PREFACE
This newsletter documents mobilization lessons of the RC for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. It focuses on experiences gained during the mobilization to develop the lessons, and is based upon objective analysis of multiple observations gathered by CALL. CALL uses a methodology that asks four basic questions: What went well?, What must be done to sustain this performance?, What did not go as well as expected?, and What must be improved or changed to meet the standard? Although these lessons will not have a direct effect on this operation, they should be useful in the event of a future mobilization. As President Bush so aptly stated on 7 December 1991, on the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, "It is for the future that we must apply the lessons of the past."
CALL subsidized its organic collection assets with many soldier-collectors from throughout the Total Force. A special note of thanks is extended to all who assisted in this effort, especially, Colonel Bridges and Lieutenant Colonel Vaughan, U.S. Army Forces Command; Colonel Hollenbeck and Major Boone, National Guard Bureau; and Lieutenant Colonels Fritz and Shaw, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, for their input in reviewing and commenting on the final draft of this newsletter.
Although many soldiers helped in this endeavor, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge several remarkable soldiers whose support of me and this project went far beyond the call of duty and friendship. First, I acknowledge Colonel Robert Grasso, Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, for his leadership and guidance in Saudi Arabia, and especially for his expert insight into the RT-12 Program of the Individual Ready Reserve. Second, I thank Sergeant First Class Michael Noone, Operations NCO for CALL, for his outstanding advice to me on the history and operation of CALL. Next, I extend my heartfelt thanks and appreciation to Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Cox, CALL, who became my mentor and friend in Saudi Arabia and at Fort Leavenworth. Finally, I thank Colonel Huey B. "Bruce" Scott, the Director of CALL, for his guidance, comments, and feedback during my tour of duty at CALL.
The
mobilization of the RC, albeit a great achievement, was not without challenges.
Among the myriad of topics and issues that arose was the first-time use of
the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C. 673b, the Presidential authority to order
members of the Selected Reserve to active duty other than during war or national
emergency. The Army leadership should conduct a careful analysis of the lessons
of the mobilization of the RC for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM
before recommending any realignment in the force structure. It should take
notice of the words of our Commander in Chief:
| "The United States has never maintained active forces in peacetime adequate for all possible contingencies we could face in war. We have, instead, relied on Reserve forces.... Reserve forces are generally less expensive to maintain than their active counterparts. So, as we adjust force structures, retaining Reserve units is one alternative for reducing costs, while still hedging against uncertainties." (George Bush, President of the United States, 6 March 1991.) |
The following chapters summarize the predominant successes and problem areas of both the premobilization and mobilization phases of the call-up. Many of these problem areas have already been corrected or are being staffed to solve the problems. Although everything did not go according to plans, the soldiers of the U.S. Army, both RC and AC, were able to accomplish the mission and return home as winners.
Fort
Leavenworth, KS
February
1992
Table
of Contents
Foreword
Historical
Overview
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NEWSLETTER
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