leaders results in refinements.
• Fratricide prevention measures are determined.
• Problems are identified and corrected.
• Increased soldier confidence and aggressiveness.
• Sense of partnership or ownership in the plan.

CONVENTIONAL AND SCATTERABLE MINEFIELD REPORTING

Experience at CMTC shows that fratricide from friendly minefields is a major problem due to lack of coordination, failure to disseminate obstacle plan, and failure to accurately report obstacle locations back up the chain. Operation DESSERT STORM was the first time scatterable mines were used by U.S. forces. Many units did not follow the doctrine for reporting, recording and marking of minefields. This was not only a joint problem between the Army and Air Force, but also an internal Army problem. FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, is under revision and will address scatterable minefield reporting, recording, marking and reorient emphasis from static barriers to dynamic (scatterable) barrier operations. Solutions include training with scatterable minefields in CPXs and FTXs; including minefield locations in your liaison officer (LO) checklists; and, development of a "flash" traffic format or quick report similar to NBC reports. Note that any use of FASCAM (and possibly some use of dud-producing submunitions) requires appropriate reporting. Although the Air Force delivered the GATOR missions mentioned in the Engineer School observation below "well beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)", this became a major problem when maneuver caused to FSCL to update rapidly to the north and east.

...Army planners released use of scatterable mines to component services without specifying the appropriate control measures as per doctrine. CENTCOM Air Force (CENTAF) flew over 35 GATOR missions (the exact number is not known), without reporting, or recording missions...During the ground offensive, units found themselves maneuvering in GATOR minefields, without any knowledge of their existence." ---U.S. Army Engineer School Operation DESERT STORM Observation

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)

During Operation DESERT DTORM, the combined dud rate of multiple engagements with improved conventional munitions (APICM, DPICM, CBUs) cause obstacles and safety concerns for the maneuver commander. Some maneuver commanders hesitated to employ the munitions, especially if the unit might have to move through the area later. Soldiers were killed and wounded while handling unexploded submunitions. Some thought the rounds were "empty" because they appeared empty. Commanders can create Restricted Fire Areas (RFAs) where they anticipate subsequent maneuver to control this problem. Dud-producing missions would then require coordination with the maneuver headquarters. Depending upon the type of forces and fires involved, these missions would be restricted or carefully recorded. Our soldiers and junior leaders must be educated with both the safety and tactical knowledge that will prevent handling unexploded ordnance. Finally, as with ammunition and pyrotechnics, leaders must not tolerate breaches of basic discipline in dealing with UXOs.

DOCTRINAL INITIATIVES

Currently, no single Army publication fully addresses fratricide reduction. Two field manuals (FM 100-5 and FM 25-101) briefly mention the need to determine risk assessments and other "How To Fight" FM address fratricide with limited emphasis. Some Missions Training Plans (MTPs) address friendly fire in task and subtask standards. The forthcoming revision of FM 101-5 will address several related issues (liaison, fratricide reduction, and rehearsals) in greater detail. New training manuals should address, in high-risk missions, these collective task measures which help reduce fratricide. The collective task matrix for high-risk missions should include individual and vehicle recognition tasks.

Table of Contents
Vignette: Operation DESERT STORM: Actions in a Movement to Contact
Chapter 3, Part 2