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* Construction of fighting positions and reaction to hostile attacks remain weak areas.
* Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) operations need improvement. Units are not able to react quickly to NBC attacks.
* FSB Tactical Operations Center (TOC) do not adequately monitor the battle and respond to changing situations.
* Logisticians do not defend themselves well. BSAs are overrun at the CTCs at an alarming rate.
* Units have difficulty with trash collection and disposal. Uncontrolled trash on the battlefield betrays BSA locations and hampers security.
* Mortuary Affairs needs increased emphasis. Units do not adequately practice Mortuary Affairs operations.
* Automation was a major problem during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Inadequate hardware and software crippled CSS operations.

Several survivability areas have established trends. The use of camouflage and cover and concealment has shown improvements. Units are making better use of available terrain to hide vehicles, tents and equipment. Camouflage net techniques have shown improvements as well. CSS units are becoming better at blending in with the surrounding terrain and using the camouflage net support systems to break up the outline of vehicles and equipment. Construction of fighting positions and bunkers is still a weak area. The average soldier in a CSS unit does not know how to construct a safe and sturdy fighting position. Survivability positions seldom progress beyond the hasty fighting position stage. Even after 4 - 5 days in a BSA location, the positions are nothing more than shallow graves with a small parapet of dirt or rocks piled in front.

The individual soldier still does not have a good understanding of how to react to hostile artillery and air attack. Too often the reaction is to leave the tents, seek high ground and stand up to watch the show. It is arguable that in a real situation, soldiers will disperse and seek cover. This may be true, but when positions with overhead cover have not been built to standard, there is no cover to seek. If soldiers are not aware that they should disperse and at least fall to a prone position, they will become casualties to the first few rounds. Unfortunately, many times logistical soldiers are at a loss on what to do when under attack. We don't build fighting positions, execute dispersal plans, or fight back well. We are normally too busy executing our logistical mission to think about the possibility of fighting. This has to change. It all comes down to training and discipline. There is no substitute for gut-wrenching, mind- numbing training that literally programs soldiers to take key actions automatically. We do not conduct this type of training well.

TECHNIQUE(S):
Battle drills are an excellent technique to make reaction to air threat or ground attack second nature. A battle drill is a series of steps taken without direction, anytime a combat-related event occurs. A battle drill for actions on enemy air attack might consist of:

• Sounding an alarm.
  
• Seeking cover.
  
• Occupying fighting positions and bunkers.
  
• Returning fire.
  

These actions occur whether or not a leader is present.

Survivability is a commander's responsibility, but NCOs execute. Review FM 5-103, Survivability Standards, for tips on constructing a proper fighting position. Practice this lifesaving skill at every opportunity.
Train intensively on:

• Cover and concealment.
  
• Construction of fighting positions.
  
• Reaction to enemy attack.
  
• Proficiency/qualification with crew-served weapons.
  
• Fields of fire.
  
• Perimeter defense.
  
• Entry control points.

Operations in an NBC environment are consistently weak. The BSA is routinely targeted and fired upon with persistent chemical agents at CTCs. Unit reactions to this threat have been fixed. Some react and cope with the situation better than others, but none do very well. Sometimes only a small area of the BSA is targeted for the persistent nerve agent. Initially the BSA goes to MOPP level IV when attacked. From there operations begin to deteriorate. Units are not able to quickly determine the limits of the contamination and then cordon off the area to establish control of entrances and exits. Contaminated areas are established by observer/controllers (O/Cs). O/Cs spray vehicles, equipment and soldiers with antifreeze which provides positive reading on M8 and M-9 chemical detection paper. Soldiers in targeted areas are provided an M-256 chemical agent detection training kit which shows a positive reading. All other areas of the BSA are furnished M-256 training kits that provide an all-clear reading. Vehicles and personnel spread the agent because contaminated areas are not quickly identified and controlled.

Confusion also results when all but one unit will report an all clear of chemical agents. Command and control of the situation by the BSA TOC needs to improve. Units have to be coached to request decontamination support from the brigade, and very often are coached as to what contamination can take place. Plans for how NBC casualties will be handled and treated in the BSA are rarely available. Collection points are not designated for personnel decontamination. As a result, casualties are transported from the contaminated area to the medical company in contaminated vehicles. This further spreads the contamination and the medical company is overwhelmed with NBC casualties.

CSS units for the most part do not conduct NBC training at home station. When they do, it consists of going about their regular jobs in MOPP level IV for a predetermined period of time. SOPs are not developed that cover how the unit will react to a persistent chemical agent attack. It is well known that threat doctrine calls for possible use of persistent and nonpersistent agents throughout the Division Main Battle Area, yet our training to conduct sustained operations in this environment is woefully inadequate.

TECHNIQUE(S):

• Use TEWTs during home-station training to hone staff skills. Practice NBC reporting. Concentrate on controlling operations in a NBC environment.
  
• Practice collective NBC tasks during FTXs. Develop battle drills for small unit actions taken upon an NBC attack. Develop SOPs that prescribe operations in a NBC environment.
  
• Use antifreeze to train soldiers on detection chemical agents. Plan how NBC casualties will be handled and treated in the medical company. Include these procedures in TACSOPs.
  
• Require BDE S4 and FSB TOC to monitor availability of water for decontamination.

Table of Contents
Historical Example
Forward Support Battalion (FSB), Part 2