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Sound FSB TOC operations have not developed as a positive trend. FSB TOC must b capable of tracking the brigade's battle by monitoring the brigade operations and intelligence (O& net. This is not done on a regular basis. Often the S3 is unaware of how the battle is progressing. He must know whether the brigade is successfully defending its sector or if the OPFOR has punched through and headed for the BSA. Too often the BSA does not receive copies of the brigade operations order and, therefore, is unaware of the operations forward.

Operational intelligence that could affect the security of the BSA is seldom passed from the brigade S2 to the FSB TOC. Reports of enemy activity in the brigade's rear area or in rear areas of adjacent units are seldom provided. The operational interface between the brigade T0C and the FSB TOC is poor. The BSA is an operational headquarters subordinate to the brigade. It is critical that the interface between the brigade and the BSA be just as viable as between the brigade and subordinate task forces. This allows better planning and execution to support the brigade commander's operational concept.

TECHNIQUE(S):

• Practice battletracking during brigade FTXs.
  
• Brigade OPORDs are critical to support the battle. Ensure the FSB 53 gets a copy.
  
• Practice FSB TOC to BDE S2 coordination during Brigade CPXs.
  
• Improve brigade TOC/FSB TOC interface during brigade CPX/FTXs.
  
• Use a brigade cell to practice BSA/brigade coordination during battalion-level training.
  
• Require BDE ALOC to collocate with FSB TOC

The planning and execution of the BSA defense and general security have shown positive trends. Support Battalion S3s generally have a good concept of how to plan a BSA defense. Integration of pre-planned artillery fires, wire barriers, tank ditches, air defense assets and minefields are normally drawn together into a comprehensive plan that can help the BSA defeat a Level II threat (a threat beyond base/base cluster defense capability).

Artillery fires are normally planned by the S3, often in conjunction with the artillery battalion service battery commander if he is located in the BSA. These fires are then forwarded to the brigade fire support officer for approval and consolidation into the brigade fire support plan. The brigade FSO then relays the mission to a battery in position to support the BSA. Another means is to relay the fire request through the service battery commander who contacts the firing battery directly. Of the two methods, the latter seems to get quicker results.

Obstacles and minefields are planned by the FSB S3, in conjunction with the brigade engineer. Execution of these obstacle plans is good overall; however, the BSA does not enjoy a very high priority within the brigade for engineer assets. Availability of Class IV material is normally not a problem, so concertina obstacles and minefields can be installed by BSA units. Any other barriers which require engineers, such as tank ditches, are often planned but seldom executed as these assets are committed to the task forces and are not available for the BSA.

Stingers and Chaparrals normally comprise the air defense capability for the BSA and the brigade rear area. The FSB S3 normally coordinates ADA defensive Fires for the BSA with the Stinger section leader or the Chaparral platoon leader. Locations of the AD systems and the air corridors covered are posted on the S3 sector sketch. Monitoring of the Division Early Warning net or the Chaparral platoon's net is normally not accomplished. The support battalion and air defenders lack the communications capability. For the most part, LP/OPs are established and maintained with communications to either the BSA TOC or to unit Cps. The reaction force plan for the BSA is normally very good, and the units understand the importance of rehearsals for employing these forces. Guards at the entrances to the BSA are normally two-man positions and challenge entrance to the BSA.

TECHNIQUE(S):

• Train an FSB staff officer to be an expert on emplacement of obstacle material. He can train others.
  
• The BSA has very few armor-defeating weapons systems organic to it. Normally a few Vipers and one or two Dragons comprise the anti armor capability of the BSA. One concept still not completely understood is the use of nonmission-capable tanks and TOWs that are in the task force field trains for repairs. The FSB S3 is encouraged to dig in these anti armor systems around the perimeter and accomplish maintenance in position.
  
• Train soldiers on how to Call For Fire.

All support battalions rotating through the CTCs experience difficulty with the issue of trash collection and trash disposal. There is no clear doctrinal solution. A major problem seems to be in fixing responsibility for this mission, then resourcing that unit to accomplish it. Trash on the battlefield gives off a tremendous signature to unit locations. Field trash disposal techniques are ineffective. While ideas exist to solve this problem in the future (mobile incinerators), units need more definitive guidance for the present. An added burden on units is the introduction of T-rations for field messing. This ration greatly increases the trash burden on the unit.

TECHNIQUE(S):
A mobile trash collection point has been used successfully. An empty Stake and Platform (S& trailer is spotted in a central location in the BSA. All trash is deposited on that trailer. S& trailers come daily from the DSA loaded with cargo. The DSA drops off the trailer with cargo and back hauls the trash-filled trailer back to the DSA. Cargo is then off-loaded from the DSA trailer, and the empty trailer is used for trash until the next day's pickup.

FSBs are typically unprepared to perform their assigned tasks in the area of mortuary affairs. There is little emphasis on mortuary affairs during home-station training, and units are comfortable thinking this skill will automatically be plused up in wartime. The one Mortuary Affairs specialist authorized in the supply company of the FSB usually works in the battalion headquarters in a job unrelated to mortuary affairs. While the skills required for unit personnel to perform this mission are minimal, it does require some local training within the standards and guidelines of FM 10-63, Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theaters of Operations.

Units experience difficulty handling contaminated remarks. FM 10-63 states that it is a unit's responsibility to decontaminate remains prior to evacuating them to the mortuary affairs point.

TECHNIQUE(S): Incorporate training on handling contaminated remains into home-station training.

Automation remains a problem area on the battlefield. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, time and distance factors and aging technology combined to severely stress the Army Logistics System. The biggest challenges were filling the overwhelming volume of requisitions submitted by units in Southwest Asia. Lack of asset visibility caused many requisitions to be passed to CONUS when the needed items were already positioned in Saudi Arabia. The vast distances between units hampered communications by computer. Soldiers had to travel hundreds of miles to transport floppy disks from one echelon to the next. Operation DESERT STORM quickly demonstrated the limitations of our current logistical automation systems. The Tactical Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) is the Army's premier hardware for tactical logistics automation at brigade level and below. TACCS is configured to run software to support the Army's key sustaining functions: manning, arming, fueling, fixing, and transporting. The Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS), Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS), Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS), and the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS) are the software engines designed to provide increased logistical capability on the battlefield.

Many units do not routinely train with their logistical automation systems when they deploy to the field. Some units deploying to the National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) bring their TACCSs, but never take them out of their containers and use them. Units are afraid that these mission critical systems will encounter technical difficulties or have maintenance problems; consequently, they revert to the manual system or use "notional" CSS exercise play. If units had routinely trained with their logistical automation systems prior to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the disastrous shortcomings that occurred would have been identified and possibly remedied.

One recurring observation from Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was the lack of existing doctrine on how to set up, operate and maintain tactical automation systems. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) are an organization's day-to-day "doctrine". Develop a tactical automation SOP based on field experience, and update it after each field training event.

Send any proposed fixes to validated automation problems to Commander, Combined Arms Command, ATTN: ATZL-CTL, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027. Validated fixes will be published in one of our newsletters for Armywide dissemination.

Table of Contents
Forward Support Battalion, Part 1
Supply Company